EVALUATION OF POLISH DEVELOPMENT AID PROVIDED THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND TO SUPPORT REFORMS IN UKRAINE AND SELECTED EDUCATION INITIATIVES IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES IN 2012-2016

Final Evaluation

Report

COMPONENT II

Warsaw 2017

Evaluation of Polish Development Aid Provided through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to Support Reforms in Ukraine and Selected Education Initiatives in Eastern Partnership Countries in 2012-2016

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAWI - Computer Assisted Web Interview

CBRN - Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats

DDC – The MFA's Department of Development Cooperation

EP – the Eastern Partnership

GIZ – German Development Aid Agency (in German: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)

GPS – Global Positioning System

ICCSS - International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security

IDI - Individual In-Depth Interview

MDGs - Millennium Development Goals

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MSFS – Main School of Fire Service

OECD DAC - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PDP- Polish Development Policy

PL-BY-UA – Poland – Belarus - Ukraine

RP – Republic of Poland

SDGs- Sustainable Development Goals

VC SFS - Voivodeship Command of State Fire Service

VFS– Volunteer Fire Service

VPC – Voivodeship Police Command

ABSTRACT

Public security projects are highly effective in terms of achieving 'hard' outcomes and outputs. In the case of some projects, the indicators have even been exceeded. The effectiveness of 'soft' outcomes is more difficult to evaluate because they are measured sporadically.

Projects implemented under Component II are distinguished by high sustainability, which is determined by the application of the knowledge and skills acquired during specialist trainings by Ukrainian services in their work and also by the project structure, which combines education initiatives with 'hard' elements, i.e. infrastructural ones (e.g. modernisation and renovation of premises) and the hand-over of equipment. However, deferred project effects are not monitored.

The efficiency of projects should be evaluated as high considering the staffing and funding limitations as well as the projects' time-frames. The solutions offered to Ukraine under Polish development aid based on Polish transformation experiences are easily adaptable to Ukrainian conditions. Savings of resources increase project efficiency resulting in lower costs of generating project outcomes, on the one hand, and in additional promotion effects, on the other.

The synergy of public security projects in Ukraine affects their implementation area, the themes of undertaken initiatives, their implementers and recipients. Most projects are implemented in western Ukraine and are based on continued cooperation, including cooperation within other funds and programmes, yet they do not overlap. No complementarity between Polish projects and other donors' initiatives was observed neither were there any overlapping of activities in the area of security. In some circumstances, poor coordination of projects with initiatives taken by other grant donors posed a risk of overlapping activities and of concurrently developing different model solutions to solve one problem where only one solution could ultimately be chosen. Poland is different from other donors in that it provides systematic, comprehensive, and specialist support for Ukraine's rescue services and this support represents an "aid niche" while fire-fighting projects play the role of a "Polish export product."

Polish institutions' great capacity is founded on the arrangements and agreements made with the Ukrainian party, their project implementation experience, expert staff, as well as their working relations and long-term cooperation. Polish partners are regarded as reliable, efficient and trustworthy. Their capacity is also determined by their cultural affinity and familiarity with Ukrainian realities to which they adapt easily, and their concentration on practical aspects. An important role in the implementation of the Programme is played by the MFA/MIAA staff and substantive capacities. The difficult political situation in Ukraine, corruption and staff turnover, delays in fund transfers, and protracted public procurement procedures are the main barriers to project implementation.

Poland should continue to support the process of changing the organisation of national rescue and fire-fighting system in Ukraine because of the opportunities provided by the decentralisation reform (systemic changes) and the chance to offer reliable templates to Ukraine which are consistent with European standards. It is advisable to maintain the present concentration, complementarity and specialist support of the rescue services and to continue initiatives in western Ukraine (for the sake of security of the Polish and external EU border). It is also worthwhile – when bigger funds are available – to include other recipients, new themes, as well as Ukraine's eastern regions in the projects, while maintaining a defined specialisation. Coordinated cooperation with different donors can increase the synergy of our aid by additionally funding infrastructural projects, and the Polish party could participate in developing systemic solutions of legislative and organisational character or in conducting trainings.

In order to increase the sustainability and impact of the assumed outcomes, it is suggested that cascade trainings, educational initiatives addressed concurrently to managerial and operational staff, as well as publications (e.g. handbooks, good practices) should be used more often in trainings. It is advisable to continue trainings on operation, service and maintenance of equipment. Also, the Ukrainian party should be under an obligation to plan how to use the project impacts and ensure that this process is monitored.

Moreover, it is recommended to select competition winners and to communicate information about allocated funds earlier than it is done now. It is also recommended to promote measuring 'soft' outcomes in the form of pre/post-tests and also to spend the saved resources on popularising the outcomes obtained. Furthermore, the present way of applying for funding and reporting should be continued to avoid excessive bureaucracy. The preliminary project selection done by the MIAA and implementation of module projects should also be continued.

I.   OUTLINE OF THE EVALUATION CONCEPT

The report, *Evaluation of Polish Development Aid Provided through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to Support Reforms in Ukraine and Selected Educational Initiatives in the EaP countries in 2012-2016* was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further referred to as MFA) to evaluate Polish development aid (further referred to as PDA). **IDEA of Development Foundation** was contracted to carry out the study following an open call for tenders. The research was conducted between 25 July and 19 December 2017.

There are three components of the research study. This part of the report evaluates Component II, the development and outcomes of selected initiatives carried out in Ukraine as part of Polish development cooperation and financed through the MFA in 2012-2016 out of the state budget's target reserve fund and MFA funds allocated to supporting initiatives addressed to Ukrainian fire, police and rescue services.

I.1. STRUCTURING WORKSHOP

A structuring workshop was held at the MFA on 17 August 2017, following the preparation of a draft methodology report. Its purpose was to reconstruct the logic of the 2012-2016 Polish Development Aid Programme separately for components I and II of the research study. The workshop results are presented in chapter II.1 of the report.

I.2. DESK RESEARCH

Desk research was conducted at stage II of the research report and consisted of an analysis of documents, data and media materials, and project outputs.

Documents, project applications and project implementation reports were analysed in detail. As a result, record cards of all projects were made and analysed qualitatively and quantitatively based on evaluation questions. The record cards were also useful in identifying the projects which were analysed in detail at the stage of field studies.

The analysed documents included national and international planning documents of strategic and operational nature. Data needed for benchmarking were analysed concurrently, as described in part I.5 of this chapter.

The analysis of data and media materials covered all the ongoing projects. Internet domains in Poland and abroad concerning all the ongoing projects, specifically the domains of project promoters and their partners were evaluated. Media content was also analysed using the available data and information from social networking sites to assess how they impacted the image of Polish aid.

Project outputs were evaluated by conducting desk research (of applications and reports), analysing Internet domains in Poland and abroad and doing field studies (interviews conducted in Poland and abroad).

I.3. FIELD STUDIES

Field studies were conducted both in Poland and Ukraine. In the course of preparing the field studies (research stage III) based on the projects' record cards, a list of projects and lists of replacement projects and proposals of case studies were drawn up upon prior agreement with the Contracting Authority. During the field studies, 5 projects (and 2 projects as a reserve) were selected for an in-depth analysis under Component II of the evaluation study. The final list of projects that were analysed in depth is included in Appendix 1.

The following field studies were conducted at stage IV of the evaluation report:

- individual in-depth interviews (IDIs),
- questionnaire surveys of project participants,
- telephone in-depth interviews for benchmarking purposes.

In order to prepare and conduct field studies in Ukraine, two-person research teams made two evaluation visits on 31 August-1 September 2017 and on 11 -13 October 2017.

I.3.1 Individual in-depth interviews

Individual in-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted with people representing different categories of respondents: government administration coordinators, services subordinated to them, partner organisations, and implementers of project initiatives, beneficiaries, MFA project supervisors and MFA senior management. The selection of respondents was intentional and resulted from the qualitative nature of individual interviews.

I.3.2 Questionnaire survey

A questionnaire survey of project participants was conducted using CAWI (*computer assisted web interview*) technique by which respondents fill in online questionnaires. The questionnaires were translated into Ukrainian. Nineteen questionnaires were obtained in Component II of the evaluation study. Difficulties with greater responsivity were due to the lack of project participants' database. In view of this, the results of the survey depended on whether project promoters and partners to whom the CAWI links had been sent in order to pass them later on to project participants were willing to cooperate. The fact that there was no direct control over the conduct of the CAWI survey had a negative effect on the return of questionnaires. Consequently, the results of the questionnaire survey were used as a qualitative contribution to the report.

I.4. CASE STUDIES

The following research techniques were used to prepare a case study:

- detailed desk research (e.g. project documentation)
- individual interviews conducted at home and abroad.

The following 3 case studies were conducted under Component I of the research study:

- 2 case studies covers projects implemented by government administration,
- 1 case study covers a project implemented by the Polish Embassy in Kiev

Additionally, out of the three case studies that were conducted under Component I one was an in-depth study.

At the stage of the methodological report, it was assumed that the in-depth case studies would present the best practices used in the evaluated projects to set a good example for other project promoters. The projects selected for the case studies were indicated in Appendix 1 (* and ** if it was an in-depth study). The case studies are presented in Appendix 2 to this report.

I.5. BENCHMARKING

In an attempt to find new solutions to apply to the model of Polish development aid, benchmarking in this study was used to identify good, innovative practices found in four selected developed countries (which carried out aid initiatives in Ukraine in 2012-2016) that could be implemented in

Polish development aid. Switzerland, Germany, Lithuania and Sweden were selected for benchmarking as previously agreed to with the Contracting Authority.

The subject matter of the research study and the Contracting Authority's information needs determined the scope of benchmarking which covered the following aspects:

- support for reforms implemented in Ukraine
- initiatives aimed at enhancing security in Ukraine
- education initiatives.

Mainly these two benchmarking research techniques were used:

- desk research consisting in:
    - reports on development cooperation carried out by selected developed countries, including documentation relating to the mission, the strategy behind the implemented initiatives, the areas of support, the institutional environment, and reports on the impact of support,
    - websites concerning the development aid provided,
    - statistical data on provided aid (including financial data),
    - OECD/DAC (Development Assistance Committee) data and reports.
- individual interviews conducted in person or on the phone with people in charge of implementing aid initiatives in Ukraine.

The report on benchmarking results is presented in Appendix 3.

I.6. PANEL OF EXPERTS AND SWOT ANALYSIS

At stage six of the evaluation, a SWOT/TOWS analysis was conducted and a panel of experts was organised to summarise the results of analyses of the initiatives taken under Component II. The panel was made up of specialists in development policy and development cooperation appointed by the MFA's Department of Development Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as the DDC).

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION RESULTS - ANSWERS TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS

II.1. RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERVENTION LOGIC

Polish development aid provided to Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries is oriented at achieving the objectives set out in Polish and international strategic documents.

In international relations, the objectives, directions and guidelines of development aid are set out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2000, and in the follow-up 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted for 2015-2030 to implement sustainable development goals (SDGs). The new development agenda will be global in its scope (covering all countries) and will be aimed at multidimensional sustainable social, economic and environmental development.

The objectives of Polish foreign policy, including development aid and development cooperation realised when aid programmes were implemented in Ukraine, are set out in *2012-2016 Polish Foreign Policy Priorities.* The *2017-2021 Polish Foreign Policy Strategy* sets out the current strategy . These two documents emphasize the importance of cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries and with Ukraine in particular. The strategic objective of cooperation and aid provided to the Eastern Partnership countries is to increase their social and economic stability and thus to raise the level of Poland's security. Sharing experiences and supporting democratisation processes, the rule of law and modernisation reforms that foster political transformation and social and economic development help to achieve this objective.

The objectives and priorities of Polish development aid, which are the subject matter of this evaluation, are set out in the *2012-2015 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme* and the *2016-2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme*. Aiding broadly understood social and economic development of developing countries and their societies is the main objective of Polish aid.

Aid recipients also see Poland in a better light and this helps Polish foreign policy to achieve its overall objectives using soft power instruments.

The Eastern Partnership countries, i.e. Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in particular are the main geographical priorities of Polish development cooperation. Aid provided to Ukraine is implemented under the following priorities for 2012-2015:

1. Public security and border management,
2. Regional development, public and local government administration capacity building,
3. Small and medium-sized enterprises and job creation.

Also as part of the following priorities for 2016-2020:

1. Good governance
2. Human capital
3. Entrepreneurship and the private sector.

Cooperation with Ukraine in security initiatives financed out of Polish development aid funds was initiated in 2010 in connection with the organisation of Euro 2012, the European Football Championship, which was co-organised by Poland and Ukraine. At the time, there was a need to strengthen cooperation between firefighting, police and border guard services of the two countries because they had to take actions to protect public security. When the Championship ended, this cooperation was continued because Ukraine faced many shortages:

non-existent or outdated procedures (e.g. regarding transport of hazardous substances), understaffed and underequipped services. By supporting the Ukrainian party in this area, the Polish objectives and priorities were also achieved because Polish borders became more secure (thanks to cross-border cooperation in migration, combating and preventing human trafficking, and counteracting mass destruction threats) as well as protection of the external border of the European Union.

The first projects relating to security that were carried out for Ukraine were education and training projects and they included classes on specialist theory and practical exercises in the field of medical rescue, chemical and ecological threats, fire protection and personal safety dedicated to fire service, but also trainings on migration as well as combating and counteracting human trafficking addressed to government administration. Since 2015, PDA projects supporting the development of of volunteer medical and mountain rescue services have also been implemented.

In Component II of this study, the outcomes and impacts of projects implemented in Ukraine under the Public Security and Border Management (2014-2015) priority and the Good Governance (in 2016) priority were analysed. The diagram below illustrates the programme intervention logic used for Component II area of support.
Particular blocks corresponding to identify potential impact of development aid for Ukraine are connected by arrows, which reflect relations – adopted explicitly or assumed implicitly - between particular elements of the intervention logic. The numbering of the squares corresponds to the evolution of relations and or to obtaining the assumed effects.

Problem and how it is solved		Direct impact	Indirect impact	Final (strategic) impact
Low operational capacity of Ukrainian rescue, emergency response and civil protection services Low capacity of Ukraine in border and migration management	**1** → Substantive and technical support for Ukraine within Polish development aid as for rescue, emergency response and civil protection as well as for border and migration management	**2** → Increased capacity of local and regional emergency management and civil protection systems Improved security of borders and borderlands	**3** → Increased internal security of Ukraine and its accelerated socio-economic development (socio-economic transformation)	→ Increased socio-political stability of Ukraine and its political-economic approach to EU

4 Improved image of Poland and Poles in the eyes of decision-makers and Ukrainian society **5** → Increased *soft power* capacity in relations with Ukraine → Improved relations with Ukraine and increased possibilities of achieving o Polish Eastern policy objectives

Diagram 1. Intervention logic for Component II

Source: Authors' own work

The above diagram shows that the main needs and reasons for implementing Polish development aid in Ukraine is the low substantive and operational capacity of Ukrainian rescue, crisis management and civil protection services and its low capacity to manage its borders and migrations.

Poland responded to the needs of the Ukrainian party by implementing projects under Polish development aid that provide substantive and technical support to Ukrainian services in the above-mentioned areas **(1)**. The following instruments were used to provide substantive support:

- study visits
- seminars
- working meetings and expert councils
- internships
- testing ground exercises, rescue and fire extinguishing drills
- conferences
- trainings and workshops
- publications
- modernisation works

Following the adopted assumption, Polish support for Ukraine should make a contribution to the development of local and regional crisis response and civil protection systems and to an improvement of border and border area security **(2)** and, consequently, it should indirectly lead to increasing Ukraine's internal security and its social and economic development **(3).** Such initiatives constitute one of the conditions for achieving a strategic objective of Polish foreign policy, which is Ukraine's increased socio-political stability and consequently Poland's increased security as well.

Another parallel objective of the Polish Aid Programme offered Ukraine is improving the image of Poland and Poles in the eyes of the Ukrainian society and the main decision-makers at the central and local levels **(4)**. In line with the adopted assumptions, an improvement in the image gained by the positive public reception of our willingness to share our transformation experiences should strengthen Poland's "soft power" capability in relations with Ukraine **(5)** and, consequently, to enhance impact and lead to more effective implementation of Poland's eastern policy objectives.

II.2. IMPACT

Which projects or initiatives have had a particularly positive impact on programmes, development strategies, legislative documents or other documents of similar significance prepared or implemented by a beneficiary? (Which to the greatest extent?)

Has synergy between Polish projects/initiatives in the given area or in the given group of stakeholders been observed? (In what aspects?)

Did impact include benefits related to the so-called soft power diplomacy? (To what extent? /In what development initiatives in particular?) Which PDA initiatives helped the most to raise the visibility of the best Polish experiences and to promote Poland's image as a valuable partner with stable development prospects? How can the correlation between Polish development aid in Ukraine and the achievement of the objectives of Polish foreign policy be strengthened?

II.2.1. Outcome assessment

In Component II, support was provided to a total of 20 projects, the vast majority of which (75%) were implemented by government bodies, i.e. the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. Another 20% of projects were developed by a higher education institution, the Main School of Fire Service. Other applicants included the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kiev (2 projects), a local government unit, the Podkarpackie Voivodeship Marshal Office (1 project) and a non-governmental organisation, the Local Action Group Warmiński Zakątek (1 project).

Security projects in Ukraine realised during two editions of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme were implemented as part of different priorities: *Public Security Border Management* (2012-2016) and *Good Governance* (2012-2016). These projects concerned different fields. As for the *Public Security and Border Management priority,* most projects, i.e. four out of ten, were in *Good Governance* (23%), approximately one in four was in *Environmental Protection* (23%) and more or less one in ten was in *Human Rights* and *Strengthened Civil Society* (12% each), and *Education* (11%). The least number of projects were implemented as part of *other social services* (4%).

In the subsequent Programme edition both the number and the thematic scope of areas were different. Within the priority – *Good governance,* the vast majority of projects were implemented in the area of *Disaster Prevention and Preparedness* (80%), whereas only one in five was implemented in the area of *Security System Management and Reform* (20%). The distribution of projects in terms of specific priorities and areas is presented in the chart below.

Chart 1. Project distribution in the *Public Security and Border Management* (2012-2016) priority

Legend:
- ■ Good governance
- ■ Education
- ■ Other social services
- ■ Environmental protecion
- ■ Human rights
- ■ Strengthened civil society

Pie values: 38%, 11%, 4%, 23%, 12%, 12%

Source: Authors' own work based on conclusions and reports on project implementation

Chart 2. Project distribution in the *Good governance* priority (2016-2020)

Legend:
- ■ Disaster prevention and preparadness
- ■ Security system management and reform

Pie values: 80%, 20%

Source: Authors' own work based on conclusions and project implementation reports

All projects were implemented in partnership with public institutions such as: the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, state rescue and migration services, regional administration of Ivano-Frankivsk region, national fire service from Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kherson, Ternopil and Rivne regions, police from Volyn region, Lviv State University of Life Safety, as well as the Kostopil Forestry Holding.

The partners' scope of responsibility was varied, but their activity focused mainly on supporting the project promoter in logistic initiatives taken in Ukraine. Partners were in charge of recruitment of meeting participants, trainings and study visits, as well as organisation of meetings and translations. In the case of some projects, they were also responsible for the substantive aspect of the implemented projects or for purchasing equipment.

The initiatives taken were addressed to a broad group of recipients, but in most projects, the ultimate beneficiaries were rescue services and representatives of government and local administration. Most projects were addressed to fire-fighting services (50%), law enforcement agencies and the Police (15%).

The projects implemented under Component II focused on issues related to emergency management and rescue (e.g. fire-fighting, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) rescue; chemical-

ecological rescue, mountain rescue and medical rescue), but also on human trafficking and migrations.

These projects were developed through a variety of initiatives such as seminars and lectures, working meetings and expert meetings, theoretical and practical trainings, workshops, rescue and fire-fighting operations conducted with the use of fire trainers and fire range drills, study visits, internships in Polish reception centres and non-governmental organisations, development of publications and handbooks (e.g. on human trafficking or CBRN threats). Modernisation works were also conducted in the Chornohora mountain rescue station, for example.

Data included in reports on the implementation of projects under Component II along with information collected in individual in-depth interviews indicate the high effectiveness of achieving the assumed impacts.

In the course of project initiatives, over a thousand people who participated in specialist trainings, practical exercises and seminars raised their competencies. The number of training participants exceeded the planned values by 10%, which proves that the implemented education activities met with great interest. Additionally, it was possible to equip rescue services with modern apparatus such as trainers, slurry pumps, GPS sets or individual protection sets. Altogether, 157 pieces of equipment were handed over.

The chart below illustrates output indicators in figures.

Chart 3. Number of project initiative participants

Source: Authors' own work based on project implementation conclusions and reports

The Main School of Fire Service (MSFS) implemented projects whose indicated output values were exceeded. The project, *Today and Tomorrow of Practical Fire-Fighting Trainings,* planned to train 630 firefighters in extinguishing indoor fires and rescue safety. In fact, as many as 663 people took part in the trainings conducted with the use of a trainer brought from Poland. It was possible to increase the indicator of planned outcomes because trainings were organised in Ukraine and in cooperation with the Lviv State University of Life Safety, which was responsible for recruiting participants. Similar factors determined the higher than planned number of seminar participants which were organised as part of the *CBRN Cross-Border Security and Cooperation* project. Seventy-three and eighty-four participants respectively attended two seminars dedicated to Ukrainian fire service's experiences related to CBRN threats and rescue, cooperation, development opportunities and security of joint initiatives which had initially been planned for a score of participants. In the opinion of the project implementer, the renown of the Lviv State University of Life Safety and the

right kind of advertising of the seminar's topics among the rescue services should take credit for the higher number of participants of such seminars.

An increase in indicators of the assumed hard outcomes and outputs referred also to the equipment which was provided to the Ukrainian partner. The purchase of additional apparatus (e.g. a thermal imaging camera) or promotional materials was possible thanks to savings and the project implementer's own initiative (e.g. a decision to provide a bigger number of used trucks for chemical-ecological rescue along with the necessary equipment).

It is worth noting that although the assumed indicators of hard outcomes and outputs are generally well described and reported, such practices with reference to presenting the level of soft outcomes are rare. In general, project promoters often declare the acquisition of particular knowledge and skills by training participants or explicit awareness of various social groups, but do not monitor the impact of this process. An example of good practice in this respect could be an initial and final measurement of the knowledge of Volyn policemen (through a pre- and post-test filled in before the training started and after it was completed), which was made by the Voivodeship Police Command (VPC) in Lublin. The initiative was aimed at showing a growth of beneficiaries' competence in dealing with procedures and algorithms of counteracting and combating human trafficking. Asking project recipients (after the completion of project implementation) about the scope and mode of using the acquired skills, which included modern methods of operational work and IT techniques, is also worth recommending. Taking account of the fact that trainings are usually one of key project elements and they often last a few or over a dozen days (even up to 20), measuring the acquired knowledge and the use of acquired skills could turn out to be a source of invaluable information for both project implementers and people interested in the Programme's outcomes.

Project initiatives yielded different direct and indirect impacts. The former involved increasing operational and organisational capacity of the Ukrainian services and were produced by 'soft' education initiatives leading to increased knowledge and skills. The effect of improved competence is a change in the approach or awareness of various solutions and rescue operations, which leads to implementing new methods of work, procedures and standards. Higher technical capacity of Ukrainian fire service owing to the 'hard' initiatives, i.e. the equipment and apparatus provided are some of the other direct impacts obtained. The effect resulting from increased operational, organisational and technical skills of the institutions which were project recipients is the increased safety of rescuers themselves and Ukrainian people, as well as Polish society when it comes to ventures with cross-border elements. The support impact can be also reflected in increased safety of tourists visiting the Chornohora mountain range, developed systems of crisis management, as well as in improved environmental protection thanks to the introduction of a forest fire monitoring system and counteracting CBRN threats.

The information collected through IDIs and CAWI questionnaires shows that the best impacts were obtained thanks to project initiatives which involved practical trainings and exercises targeted at operational staff as well as seminars and meetings for management staff. Projects of this kind were implemented, e.g. by the MSFS, the Embassy of the Republic of Poland and the Voivodeship Commands of State Fire Service (VC SFS) in Krakow and were addressed to rescue services. Very good results were also observed when infrastructural projects were combined with 'soft' initiatives aimed at increasing the competence of staff who are to work in modernised premises such as watch-towers of volunteer fire service in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions or in a mountain rescue station on the Chornohora. The multiplier effect, which involves training people who did not participate directly in educational projects, was obtained thanks to cascade trainings and purchases of equipment (e.g. trainers, training kits) necessary for conducting trainings for other rescuers.

One of the most important impacts of the development aid projects was the Council of Ministers' decision taken in 2013 approving the operation of volunteer fire service in Ukraine. Since the decentralisation reform provides opportunities for developing this service (i.e. by implementing systemic changes), it is worthwhile to continue supporting the process of changes in the organisation of the national rescue and fire-fighting system, especially in view of the fact that Poland can offer Ukraine reliable models, in line with European standards.

As for the effects obtained by the implementers of development aid projects, it is worth pointing out that the Polish party also benefits from cooperation with its Ukrainian partners. Ventures aimed at cross-border cooperation with reference to counteracting CBRN threats, combating and preventing human trafficking or those related to migration also contribute to improved security of Polish borders. A good example of a tangible benefit gained from cooperation between Lublin Police Command and Volyn Police Command under one PDA project was a joint criminal investigation into a human trafficking group operating in Poland whose victim was a Ukrainian national. Every project provides an opportunity to exchange experiences and to develop competences of the staff engaged in initiatives, e.g. experts conducting trainings. The Multiannual Development Aid Programme can also benefit our economy, because Ukraine is a potential market for Polish goods (rescue equipment and gear), as well as services (e.g. commercial trainings for police and fire services).

While analysing the effectiveness of the projects implemented under Component II, worth mentioning are their unplanned outcomes and value added, which are:

- declared participation of the Ukrainian party in subsequent joint ventures such as trainings, hand-over of equipment, implementation of European systemic solutions and conceptualisation of new projects,
- closer cooperation and working contacts, creation of an informal platform of information exchange between fire and police units of the two countries (e.g. Ukrainian respondents pointed out that they can ask their Polish counterparts for professional advice and assistance in solving problems),
- dissemination of acquired knowledge (e.g. on human trafficking) at conferences and meetings with young people attending school,
- cultural programmes implemented after completion of project initiatives (e.g. city sightseeing).

II.2.2. SYNERGY IMPACT

The synergy of projects developed under Component II can be discussed with reference to the area on which they are implemented, the subject matter of the initiatives, their implementers and recipients.

Most fire-fighting projects and those dedicated to counteracting CBRN threats were implemented in western Ukraine, mainly in the Lviv region and in the neighbouring Ivano-Frankivisk, Volyn, Rivne or Ternopil regions. Initiatives addressed to rescue services located in the central and eastern parts of Ukraine, e.g. Kiev, Cherkasy or Kherson regions were, by contrast, rare. The concentration of projects implemented in western Ukraine promotes the accumulation of effects, such as increased internal security and integration with the European rescue system.

The synergy impact also results from continuity of the existing cooperation, i.e. project initiatives were carried out by the same implementers (e.g. MSFS, Polish Embassy in Kiev) for the benefit of former project recipients, e.g. Lviv State University of Life Safety or the State Emergency Service of

Ukraine. It is also worth pointing out that these ventures do not overlap – each one builds a new quality based on gained experiences and needs expressed by beneficiaries.

 The synergy of public security initiatives largely results from the fact that most projects are being coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, which commissions its subordinate units to carry them out and oversees both the subject matter and the implementation of successive projects.

The synergy impact is also observed in the context of supporting initiatives in Ukraine with funds other than Polish development aid, e.g. Norwegian or EU funds under the PL-BY-UA Cross-Border Cooperation Programme with respect to projects aimed at combating human trafficking or supporting rescue services.

In the case of Component II, the synergy impact is most visible in the subject matter of the implemented initiatives. The first project related to CBRN rescue, implemented in 2014-2015, was limited to training and equipping the Regional Command of Fire Service in Lviv with specialist apparatus to identify such threats and protective gear for rescuers. The subsequent venture, although based on former experiences, contributed to creating a new quality, since it was largely focused on the protection of victims by developing principles of mass decontamination system.

The impact of 'thematic' synergy was also observed in projects establishing volunteer fire services (VFS) in Ukraine, which were implemented by the MSFS and the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kiev in partnership with the Lviv State University of Life Security. Initiatives implemented in 2012-2013, such as *Modern Equipment for Personal Protection of Rescuer – Legal Norms, Practical Application and Maintenance,* and *Today and Tomorrow of Practical Fire-Fighting Trainings,* as well as *Volunteer Fire Service in Poland and Ukraine* initiated legislative works aimed at developing organisational and legal bases for Ukrainian VFS units, the functioning of which was approved by the Council of Ministers in 2013. Further ventures of the Embassy, conducted over 2013-2014, were a continuation of the support given to the Ukrainian party to create the VFS system. Within the project: *Creation of Volunteer Fire Service structure in Ukraine,* a seminar for representatives of governmental and local self-governmental administration as well as for the management of the National Fire Service (NFC) in Ukraine was organised and it was devoted to legal and organizational principles of functioning Polish VFS. Also, within the same project two watch-towers were modernised and two VFS units were provided with equipment. Another project: *Training the personnel of Volunteer Fire Services in Lviv region* helped among other things, to work out procedures and rules for VFS functioning as well as training programmes for volunteers. It should be stated that joint ventures in favour of creating VFS units taken together with other donors operating in eastern Ukraine (e.g. with Germany, USA, Canada), especially in the regions where Poles previously implemented other projects, would foster obtaining synergy effects. Given its experience and easier cooperation with the Ukrainians, the Polish party could participate -to a greater extent- in 'soft' initiatives, such as working out systemic legislative and organisational solutions or conducting trainings and -to a smaller extent- in purchasing equipment or building or modernising fire stations, which demands considerable financial resources.

Clear complementarity is also seen in the *Modernisation of Chornohora Mountain Rescue Station* project*.* Continuing work in subsequent years (2016 and 2017) and combining hard infrastructural initiatives with training conducted under another PDA project (*Increased Competence and Operational Capacity of Emergency Response Services in Ivano-Frankivisk Region in Flood Prevention and Recovery and Mountain Rescue*) reinforced the impact of the intervention undertaken on Pope Ivan mountain thus generating synergy impact.

II.2.3. Image impact

Polish development aid projects implemented under Component II affect the image of Poland and of the Polish government administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration.

Representatives of entities that implemented projects said during IDIs that the Main School of Firefighting Service (Polish: SGSP), the Voivodeship Command of State Firefighting Service in Krakow and the Lublin Police Command, among others, published up-to-date information about the projects on their websites when they were being run. Education material used during lectures, seminars and trainings (e.g. file jackets, pens, pen drives, presentations and newsletters) carried logotypes and information on the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme in line with the rules applicable to the use of such designations.

Rescue projects are noticeable and recognisable in western Ukraine because they are coherent and consistently implemented over many years. They are not 'spot' or ad hoc initiatives, but cohesive measures which are being continued and developed successively over the years. Moreover, they are sustainable on account of their 'hard' components that is equipment and gear provided during trainings and infrastructure i.e. the modernised mountain rescue station on Chornohora and the renovated volunteer firefighting stations. Projects implemented under Component II and their impacts are visible because of these project aspects. Firefighting projects also created a big media effect. Such project initiatives look good in the media because they are 'spectacular' and also because of the equipment that is left behind, they create promotional impact.

It is worth pointing out that all the equipment and apparatus provided under Polish development aid was produced in Poland and that it is always identified with the PDA's logotypes. At the Chornohora rescue station, a plaque was put up with information that the renovation of the building was financed with PDA funds. The project is very effective in terms of image because the site is frequently visited by Ukrainian and foreign tourists who can stay overnight at the renovated station in case of emergency or - if necessary – benefit from assistance provided by mountain rescuers trained as part of PDA.

An analysis of media data and material conducted during the evaluation study shows that projects implemented under Component II in 2012-2016 were promoted mostly on the project promoters' websites. Other media materials, of which only few were found, included electronic versions of articles published in the Polish diaspora press.

Moreover, the analysis showed that not all projects were promoted on websites, or even if they were, access for people who would be interested in them might prove difficult. As regards some projects, during information searches, it was possible to find links to the Internet sources, but when attempts were made to open them, it turned out that they are inactive. As one report on the implementation of a project addressed to firefighters – rescuers put it, information on the project was available on the website of the Main School of Firefighting Service "for the duration of the project." It might mean that after the project initiatives were completed, information about how they were run were replaced with new information.

Having reviewed the media data, it is clear that in respect of the promotion of Polish activity under Component II, one source which could collect information on the initiatives taken is missing. Such a role could be played by the portal polskapomoc.gov.pl. Apart from a list of implemented projects along with highlighted fund values and beneficiaries' names, detailed information on just a few selected projects is available. Also, the websites of Polish diplomatic missions in Ukraine are not sources of detailed information on the Polish activity. Web pages concerning Polish development

cooperation contain only general information on this subject and links to other websites dedicated to this subject matter, without any project details. In the section of current affairs there is, by contrast, up-to-date information not including the period which is evaluated in this research.

Under Component II, a total of 20 projects were analysed. In the case of 6 projects, it was not possible to find any specific information about them on any websites, or on any sub-sites of the beneficiaries' official websites or on sub-sites that would be dedicated to a specific project. Nevertheless, some project names can be found on the Internet, but solely in the context of public procurement for a specific project. As a rule, this information can be found in Public Information Bulletins of the units implementing such projects or on the websites publishing summary information on public procurement, such as the site www.portalsamorzadowy.pl. They mainly focus on terms of reference and do not contain detailed information on the project itself. As regards the project, *Combatting and Preventing Human Trafficking as a Joint Challenge for Poland and Ukraine,* some information on its implementation appeared on a regional public television station, TVP Szczecin, but it did not include any specific information about the sources of its financing. The TV material only reports the fact that a study visit by Ukrainian policemen was organised in Szczecin.

In some cases, the only traces of the above mentioned projects (but not of all of them) are short mentions on the site www.polskapomoc.gov.pl. An attempt at identifying the project information on Ukrainian websites was unsuccessful. However, it is worth stating that it does not mean that information on a specific project is not available on the Internet at all. The fact that there is a problem with searching for it implies that the average user will also find it difficult, which finally might make them stop searching. Consequently, it might negatively influence the visibility of Polish aid initiatives and recognition of Poland as a donor operating in Ukraine.

Information on the other evaluated projects can be found on websites, although they differ in the approach to how the information is presented.

Chart 4. Methods of presenting information on projects implemented under Component II

Source: Authors' own work based on analysis of websites

For two projects, *Combating Human Trafficking – Support for Police Forces in the Volyn Region* and *Increased Effectiveness of Emergency Response by Ukrainian Rescue Services,* sub-sites were created containing project descriptions and information about the donor, the group of beneficiaries that was covered by the initiatives, a description of the project process and information about the achieved impacts. Some information about project initiatives can be also found in the current affairs section where it was posted throughout the project duration. The sub-site dedicated to the human trafficking project also includes some videos and a promotional spot produced as part of project initiatives. It was also uploaded on the website of the Ukrainian partner in a brief note about the project. An article about this project also appeared in the online version of the Polish-Ukrainian bi-weekly [Monitor Wołyński](#) .

The only information about the other 12 projects that can be found on the Internet is published in the form of news items, and as regards four of these projects, only Ukrainian language sub-sites carried any information about them. In the case of two of these projects, information was put out about the Polish partner that provided equipment and outfit under the projects.

Most of the above mentioned projects include information on the donor and support beneficiaries. Internet sites also contain more or less extensive descriptions of 10 projects. In the case of 4 projects, only rudimentary information was provided.

The project, *Increased Competence and Operational Capacity of Emergency Response Services in the Ivano-Frankivisk Region in Respect of Flood Prevention and Recovery, as well as Mountain Rescue*, also includes information on additional planned initiatives, because the implementation of future projects regarding the same sphere was discussed under the Poland-Belarus-Ukraine 2014-2020 Programme. As compared with other projects implemented under Component II, the above mentioned project stands out because it is visible. Information about the implementation of the project was provided on the Podkarpackie Voivode's website and Facebook profile. Also, a reference to the project and the tasks implemented under it was posted on the [Media Rzeszów](#) web portal, and on the online edition of [Kurier Galicyjski,](#) an independent journal published by Poles living in Ukraine.

For 10 implemented projects, photo documentation is available on the Internet that presents in less or greater detail the process of their implementation. The logo of Polish aid appears in connection with 7 projects. Unfortunately, the material on project implementation that could be downloaded or links to the websites of partners/entities participating in initiatives cannot be found. Also, there are no links to media information.

Information about five projects was successfully identified on Facebook. Four of them concern support for rescue services, and one refers to combating and preventing human trafficking.

The analysis of media data in Component II has revealed that the main source of information on Poland's development cooperation activity in Ukraine are the websites of Polish project promoters/partners.

It should be stated that, as regards the method of publishing information on the above mentioned websites, no minimum standards have been adopted, i.e. the adopted form and scope of presenting information depends on the approach of entities taking part in project implementation. As a result, the impact generated by the implemented Polish development cooperation projects is less visible than if such projects had been disseminated and promoted in a more orderly fashion.

In order to improve the image impact, it is suggested that the project contents be presented in greater detail on the Internet. The coverage of initiatives financed with Polish development aid should:

- include minimum information on the project financed under Polish development cooperation, describe projects outcomes on the websites more thoroughly (in the form of figures, but also from the point of view of individual recipients)
- contain, depending on the nature of the project, project outputs ready to be downloaded, such as training material, reports, or at least bulletins or information leaflets,
- include Polish aid logotypes
- include links to the partners' websites along with information on the partner (provided that such websites exist)
- inform about prospective plans to continue the initiatives taken in the project or about connections with other projects
- be available for some time after the project is completed.

In order to put the above mentioned assumptions into effect, it could be advisable to consider developing guidelines for project promoters which would include minimum requirements regarding the scope and mode of presenting information on websites, as well as good examples taken from the experiences of other donors/other projects. Also, it would be a good idea to consider the idea of organising trainings, including e-learning, for project promoters in this regard.

As for Polish development cooperation projects implemented under Component II, they are poorly visible in the Polish and Ukrainian media and, in this respect, it would be advisable to take some measures which would result in disseminating knowledge about the aid implemented by Poland in Ukraine. To this end, it is worth considering organising trainings for project promoters on cooperation with the media.

With a view to monitoring the visibility of information on Polish projects in the future, it is also suggested to modify the report format template so that – like in the case of projects implemented under the Poland-Canada Democracy Support Programme, financed by the governments of Poland and Canada, it will include a field referring to IT technologies used in the project and to information that appeared in the media about the project. In the future, it will make it possible to more effectively access information on projects published in sources other than the Internet.

At the same time it is worth considering creating a platform that could collect information on implemented projects, stating the minimum scope of information. A good basis for creating such a tool would be the website: www.polskapomoc.gov.pl, which now contains detailed information on just a few selected projects. Collecting such information in one place would not only improve the visibility of Polish development aid impact, but it would also enable future project promoters to identify prospective partners for their initiatives or plan projects complementary to those already implemented, among other things.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Projects related to public security are characterised by high effectiveness in achieving the assumed hard outcomes and outputs. In some cases, their indicators were exceeded (mainly a number of trained people, a number of provided outfits or promotional materials). The extent to which the planned soft outcomes were achieved is measured sporadically.

2. One of the most important effects of the realised development aid projects was the adoption by the Council of Ministers of a decision approving the operation of volunteer fire service in Ukraine, given the opportunities created by the decentralisation reform to continue developing in this direction, i.e. systemic changes.

3. The Polish party also benefits from cooperation with Ukrainian partners. Ventures aimed at, for example, cross-border cooperation also contribute to the improved security of Polish borders. The projects also provide an opportunity for sharing experiences and developing competences of the staff engaged in the initiatives. The development aid projects can generate benefits for our economy because Ukraine is a prospective selling market for Polish goods (equipment, outfits, and training services).

4. The synergy of projects developed under Component II can be discussed with reference to the area on which they are implemented, the subject matter of initiatives taken and their implementers and recipients. Most projects are implemented in western Ukraine and they are based on ongoing cooperation, including cooperation within other funds and programmes (e.g. Norwegian funds, EU funds under the Poland-Belarus-Ukraine Programme).

5. The synergy of projects implemented in the area of security results, to some extent, from the fact that a many of the projects are coordinated by the MIAA in cooperation with the MFA. Consequently, the ventures do not overlap – each of them builds up a new quality based on gained experiences and actual needs expressed by beneficiaries.

6. Synergy effects are most visible with respect to the subject matter of implemented initiatives, especially the establishment of volunteer fire service in Ukraine, which fits into the process of reforms carried out by government and local self-government administration and involves modification of rescue and firefighting structures.

7. An analysis of media data shows that it is possible to improve the impact by presenting more detailed information on the projects on websites.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Support for the process of changing the way the national rescue and fire-fighting system is organised should be continued because the decentralisation reform provides opportunities for further development in this area and Poland can offer reliable templates in line with European standards.

2. Subsequent rescue projects should be complementary to earlier ventures but, at the same time, aiming at greater synergy of initiatives taken, they should include:

- new recipients, e.g. fire-fighting services in chemical plants or nuclear power stations

- New thematic areas, e.g. medical rescue, fire-fighting in industrial plants, on railways, and underground car parkings).

- More distant regions of the country, i.e. regions located in eastern Ukraine that are not under threat of war, e.g. Kherson, Cherkasy, Kharkov regions, particularly in cooperation with other donors. Due to its experience and easier cooperation with Ukrainian partners, the Polish party could participate, to a greater extent, in 'soft' initiatives, such as developing systemic legislative and organisational solutions or conducting trainings and, to a less extent, in purchasing equipment, building or modernising premises (fire stations), which require significant financial resources.

3. Initiatives in western Ukraine are worth continuing since they provide opportunities for cross-border cooperation and security of the Polish border and the EU's external border, and carry only a small risk of overlapping projects and other donors' initiatives.

4. It is advisable to promote among project implementers the measurement of soft outcomes in the form of testing knowledge and/or skills evaluated before trainings start and after they finish (pre/post- tests), which will make it possible to assess the obtained level of the adopted assumptions and which will be the feedback for people conducting trainings.

5. The coverage of projects placed on websites should include a description of outcomes (presenting figures and numbers, but also showing them from the point of view of individual recipients); it is also supposed to hint at prospective plans of continuing project initiatives or in connection with other projects; it should also display Polish aid logotypes and links to the partners' websites along with information about the partner.

6. In order to put the above mentioned assumptions into effect, it would be advisable to consider developing guidelines for project promoters which would include some minimum requirements regarding the scope and method of presenting information on websites, as well as good examples taken from the experiences of other donors/other Polish projects. Also, it would be a good idea to consider organising trainings for project promoters in this respect, including e-learning.

II.4. SUSTAINABILITY

Which initiatives supported under Polish development cooperation have had the most sustainable impact on the situation of beneficiaries?

The evaluation results show that the projects on public security, which have the most sustainable impact on the situation of recipients, combine 'hard', i.e. infrastructural or logistic initiatives with 'soft', educational ones.

'Hard' initiatives involved modernising or renovating buildings (e.g. mountain rescue stations, watch-towers for VFS units) as well as providing the Ukrainian party with specialist equipment. On the one hand, such equipment allows using acquired skills in everyday work of the Police and firefighters; on the other hand, it is used to train other people. As regards initiatives taken by fire-fighting services (e.g. MSFS, VH SFS in Krakow), the provided equipment included self-contained trucks for chemical-ecological rescue, a decontamination chamber, fire-hoses, extinguishers, detectors, gauges, personal protection equipment (e.g. special protective clothing for fire-fighting and chemical protection), gloves, boots, balaclavas, fire helmets, protective breathing apparatus and stations for maintaining and servicing equipment.

The Ukrainian party is very interested in receiving specialist equipment because it has enormous shortages in this respect. The lack of equipment and the fact that it is obsolete results from a shortage of funds and permanently underfinanced rescue services for which the current political situation is also partially to blame. Most factories producing fire-fighting equipment in Ukraine are located in Ukraine's occupied territory, so equipment cannot be locally produced and purchased. By contrast, foreign-made equipment is too expensive, especially given the fact that the military operations conducted in the eastern part of the country require significant financial outlays. The possibility of improving rescue operations using equipment donated by Poland represents the highest value for Ukrainian services in relation to Polish development aid.

Providing strictly training equipment, e.g. a trainer for simulating indoor fires, also contributes to maintaining the sustainability of the transferred knowledge and skills, because it enables to further improve fire-fighters' skills, both of the participants of trainings carried out as part of the projects, as well as of other staff from their units. Worn equipment, such as the CBRN rescue equipment, which has a relatively short life span, could also be used for training purposes.

It is worth stating that the specialist equipment provided to the Ukrainian party is also used to train civilians, e.g. young people or teachers who are instructed by firefighters how to use fire extinguishers.

Although providing equipment, as a rule, guarantees sustainability of project impact, there are risks connected with it, such as misusing equipment or wearing it out because of the lack of proper maintenance. As for the project: *CBRN- cross-border security and cooperation,* a good practice related to ensuring the stability of the obtained outcomes turned out to be the empowerment of Ukrainian rescuers for servicing personal protection equipment. The care for teaching beneficiaries not only how to operate the equipment, but also how to repair and maintain it contributes to its longer life.

The sustainability of the project outcomes was also ensured by providing the partner with manuals explaining how to put on the equipment and test it, which were translated into Ukrainian.

The sustainability of project outcomes is ensured not only by initiatives involving equipment provision, but also infrastructural ventures, including investments aimed at modernising the existing infrastructure. An example of such initiative is the project implemented by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland: *Modernisation of Chornohora Mountain Rescue Station.* Under this project, a few sustainability aspects were identified: its financing (by ensuring continuation of the grant in 2017), its technical sustainability (by using materials adapted to harsh weather conditions) and the continuation of work by mountain rescuers, who were employed by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. The greatest threat to project sustainability is the unstable political and economic situation in Ukraine. Although there is no real risk that the rescuers' job contracts will be cancelled, the above-mentioned institution could be transformed and, if left without financing, the rescue station will lose its employees.

In view of maintaining the project impact over time, it should be emphasised that the sustainable impact on the situation of recipients is only guaranteed by a combination of infrastructural or logistic components with educational ones. Providing equipment must be accompanied by trainings on its use and service, which guarantees that the received equipment will be used later.

Purely educational projects can ensure maintaining impact over time also when they are not complemented by 'hard' initiatives, although undoubtedly, the latter contribute to greater sustainability. Specialist trainings on, e.g. rescue operations, combating human trafficking or migrations, which enable their recipients to gain specific knowledge and skills are later used in the work of fire-fighting and police services and thus help to maintain sustainability of project outcomes.

Also, the consistent implementation of training programmes within consecutive projects developed over subsequent years, which helps to broaden and consolidate knowledge, influences the sustainability of education effects. Moreover, cascade trainings, involving passing the acquired competence to other people who do not participate directly in project initiatives, considerably contribute to greater sustainability and impact of project outcomes. Such trainings were conducted, for example, within the two projects implemented in 2016: *Increased Effectiveness of Emergency Response of Ukrainian Rescue Services* and *Combating Human Trafficking – Support for Police Services in Volyn Region.* As a result of the cascade trainings conducted by participants of classes which were run by Polish experts from VH SFSs in Krakow and Lublin, more firefighters from Ivano-Frankivsk and Kherson regions, as well as policemen from the Volyn police's crime branch were trained after the project initiatives were completed.

In order to ensure sustainability of project outcomes and to level the problematic rotation of management staff in the Ukrainian fire and police rescue services (partially due to political factors), educational initiatives targeted at representatives of different levels (management and command staff of various ranks, as well as private firefighters or policemen) should be taken in parallel. In view of this, the teaching content and forms of communication, such as conferences, seminars, theoretical and practical trainings and exercises (including field exercise) should be diversified due to the occupational profile and specific needs of the recipients. Such initiatives were taken, for example, within the projects: *Increased effectiveness of the emergency response of Ukrainian rescue services* and *Today and tomorrow for practical trainings in fire-fighting.*

One of the most interesting initiatives aimed at ensuring sustainability and increasing the project impact was a preventive spot prepared by VPC in Lublin in cooperation with the Police Command in Volyn. Its purpose was to increase the awareness of human trafficking –related threats, to inform about the rights which victims of this crime have and to increase the security of migrants from Ukraine. The footage on labour exploitation and sexual abuse was propagated on regional television, where it was broadcast quite frequently, i.e. 5 times a day for a month. Besides, the spot was

ublished on the websites of consulates of the Republic of Poland and of Ukraine, on the information portals of the Volyn police and the Council of Volyn Region, as well as on the website and Facebook profile of the Police Command in Lublin. The widespread publicity of the spot and its frequent broadcast contributed to the consolidation of an appropriate approach to dangers of human trafficking. The footage got a very positive reception in Ukraine and it was broadcast for a longer time that it had been expected. The process of selecting the script and the company which produced the spot was supported by the spokespeople of Polish police. Also, the Ukrainian partner became very much involved in preparing the footage, which resulted in creating very substantive contents of the message.

The security projects' sustainable outputs also include publications: papers, reports, handbooks or good practices, which could be used not only by its beneficiaries when the project is completed, but also by people who did not participate in the project initiatives. For example, an attempt was made to pass the knowledge acquired or developed during projects to possibly the biggest group of recipients in the handbooks written on CBRN rescue or good practice in combating human trafficking. Such an initiative was propagated in departments of the Ukrainian police dealing with the issues. Moreover, Volyn policemen were obligated to use the knowledge and skills gained during trainings according to the rules of good practice during their everyday work.

Sustainability of the obtained impact also depends on another kind of initiatives taken independently by beneficiaries, i.e. activities which were not included in the project and which go far beyond it. An example of such independent initiatives can be a methodological guidebook developed by a person who took part in trainings on medical rescue and then instructed other people. Maintaining the outcomes of projects that support the reform of the emergency management system or establish Volunteer Firefighting Services are conditioned by the implementation of these changes in Ukraine.

Impact sustainability is also determined by continued cooperation with Ukrainian partners, ongoing exchange of knowledge and experiences, which fosters further operational and non-operational cooperation after the completion of project initiatives. The projects developed within the Multiannual Programme also contribute to establishing and developing a network of permanent cooperation between Poland and Ukraine on rescue and fire protection. Consequently, the capacity of Ukrainian services and their readiness to implement reforms increases. Many IDI respondents pointed out that working contacts established during the project implementation are also continued after their completion, which contributes to the long-term cooperation of both parties.

However, it should be noted that the sustainability of outcomes obtained or the deferred impact of projects implemented in Ukraine under Polish development cooperation are not monitored. Therefore, there is no certainty that the provided equipment is still used by its recipients after several years and that it is used and serviced properly. Moreover, the mechanism of Polish aid management does not foresee reporting on how the knowledge and skills transferred during trainings are used, especially in a long-term perspective.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The most sustainable impact on the recipients of projects dedicated to public security is observed with reference to knowledge and skills that are transferred during specialist trainings and later used in the work of fire and police services and to 'hard' initiatives, such as providing the Ukrainian party with equipment, as well as infrastructural ventures (e.g. modernisation of the existing buildings) combined with training activities in particular.

2. An increase in the sustainability and impact of project outcomes is also fostered by providing the Ukrainian party strictly training equipment (e.g. a trainer simulating indoor fires), cascade trainings, developed and popularised publications and established working contacts and long-term cooperation.

3. The outcome sustainability or deferred impact of projects implemented in Ukraine are not monitored, so no precise information is collected on whether the handed over equipment is still being used by its recipients and how, and whether they still use the skills learned during trainings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is worthwhile to continue incorporating in projects such elements as providing equipment to the Ukrainian party and taking infrastructural initiatives (e.g. renovations of fire stations for VFS), especially in cooperation with other donors. Also, it is worth combining 'hard' components with training initiatives.

2. Risks related to providing equipment, such as misusing the equipment or wearing it out, also as a result of improper servicing should not be disregarded. Therefore, account should also be taken of trainings on equipment servicing and maintenance in the case of 'hard' initiatives.

3. It is worth ensuring monitoring (and possibly reporting) of how the provided equipment and outfit are used and how the knowledge and skills gained during previous trainings are used, especially in a longer-term perspective.

4. The Ukrainian party could be obliged to include a plan for using the project impact in the letter of intent.

5. It is suggested that cascade trainings and publications (e.g. handbooks, good practices), which increase the sustainability and impact of assumed results, should be used more often in trainings.

6. Parallel trainings addressed to managers and operating officers could ensure the sustainability of training impact and at the same time offset the problem of Ukrainian staff turnover.

II.4. EXTERNAL COHESION AND PDA DISTINCTIVE FEATURES

Which projects or initiatives were compatible with the initiatives of other donors? Could cooperation with them increase the value added of Polish aid (In what areas? /On what conditions?)

Did the Polish aid initiatives stand out among other donors' initiatives? (In what aspects?)

Benchmarking has shown that the studied donors understand the issue of supporting security in Ukraine mainly in terms of humanitarian aid, seeking a peaceful conflict resolution or promoting respect for human rights and observing international humanitarian law. In view of this, direct initiatives in this area focus mostly on the support for internally displaced persons, providing humanitarian aid and cooperating in this respect with international organisations. The area of cooperation with different services responsible for security in Ukraine is not a development aid priority for the studied donors operating in Ukraine. If this issue is raised at all, it appears in the context of military cooperation (Sweden/ Germany).

As for the studied donors, only Germany took initiatives aimed at supporting rescue services, which were implemented in two modes. First, the Embassy of Germany in Ukraine is in a position to flexibly respond to emergency situations by initiating aid the moment a tragedy occurs (e.g. a natural disaster) by providing the necessary equipment or first aid products to injured people. Second, the German Agency for Development Aid (GIZ) implemented a project targeted directly at the institutions supporting communes which hosted internally displaced persons, i.e. the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Red Cross. The project, *Enhancing Capabilities of Ukrainian Emergency Services*, committing thirteen million euro, is implemented in 2015-2018 in eastern regions of Ukraine. Within the project, beneficiaries receive technical support in form of equipment purchased, as well as substantive support involving trainings, workshops and study visits.

However, the goal and justification of these initiatives taken by Germany within the above mentioned projects is different to that of Poland's, as the point is to mainly improve the institutional capacity of Ukrainian services to effectively assist internally displaced persons. Also, it is difficult to find complementarity with Polish initiatives. Nevertheless, having in mind the overall difficulties reported by respondents and related to the coordination of initiatives taken by all donors in Ukraine, it should be stated that the initiatives taken by Poland do not overlap with the activities implemented by other donors, which could be regarded as a success. In the case of the German project, such a guarantee was the concentration of support in eastern Ukraine due to the ongoing conflict, while Polish projects were implemented mostly in western Ukraine. However, attention should be paid to the significant scale of committed funds and consequently, the volume of the support provided by the Germans (for more information see: report on benchmarking). In view of this, it is worth considering using the existing coordination channels so as to find a demarcation line for not overlapping initiatives on the one hand, and to search for a way to combine efforts to obtain a synergy impact on the other hand. This is especially important in the case of launching advisory support that is developed at the central level, and then implementing new models of activity (e.g. regarding volunteer fire service). Such an approach prevents the concurrent development of different model solutions. Nonetheless, it should be stated that such a risk is negligible due to the above mentioned lack of donors' interest in this particular area of support.

Interestingly enough, Poland is different from other donors in that it supports rescue services in Ukraine regularly. It can be said that there is a niche in development aid in Ukraine that is filled up by Polish aid. This is particularly important in terms of image impact. When various donors are intensely operating in Ukraine, the fact that one area of support has been almost completely monopolised leaves room for higher visibility of Polish development aid in this country.

A lack of significant activity of other donors in this area is justified by difficulties related to cooperation with the Ukrainian administration, which is uneasy due to formality, hierarchy and inflexibility in acting, which are even highlighted with regard to cooperation with different services. In this respect, the Poles, as compared to other donors, are assessed very positively by the support beneficiaries (projects implemented in cooperation with the Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and the French have been mentioned). As compared to other donors, the Poles stood out on account of their cultural affinity, similarity of the language and mentality, which makes it possible to establish closer relationships, eliminate barriers between partners and increase effectiveness of support. Moreover, Polish development aid was characterised by high practicality of the conducted trainings, good understanding of, and adjustment to local specificities.

The VFS solutions introduced in Ukraine are quite often based on Polish pre-war regulations. No other models, apart from the Polish ones, are taken into consideration by the Ukrainian authorities, so in this respect it can be stated that they are a 'Polish export product'. Poland is a leader in implementing fire-fighting projects, which for some time have been our specialisation due to the fact that Polish solutions are easily adopted in Ukraine. This is our advantage over other donors' initiatives. Also, an important thing is that Polish procedures and solutions are based on European standards.

Our experiences related to decentralisation have made us an expert in this field. Ukraine can easily take advantage of these experiences and base its own solutions on Polish templates because those applicable in the countries of West Europe are not familiar to it and are often inadequate since they do not fit in with the country's realities.

Despite the fact that the funds allocated to supporting Ukraine in respect of public security under Polish development cooperation are small as compared to the funds committed by other donors in various support areas, our aid has some features which distinguish it from the aid provided by other countries, such as regularity, complexity along with specialist profiles. Discontinuing funding for such initiatives is bound to cause a considerable damage in terms of image and prestige.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Poland differs from other donors in systematic, complex and specialist support provided to rescue services in Ukraine. Discontinuing funding for such initiatives is bound to cause considerable damage in terms of image.

2. The area of enhanced security in Ukraine by supporting different rescue services is a Polish niche, while fire-fighting projects are a 'Polish export product'.

3. Neither complementarity of Polish security initiatives with other donors' initiatives nor any overlapping activities in this area have been observed.

4. Polish development aid is distinguished by adjustment to the Ukrainian realities, an approach to passing on practical solutions and cultural affinity, but also by similarity of the language and mentality, which positively impacts aid efficiency and effectiveness. The Ukrainian party willingly uses Polish templates, which can be easily copied and which fit in with the local conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is worth considering using the existing channels of coordination of Polish initiatives with other donors to find a demarcation line so that initiatives do not overlap on the one hand, and to search for a way to pool efforts in order to obtain a synergy impact on the other. This is especially important when initiating advisory support to develop and then to implement new models of activity (e.g. regarding volunteer fire service). Such an approach prevents the concurrent development of different model solutions.

## II.5. FACTORS DETERMINING POLISH AID EFFICIENCY

What type of experiences and capacity of Polish organisations and institutions are necessary/particularly fosters project implementation in Ukraine: a) with public administration at different levels, b) with local non-governmental partners c) with other donors (states, international organisations)?

What are the key political, social and organisation limitations and challenges which impact the effectiveness and efficiency of initiatives taken by Polish project promoters and what remedial measures were taken in the process of project implementation in order to offset a negative influence of various barriers on the effectiveness and efficiency of the implemented projects?

(To what extent) do Polish projects present innovative and implementable (from a point of view of the support recipients) solutions?

For the past five years 20 projects received support under Component II and the amount applied for was PLN 4.5m. The chart below presents the values of the projects defined in applications for grants as well as the actual expenditures incurred in particular years (Chart 5.)

Chart 5. Project values planned and settled in particular years

Source: Authors' own work based on conclusions and reports on project implementation

While analysing the budget distribution under Component II for particular years, it should be noted that the biggest allocations of funds were observed in 2012 and 2016, when the most projects were implemented, respectively 8 and 6, whereas in the year 2014 only one project was implemented. The available allocation was used in 90 % and such under-spending resulted mainly from a long-lasting approval of applications and notification of launching resources within the specific provision, which made it impossible to implement the project in its full scope.

The efficiency of the projects implemented under Component II, referred to as the ratio of expenditures incurred to the effects obtained, is increased by the saved resources, because on the one hand they allow to obtain the assumed outcomes at a lower cost, and on the other hand they make it possible to obtain additional outcomes (which were not assumed earlier). Savings in the projects result mainly from fluctuations in the hryvnia exchange rate (a decline in the currency

value), better than the previously assumed terms of reference in public procurement procedures and from cost-free implementation of some project tasks, such as in-house translations |of presentations and training material into the Ukrainian language or conducting trainings as part of official duties. The resources saved in this way are not always returned to the donor but they are earmarked for popularising outcomes and promoting project, and consequently, a pool of the obtained effects is increased by, for example, purchasing additional promotional and stationery materials marked with the Programme logo, portable USB flash drives with an uploaded preventive spot and purchasing additional equipment (e.g. a thermal imaging camera), including devices for conducting trainings (a multimedia projector).

The increased efficiency is also fostered by modifications introduced when projects are in progress. These changes are most frequently caused by delays in taking project initiatives due to long waiting for specific provision funds. A change in project schedules can contribute to the increased indicators of the assumed outcomes or to the obtained additional impact. For example, in the module project: *Increased effectiveness of the emergency response of Ukrainian rescue services* providing two used self-contained trucks for chemical- ecological rescue was postponed until the following year, because it was intended to pass two further vehicles on to the Ukrainian party, which demanded consent of the SFS Chief Commander. Further modifications of this project were aimed at improving its implementation process. Due to economic and practical reasons, a means of transport was changed during a study visit to Kherson. A visit to Ivano-Frankivisk, by contrast, was lengthened by one day because of a number and character of the issues discussed.

The elements which contribute to higher effectiveness of projects implemented under Polish development aid are as follows:

- letters of intent signed by the Ukrainian party which should prevent partners from backing down from taken initiatives,
- number of project participants estimated through consulting the Ukrainian partner at the stage of designing an application for the support to avoid problems with finding a sufficiently large group of recipients,
- projects implemented in the module course, which was indicated by IDI respondents as a strength of the ventures conducted within development aid, which makes it possible to implement complex initiatives and to use conclusions drawn from the previous stages of the project in its subsequent modules,
- informative-educational initiatives taken at different stages: strategic, tactical, managerial with reference to an intervention and executive, for example, trainings and seminars for fire-fighters and conferences for decision-makers (representatives of Voivodeship commands of fire service, fire-fighting schools, state administration, the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergency Situations) organised in parallel,
- trainings organised with participation of interpreters with experience in specialist translations (they are better at putting contents across) and knowledge of the Ukrainian language
  in the case of Polish project coordinator and vice versa (which contributes to a decrease in project costs, makes it easier to communicate for both parties and minimize a risk of language misunderstandings),

- some cost-free initiatives taken by members of a project team and experts within official duties and a possible use of the technical background of the project implementer as their own contribution (e.g. office equipment, rooms, multimedia).

The efficiency of Polish development aid would increase if a multiannual structured plan of initiatives taken to support public security in Ukraine was created and if the aid concentration was narrowed in favour of specialised aid that would focus on several objectives and outcomes. Due to the high effectiveness of the projects in the area of rescue, which have become our specialisation, it is recommended to concentrate the support on these ventures, especially on those which aim to establish volunteer fire service in Ukraine.

II.5.1. EXPERIENCE AND CAPACITY OF POLISH ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

An important role in implementation of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme is ascribed to the staff capacity and substantive capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which is in charge of this aid mechanism, and to the capacity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MIAA), which delegates project implementation to subordinate bodies.

IDI respondents have positively assessed the table principles and procedures on which the Programme is based. Due to the fact that many changes in project funding, reporting or promoting are not introduced, the project implementation is easier. Project documentation is friendlier and its different elements have a logical layout. Also, the Programme is free of excessive bureaucracy, which positively influences the efficiency of works in progress. The support given by the person supervising projects under Component II was highly thought of as well, due to the person's willingness to help and his continuous availability (e.g. the problem of free visas for the Ukrainian participants
of trainings was solved immediately).

The cooperation of MIAA project implementers was as efficient as their MFA counterparts, and it made it possible to refine various elements of applications for the support in detail. The MIAA plays an important role in preparation of this documentation, as it invites subordinate services to submit the so-called project record cards in order to select the most interesting and efficient ventures among them. The next stage, involving refinement of the application, refers solely to the projects selected
by the MIAA. The Department of International Affairs of this Ministry supports project promoters in preparing project applications, if necessary, and corrects them, which translates into the high quality documentation (e.g. high logical cohesion of particular project elements).

The experience and capacity of Polish institutions dealing with the implementation of projects for public security in Ukraine are definitely a strength of development cooperation. The factors which facilitate implementing such ventures and obtaining the assumed impact are among other things, formal arrangements and agreements concluded with the Ukrainian party, e.g. the Implementing Arrangement on cooperation regarding combating organised crime concluded between the Police Chief Commander of the Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs of 2007.

The considerable capacity of Polish entities is also influenced by their great experience in winning and implementing projects which are financed from external resources, e.g. European and Norwegian funds. In some units, e.g. in the VPC in Lublin and the VC SFS there are project teams whose scope of occupational duties include implementing projects, including those referring to international cooperation. The staff capacity of these institutions is also composed of specialists

conducting project trainings. They are usually internal experts, employed in these institutions, e.g. officers in the Crime Department dealing with human trafficking, employees of the Forensic Laboratory, firefighters of the VC SFS in Cracow specialising in extinguishing indoor fires or in road rescue as well as the staff of The Main School of Fire Service dealing with CBRN threats. The participants of some trainings are also specialists from the entities which cooperate with project implementers, e.g. members of a specialist group of chemical and ecological rescue, which was reported as a CBRN module to be used in international operations. Thanks to the staff base of these institutions, it is possible to focus on practical aspects in trainings, which is indicated by Ukrainian recipients as most useful.

The efficiency of Polish development aid is determined not only by the capacity of native institutions, but also by the capacity of its recipients, i.e. capabilities of receiving and using the support given. Partners of many projects implemented under Component II are the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (by 2015 Ministry of Emergencies) and Lviv State University of Life Safety. Both institutions are 'natural' partners for the implementers of projects on public security. The State Emergency Services of Ukraine is a counterpart of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, which supervises fire and police services, whereas Lviv State University of Life Safety plays in Ukraine a similar role to The Main School of Fire Service. Although the university in Lviv does not deal with operational activity, it has a good grasp in the problems and needs of Ukrainian rescue services and it is in a position to popularise the solutions presented within Polish projects nationwide. In 2017 the MSFS signed with Lviv State University of Life Safety an agreement on launching joint fire-fighting university studies, the diploma of which will be recognised in the European Union. In Kharkov there is another fire college which can be included in the implementation of development aid projects, however, this entity does not have such an extensive experience as the university in Lviv and its location is much more distant (about a thousand kilometres to the east of Lviv, 12-hour drive, which considerably increases transport costs and hinders taking projects initiatives).

The information gained during individual in-depth interviews show that project implementers prefer to cooperate with the Ukrainian partners that have proven to be reliable in previous ventures and who can be relied on like, e.g. the Voivodeship Police Command in Lublin, which earlier cooperated with the police of Volyn region within the Programme Poland-Belarus-Ukraine. The Voivodeship Command of State Fire Service in Cracow, by contrast, has established cooperation with a new partner but it was based on working relationships that were struck earlier in Poland and Ukraine.

Cooperation with regular partners is assessed by the two parties very positively. Polish institutions and services are regarded as reliable, trustworthy and efficient partners. As for project implementation, the experience of Ukrainian institutions in taking joint ventures is also of great significance, as it facilitates further initiatives. However, in Ukrainian services there are no project teams, which means that project initiatives are taken by policemen who are busy performing their everyday duties, and consequently there are not enough people capable of evaluating or promoting the project by, for example, operating the project website. There is also a lack of funds for technical assistance. The Polish partner provides the basic things in terms of staff and technical aspects, which facilitates the implementation of ventures financed from external resources, whereas Ukraine lacks in such a basis. For example, during cascade trainings firefighters and policemen are forced to use their own equipment at best because their units do not have portable computers. Despite the fact that the project basis is provided by the Polish partner, the process of project implementation seems to be a great administrative burden to them due to the limited staff resources.

II.5.2. Political, social and organisational barriers

The evaluation research has shown that most barriers in project implementation were objective, i.e. they did not depend on implementers. These difficulties were mostly identified as political and social barriers. The former included the difficult political situation in Ukraine in 2014 (Euromaidan, warfare in the south-east part of the country), which resulted in changes that had to be made in project implementation schedules. A social barrier, by contrast, is corruption-stricken Ukrainian administration, which could procrastinate the settlement of various official matters, and consequently cause delays in project implementation.

A social barrier is also a considerable rotation of Ukrainian managerial staff. A limited professional experience of new officials due to a short seniority at the given position, as well as risks of wasting acquired competences which are not passed on to others by people leaving jobs could significantly decrease the sustainability and efficiency of the obtained outcomes. A lack of continuity at the managerial level, also in the case of the Polish party, might considerably weaken partner cooperation, as it means having to build new relationships.

Also, it is essential that the stability and relevance of training groups should be guaranteed. One of the reported problems was a lack of transparency in the recruitment of participants of project initiatives. It happened that trainings were mainly attended by people holding managerial posts or that taking part in the project was regarded as a kind of reward to employees. Now the problem has been levelled considerably due to the fact that project implementers have defined criteria for recruitment of participants, provided the Ukrainian partner with templates of personal questionnaires
and introduced the requirement of appointing the recruitment committee and of making the recruitment report. There is also a reserve list of participants, which is a kind of collateral in terms of obtaining the assumed outcomes, in case some recipients drop out. Conducting the relevant recruitment of participants is fostered by narrowing the thematic scope of trainings because the concentration on a specific issue helps to select people for whom dealing with it is part of their professional duties.

For new partnerships, a difficulty could be a lack of trust from recipients, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where the culture of cooperation is underdeveloped as compared, for example, to Lviv region, and also a lack of efficient cooperation between particular region using different procedures, which is very important as for projects addressed concurrently to partners from other parts of the country. However, many projects implemented under Component II were the continuation
of the previous initiatives- taken in most cases with the same partners - so the cooperation was stable and the projects were implemented smoothly. The only difficulty, highlighted in the reports on project implementation, was delays in notifying the allocated funds for project implementation and in transferring those resources. Due to the delays relative to the deadlines defined in applications, project implementation in its full scope was difficult and in some cases it was just impossible,
which was reflected in the indicator values. Additionally, some projects were hindered by long-lasting public procurement procedures, which translated into having to modify the project implementation schedule. All the above mentioned factors considerably shortened the project duration, which consequently limited the planned initiatives and brought about lower effects than the assumed.

It is worth pointing out that one of the most frequent difficulty in project implementation, i.e. delays in launching project initiatives, results not only from the factors that do not depend

on the implementer, such as a delayed notification of the competition results or a delayed transfer of funds, but also from formal errors made by project promoters, which hinders the process of signing the agreements on implementing the supported ventures.

Organisational hindrances due to annual budgetary planning are often partially levelled by module projects. A short duration of annual projects, which is limited to a few months due to a long-lasting procedure of launching specific provision funds, considerably narrows the scope of the initiatives taken. There is a risk that taking such initiatives within several separate projects instead of one module project will result in different recipients participating in these ventures. In view of this, trainings would have to overlap and start from the very beginning and the threads already raised could
not be continued. The implementation of module projects makes it possible to plan activities in a broader time perspective and to present more advanced solutions, for example, implementers of trainings can start them with presenting basic knowledge and to finish with discussing European standards. The module course, which provides longer relationships with recipients, makes it possible to better diagnose their needs by getting to know the beneficiary's exact expectations and capacity and by adjusting the initiatives taken to them. However, module projects need to have funding for their subsequent implementation stages ensured because lack of such a guarantee poses a risk and organisational hindrance.

An objective organisational difficulty was also to get free visas for participants of trainings which were held in Poland within the projects implemented by the VPC in Lublin and the VC SFS in Cracow. The problem was solved only after the MFA project supervisor intervened as the implementers' attempts were unsuccessful. Moreover, it was reported that there were some problems with providing the Ukrainian party with equipment, especially vehicles, which have been held at the border
for a few weeks/months (also thermal imaging cameras) because of having to pay a duty. Now the problem is being solved in the way which allows to transfer the trucks within humanitarian aid.

In the project: *Modernisation of Chornohora mountain rescue station* it was necessary to change a partner implementing the project – from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to the non-governmental organization – the Foundation for Development of Social Initiatives. The change was forced by the Ukrainian budgetary regulations which demand that any funds obtained by a central implementing authority (like SESU) become automatically part of the central budget
and in view of this they might not be earmarked for achieving the goal they were allocated to. A change was also made in the scope of the initiatives envisaged in the project. It was due to the fact that a company committed itself to providing windows to the watch-tower- within a campaign promoting and building its brand- only to withdraw, so it was necessary to purchase the windows in order to complete the building.

Another significant barrier visible in Ukraine is the lack of progress in implementing the local government reform. Decentralisation also refers to public security issues, e.g. establishing and financing VFS, because such competences and tasks will be the responsibility of communes. Ukraine lacks a fire-fighting strategy (in this respect only three draft laws have been created so far). The Regulation on establishing VFS of 2013 has not brought about the expected effects, as the system of volunteer units has not been established – only pilot formations were created. Nevertheless, the works on a new law, which is to be connected to the self-government reform, bring hope that the initiatives aimed at establishing VFS will be taken on a broader scale. The military conflict in the

Donbas has revealed a weakness of emergency management in Ukraine, for example in respect of cooperation between services, therefore building a system of Volunteer Fire Service is of great importance as it can strengthen and consolidate local authorities. The failure of the Ukrainian government to implement the self-government reform might significantly limit the scope and impact of Polish development aid, particularly in respect of obtaining a systemic change.

II.5.3. Innovative solutions

In most cases, the projects implemented under Component II included educational initiatives, seminars, equipment purchases and practical exercises using the acquired skills and modern equipment that had not been unavailable before to the Ukrainian services. However, most initiatives were of standard nature and did not make use of innovative solutions. The respondents who participated in in-depth interviews found it a bit difficult to point at novel elements in the implemented projects. In their opinion, innovation can be only discussed from the perspective of the Ukrainian party because the educational contents, solutions, procedures and methods presented by the Polish partner, as well as the equipment and outfit are standard in our country. At the beginning of the 1990s, Polish rescue services were in a similar situation to one Ukraine is in now, but since then Polish fire service and police have acquired modern equipment that does not depart much from European standards. Rescuers from West Europe are sometimes surprised at the high level of our equipment.

Purchases of equipment are some of the examples of innovative initiatives undertaken in public security projects. For the project, *Increased Security Level of Rivne Residents with Special Emphasis Placed on School Youngsters,* equipment was purchased to conduct trainings for firefighters using a mobile firing range simulator of indoor fires, which provided a training opportunity under real fire conditions. *Today and Tomorrow of Practical Training in Fire-fighting*, represents a similar project for which modern trainers simulating indoor fires based on a training module of 30 m^2 were purchased.

Under the project, *Today and Tomorrow of Practical Fire-fighting Training,* not only equipment, but also initiatives to improve work safety and ergonomics, which were presented by the MSFS, represented a new quality for the Ukrainian fire-fighters. The project, *CBRN- Cross-Border Security and Cooperation*, by contrast, brought a novelty to Lviv rescuers, who became authorised to service personal protection equipment.

Let's Protect the Forest against Fire - Innovative Fire Protection Programme of the Natural Environment in Rivne Region is a project that is based on innovation. It was aimed at raising the level of public security by supporting the entity in charge of natural environment safety, which involved providing an innovative system of monitoring forest fires. The project was implemented in three stages. The first stage involved training employees of the Kostopil Forestry Holding in forest fire protection systems in Poland. The second stage consisted of purchasing and installing an audio-visual fire protection system and conducting a specialist training on using the equipment. The third stage involved implementing a system based on modern satellite and radio technologies. Initiatives that had an impact on developing awareness and a pro-ecological attitude among the residents when it comes to preventing fires, as well as the engagement of social organisations operating in the area of environmental protection were additional important elements of the project.

The project, *Increased Effectiveness of Emergency Response of Ukrainian Rescue Services*, used an innovative and unique tool for practical training: a mobile smoke and flash-over chamber for simulating indoor fires. Only a few units have such equipment in Europe, the VC SFS in Krakow is the only one in Poland that uses it. Moreover, during trainings on transporting hazardous substances, the equipment for shunting such substances from a tanker was used which was a novelty for the

Ukrainian party. Also, according to the Krakow Command, an innovative aspect of the project was that the project initiatives were addressed not only to units located in western Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk region), but also in the eastern part of the country (Kherson region), where other donors rarely provide support.

Despite the fact that no innovative elements were assumed in the project implemented by the VPC in Lublin on counteracting and combating human trafficking, the solutions and equipment presented to the Ukrainian police unit: the technical aspects, software, laboratory equipment or a modern shooting range turned out to be novelties for the recipients. During their visit to the Forensic Laboratory, the policemen from the Volyn region were very impressed by the well-organised databases. For the Ukrainian party, the problem of forced begging, discussed during a training session on labour exploitation, was also something new, which the Ukrainian party had not encountered of before.

The idea of establishing units of volunteer fire service in Ukraine can also be regarded as innovative because in the past it was not used as a solution. VFS units are deeply rooted in the Polish rescue and firefighting system, which dates back to the pre-war period, while for the Ukrainian firefighters it is a completely new organisational solution.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Considering the staffing and funding limitations as well as the projects' time constraints, their efficiency should be assessed as high. As compared with other donors, our outlays are small, however, we specialise in fire-fighting projects. Due to the experiences gained during the transformation process, the procedures and solutions used by Polish services could be a model for Ukraine to follow as they are easily adoptable there and they are based on European standards.

2. The project efficiency is increased by saving funds which could be additionally used for popularising the outcomes and promoting the projects and by making changes in them, usually due to having to wait for the specific provision funds.

3. Other elements increasing the efficiency were mainly: trainings and seminars conducted at different levels concurrently (strategic, tactical, and executive) as well as organisational solutions (e.g. letters of intent, estimating the number of project participants in consultation with the Ukrainian party).

4. Project implementers prefer to cooperate with Ukrainian partners who have 'passed the test' in previous ventures (e.g. the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the Lviv State University of Life Safety).

5. Polish institutions' big potential is determined by: formal arrangements and agreements concluded with the Ukrainian party, a track record of implemented projects, including international ones, the presence of project teams existing in fire service and police units, substantive experience of specialists conducting trainings (usually they are in-house experts), as well as working contacts and long-term cooperation with the Ukrainian party which helps to launch new projects.

6. An important role in the implementation of the Multiannual Programme of Development Cooperation is played by staff and substantive capacity of the MFAs and the MIAA, which delegate project implementation to subordinate bodies. The stable principle and procedures on which the Programme is based, friendly documentation, lack of excessive bureaucracy, and support provided by the supervisor of the projects make it easier to implement them.

7. Different obstacles came up during the implementation of these projects which were generally overcome. Objective problems over which implementers had no control included: Ukraine's difficult political situation and corruption on the one hand, and delaying information about awarded project funds, late transfers of funds, and protracted public procurement procedures on the other hand. The late start of project initiatives was also caused by formal errors committed by grant recipients which postponed in time the signing of contracts.

8. Staff turnover at the managerial level, the lack of transparency during the recruitment of project participants, and the inability to ensure stable staffing in the trained groups represented some other difficulties, but the last two problems have been overcome. Project implementation could also be hindered by the lack of recipients' trust, poor cooperation between particular regions, as well as the lack of project teams in the Ukrainian party.

9. Educational content, applied solutions, procedures and methods of operation, as well as equipment and outfit, which are the standard in our country, are regarded as innovative elements by the Ukrainian party.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The efficiency of Polish development aid would be increased if a structured multiannual plan of initiatives in respect of supporting public security in Ukraine was developed, which would be aimed at narrowing down these initiatives, their concentration and specialisation (e.g. in the scope of rescue or establishment of Ukrainian volunteer fire services).

2. Due to the high efficiency of the projects in the area of rescue, which has become a Polish specialisation, it is advisable to concentrate support on these ventures, especially on establishing volunteer fire services in Ukraine.

3. It is recommended that the cooperation with proven partners such as the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the Lviv State University of Life Safety should be continued because these partners are capable of popularising solutions presented as part of Polish projects nationwide.

4. It is advisable to earlier complete the competition and to inform about the funds allocated to project implementation. In the event that it takes a long time before funds from the target reserve are allocated, project initiatives that do not require financial outlays should be implemented.

5. It is also suggested that project initiatives should be addressed to people from both managerial and operational levels concurrently and that module initiatives should be implemented in order to offset the problem of staff rotation and to ensure that the impacts obtained are comprehensive. Also, cascade trainings could help reduce the staff fluctuations.

6. It is recommended to define criteria for recruiting participants in each project and to provide the Ukrainian partner with personal questionnaires templates, to introduce the requirement of appointing a recruitment committee and to write a report. The recruitment form should include a description of professional experience, motivation for project participation as well as information on how the knowledge and skills gained during the project implementation will be used.

III. RESULTS OF SWOT ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
o Polish aid specialises in fire-fighting projects, which are our 'niche' and a 'Polish export product. o Great horizontal synergy of the projects, which fall into place - subsequent ventures are based on the experiences of previous initiatives. o Initiatives adjusted to Ukrainian realities and a practical-oriented approach o Cultural affinity, similarity of languages and mentalities, which positively impact the efficiency and effectiveness of aid. o Good and close cooperation with Ukrainian partners which facilitates taking initiatives. o High effectiveness in obtaining the assumed hard outcomes and outputs. o Great capacity and experience of Polish institutions, including MIAA initiatives, which translate into high quality project documentation. o Stable principles and procedures on which the Programme is based, friendly documentation, a lack of excessive bureaucracy and the support of project supervisor facilitate their implementation. o Initiatives regarding public security are targeted at complementary groups of recipients (managerial and operational staff concurrently). o Conducted extensive, comprehensive and specialist practical trainings. o Solutions and procedures are presented by the Polish party on the basis of EU standards: modern equipment possessed by Polish services. o Projects implemented in the module procedure, which makes it possible to carefully recognise the recipients' needs and to undertake comprehensive initiatives (e.g. training cycles). o Infrastructural initiatives and equipment transfers, as well as combining these components with trainings, which ensures project sustainability. o Benefits from cross-border cooperation - improved security of the Polish borders and of the EU's external border.	o Projects are not connected with other donors' initiatives (except for cross-border cooperation under the PL-BY-UA 2007-2013 Programme). o Staff rotation hinders the sustainability of project outcomes and negatively affects efficient cooperation between the existing partners which leads to a lack of continuity in this regard. o Long-lasting procedure of launching funds from the specific provision, delayed notification of allocated funds and transfers of the funds. o Lesser possibility of project implementation in eastern Ukraine due to the warfare in progress and considerable distances (underdeveloped roads and high transport costs). o Projects are promoted only in their duration, mostly on the websites of implementers. A lack of minimum standards with regard to the form and scope of information presented, which weakens the image impact of Polish aid. o Lack of stable project teams in institutional structures in the Ukrainian party. o Occasional measurement of the level of planned soft outcomes obtained.
CHANCES	**THREATS**
o Reform of Ukrainian government and local government administration makes it possible to introduce changes in the rescue system	o Lack of continuity of initiatives aimed at the self-government reform could block establishing the structures of volunteer fire service in Ukraine.

(e.g. to establish volunteer fire services).	o Lack of a multiannual plan for supporting public security in Ukraine.
o The Ukrainian party is willing to use Polish templates which are easily implemented as they fit in with local conditions.	o Poor coordination of the implemented projects with initiatives of other donors poses a risk of their overlapping with the initiatives of other donors or working out different model solutions in parallel.
o Insignificant 'competition', i.e. other donors implementing projects in the same thematic and geographical area (western Ukraine).	o The outcome sustainability or deferred impact of the projects implemented in Ukraine are not monitored, therefore it is not certain whether and how the equipment provided serves for recipients and how they use the competences acquired during trainings.
o Considerable shortages of equipment, competence and procedures give rise to prospects for subsequent aid initiatives with participation of new recipients and in new thematic areas.	o Project implementation is hindered by objective factors, independent of implementers: the political situation in Ukraine, corruption, considerable staff rotation.
o Development projects could be beneficial for our economy, as Ukraine is a potential selling market for Polish goods and services.	o Underdeveloped culture of cooperation in eastern Ukraine as compared to e.g. Lviv region, as well as a lack of efficient cooperation between regions which use different procedures.
o Ukrainian partners are willing to maintain working relationships and establish long-term cooperation with the Polish party.	
o Educational content, applied solutions, procedures and methods of acting, as well as equipment and outfit, which are the standard in our country, are regarded as innovative elements by the Ukrainian party.	
o The agreement signed in 2017 by the MSFS and the Lviv State University of Life Safety enables the organisation of joint fire-fighting university-level studies whose diploma will be recognised in the European Union.	
o Free-of-charge airing of preventive advertising spots on Ukrainian regional public TV creates an opportunity to disseminate project outcomes (concerning e.g. human trafficking and other threats) without having to incur considerable expenditures.	
o Visa-free border traffic with Ukraine eliminates one of the difficulties encountered in project implementation.	

One of the strengths of the projects implemented under Component II is their high level of horizontal synergy, i.e. cohesion and sequence of initiatives undertaken to enhance public security in Ukraine. These ventures fall in line logically because further projects are based on the experiences of previous initiatives. They are not ad hoc spot activities, but projects that fall into a certain strategy, which does not exist in the form of one document, but nevertheless ensures their sustainability, impact and efficiency. It is justifiable to talk about Polish specialisation in fire-fighting projects, which are our 'niche' and a 'Polish export product'. The reform of Ukrainian central and local governmental bodies provides an opportunity to make changes in the rescue system (e.g. to establish volunteer fire service). At the same time, abandoning these reforms could block the formation of volunteer fire service structures in Ukraine. The lack of a multiannual plan for supporting public security initiatives in Ukraine also represents a major threat to Polish development aid.

The success of Polish development projects depends on many factors – cultural affinity (similarity of the languages and mentalities), good and close cooperation with Ukrainian partners. The adjustment

of the support to the Ukrainian realities, as well as an attitude to practical aspects. These elements contribute to high efficiency and effectiveness of obtaining the assumed hard outcomes and outputs. Reporting the obtained level of the assumed soft outcomes is, by contrast, rare, although it could be an invaluable feedback for people conducting trainings and project implementers. It should be stated that neither the outcome sustainability nor the deferred impact of the projects implemented in Ukraine is monitored, therefore it is not certain whether and how the equipment provided serves recipients nor how they use the skills they acquired during trainings.

Due to the ongoing hostilities in eastern Ukraine, substantial cost of transport and bad roads, Polish development aid is focused on the west part of Ukraine. An additional barrier to implementing projects in the east part of Ukraine could be the poorly developed culture of cooperation (as compared to e.g. the Lviv region) and the lack of efficient cooperation between particular regions which apply different procedures. An advantage gained by concentrating Polish initiatives on the west part of Ukraine is small 'competition' from other donors who would implement fire-fighting projects in the same thematic and geographical areas. On the other hand, the lack of connection of the projects with other donors' initiatives (except for cross-border cooperation under the PL-BY-UA Programme) weakens Polish aid and poses a risk of overlapping ongoing ventures, including concurrent development of different model solutions.

The great capacity of Polish institutions, their experience in implementing international projects, as well as their working relationships and long-term cooperation with Ukrainian partners, which in the MSFS's case led to organising joint fire-fighting university studies, is one of the Programme's assets. The capacity of Polish entities is also built by the MFA's and MIAA's initiatives, which translate into high-quality project documentation. The stable principles and procedures on which the Programme is based, friendly documentation, the lack of excessive bureaucracy and support by the project supervisor significantly facilitate their implementation. Visa-free border traffic with Ukraine is another factor that will improve project implementation.

Project implementation is hindered mostly by objective factors over which implementers have no control, such as the political situation in Ukraine, corruption, staff rotation, which negatively affects not only the effectiveness of partner cooperation, but also the sustainability of the obtained outcomes. Unlike Polish services, in Ukraine there are no project teams that could deal with, e.g. project evaluation or promotion. The Programme's weakness is also an incomplete use of its promotional capacity, which weakens the image impact of Polish aid. Development projects are only promoted in their duration mainly on the websites of implementers. The situation could change if minimum standards with regard to the form and scope of presented information were defined. Gratuitous broadcast of social spots on Ukrainian public TV gives a chance of popularising and promoting projects included preventive initiatives (e.g. referring to human trafficking and other threats).

Module projects, which make it possible to precisely diagnose the needs and the capacity of recipients and to undertake comprehensive initiatives (e.g. complete training cycles) is one of the Polish development aid's strengths. The module procedure under which projects are implemented could offset the negative impact of protracted procedure for releasing funds from the target reserve, and delayed information about awarded financing or the late transfer of funds because it is connected with implementing initiatives over a longer period.

Conducting extensive, comprehensive and specialist trainings addressed to complementary recipient groups, i.e. concurrently to managerial and operational staff, which is made possible by module projects, allows to develop better impacts and contributes to their increased sustainability. This goal is also achieved by taking infrastructural initiatives and transferring equipment, specifically by

combining these components with educational initiatives. The solutions and procedures based on EU standards, which are presented by the Polish party, as well as the modern equipment at the disposal of Polish services increase the utility of the support provided. The Ukrainian party is willing to use Polish templates which are easily implementable because they fit in with local conditions. Big shortages of equipment, competencies of Ukrainian services, as well as public security procedures create prospects for additional aid initiatives with the participation of new recipients, other thematic fields and areas. Something that the Polish party often considers to be the standard, e.g. the provided training content, presented solutions, procedures and methods of operation as well as equipment and outfit, could be regarded as innovative by the Ukrainian services.

It is worth pointing out that the Polish party also benefits from project implementation in Ukraine, mainly because it can develop its institutional capacity, share experiences and improve staff competence, but also contribute to enhanced security at the Polish and the external EU's border. Development projects could provide benefits to our economy, because Ukraine is a potential selling market for Polish goods and services.

IV. TABLE OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS –COMPONENT II

No.	Conclusion	Strategic recommendations	Addressee
1.	Poland differs from other donors in systematic, complex and specialist support for rescue services in Ukraine. This support is a Polish 'niche' and fire-fighting projects can be regarded as a 'Polish export product'. One of the major effect of Polish development aid is a regulation of the Council of Ministers of 2013 on the functioning of volunteer fire services (VFS) in Ukraine.	Support for the process of changing the organisation of the national rescue and firefighting system in Ukraine should be continued because the decentralisation reform (i.e. systemic changes) provides an opportunity to further develop in this regard and Poland can offer Ukraine reliable templates in line with European standards. Discontinuing funding of such initiatives supporting Ukrainian rescue services will result in a major loss of image. The efficiency of Polish development aid would be increased if a structured multiannual plan of support for public security in Ukraine was developed. (Chapter II.5., p. 24)	MFA, MIAA
2.	Complementarity of Polish initiatives for security with initiatives taken by other donors has not been observed, nor have cases of overlapping activities in this area been noticed. Poor coordination of projects implemented together with other donors' initiatives risks overlapping and concurrently developing different model solutions.	Cooperation with other donors on fire-fighting projects could increase the value added of Polish aid by e.g. financing infrastructural projects, renovating VFS or mountain rescue stations and equipping them. The Polish party could become more engaged in 'soft' initiatives, such as developing legislative and organisational solutions or conducting trainings which require less financial outlays. (Chapter II.2., p. 29) Cooperation with other donors requires greater coordination of initiatives taken to avoid their overlapping and to achieve synergy effects. This is especially important in advisory support provided when new models of operation are prepared and implemented to avoid concurrently developed different model solutions. (Chapter II.4., p. 32)	MFA, MIAA

3.	The synergy of projects refers to their area of implementation, the subject matter of the initiatives, their implementers, and recipients. Most projects are implemented in western Ukraine and they are based on ongoing cooperation, including cooperation as part of other funds and programmes (e.g. Norwegian funds, EU funds). The synergy of security initiatives results, to some extent, from the fact that many projects are coordinated by the MIAA. Consequently, ventures do not overlap – each of them builds up a new quality based on the gained experiences and actual needs expressed by beneficiaries.	Subsequent fire-fighting projects should be complementary to previous ventures. It is worth maintaining the present concentration and specialist support for rescue services, but also – in case bigger funds are available- including new recipients in ventures (e.g. company units of fire service in chemical holdings or atomic power stations), new subjects within present areas (e.g. medical rescue, extinguishing fires in railway premises and underground car parks) and regions located in eastern Ukraine where there is no warfare (e.g. Kherson, Cherkasy, Kharkov regions), particularly cooperating with other donors and ensuring the coordination of this support. At the same time it is worth continuing initiatives in western Ukraine due to cross-border cooperation and security of the Polish border and EU external border as well as due to a small risk of overlapping projects and other donors' initiatives. (Chapter II.2. p. 24)	MFA, MIAA
	Conclusion	**Operational recommendations**	**Addressee**
4.	Security projects are characterized by high effectiveness in achieving the assumed hard outcomes and outputs. In some cases their indicators were exceeded (mainly the number of people who were trained and the quantity of equipment or promotion materials provided). The obtained level of the planned soft outcomes is measured sporadically.	It is advisable to promote among project implementers the measurement of soft outcomes in the form of testing knowledge and/or skills evaluated before trainings start and after they finish (pre/post-tests), which will make it possible to assess the obtained level of the adopted assumptions and which will be a feedback for the people who run trainings. (Chapter II.2., p. 26)	MFA
5.	An analysis of media data shows that image impact can be improved when project content is presented in more detail on websites.	It is suggested to consider developing guidelines for project promoters (e.g. in the form of an attachment to an agreement), which would include minimum requirements regarding the scope and mode of presenting information on the Internet. This information should refer to good examples taken from the experiences of other donors/other Polish projects. (Chapter II.2., p. 26)	MFA

6.	The most sustainable impact on project recipients are the knowledge and skills transferred during specialist trainings and later used in the work of fire-fighting and police services, and 'hard' initiatives such as providing equipment to the Ukrainian party, and infrastructural ventures (e.g. modernisation of existing buildings) combined specifically with training activities. Higher sustainability and impact of project outcomes is achieved by providing the Ukrainian party with strictly training equipment (e.g. a trainer), cascade trainings, developed and popularised publications and established working contacts and long-term cooperation.	It is advisable to include elements in projects such as providing equipment to the Ukrainian party and infrastructural initiatives (e.g. renovation of single VFS stations), particularly in cooperation with other donors, and to combine 'hard' components with training activities. Projects should increasingly take in to account cascade trainings and publications (e.g. handbooks, good practices) which increase the sustainability and impact of the assumed objectives. (Chapter II.4., p. 30)	MFA
7.	The outcome sustainability or the deferred impact of the projects implemented in Ukraine are not monitored, therefore it is not certain whether and how the equipment provided serves its recipients and how they use the skills learned during trainings.	Risks connected with the transfer of equipment e.g. its use contrary to the project's aims or its wearing out, including as a result of improper use should not be disregarded. For this reason, equipment servicing and maintenance trainings should be continued under 'hard' projects. Ways in which the transferred equipment is used and how the knowledge and skills learned during training are applied should also be monitored specifically in the longer-term perspective. This initiative could be carried out as part of the ongoing monitoring of projects implemented for the same recipients or by grant recipients (e.g. during one year following the completion of project initiatives), who cooperate with the same partners. The Ukrainian party can also be required to include a plan for using the project impacts in a letter of intent (Chapter II.4., p. 30)	MFA,MIAA other project implementers

8.	Taking account of limitations in terms of staff and funds as well as time frameworks of the projects, their efficiency should be assessed as high. Due to the experiences gained in the transformation process, procedures and solutions used by Polish services could be a model for Ukraine to follow as they are easily adoptable there. The efficiency of the projects (referred to as the ratio of expenditures incurred to the effects obtained) is increased by saved resources, because on the one hand they allow to obtain the assumed outcomes at a lower cost, and on the other hand they make it possible to obtain additional effects (which were not assumed earlier) aimed at promoting the projects. Increased efficiency is also fostered by modifications introduced when projects are in progress. These changes are most frequently caused by delays in taking project initiatives due to long waiting for specific provision funds. A change in project schedules can contribute to increased indicators of the assumed outcomes or to obtained additional impact. Other elements increasing the effectiveness are: trainings and seminars conducted in parallel at different levels (strategic, tactical and executive) as well as some organizational solutions.	It is advisable to earlier announce the winners of the competition and to inform about the funds allocated to project implementation. In the case of a long wait for funds from target reserve, it is recommended to launch project initiatives which do not need expenditures. It is worth popularizing solutions, which increase the efficiency of projects in the following aspects: • organizational, e.g. parallel running of educational initiatives for managerial and operational staff • financial, e.g. in justifiable cases the saved funds should not been returned but spent on popularising and promoting the obtained outcomes, on better satisfying recipients' needs, increasing the obtained impacts, etc. (Chapter II.5., p. 43)	MFA,MIAA other project implementers
9.	Grant recipients prefer to cooperate with Ukrainian partners who passed the 'test' in earlier ventures because they have a track record implementing projects (both in terms of the project substance, its organisation and its formal aspects) and can be relied upon.	Cooperation with tested partners such as the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the Lviv State University of Life Safety should be continued because these partners are capable of popularising solutions presented under Polish projects nationwide. (Chapter II.5., p. 41)	MFA,MIAA other project implementers

10.	The great capacity of Polish institutions is determined by: formal arrangements and agreements concluded with the Ukrainian party, experience in implementing projects, including international ones, project teams existing in units of fire service and police, substantive experience of specialists conducting trainings (usually they are internal experts), as well as working relationships and long-lasting cooperation with the Ukrainian party, which contributes to new projects launched by it. Polish partners are regarded as reliable, efficient and trustworthy. Their capacity is determined by cultural affinity, familiarity with Ukrainian realities and easiness of adapting to them as well as concentration on practical aspects of trainings, which are highly thought of by recipients. As for the Programme implementation, an important role is played by the staff capacity and the substantive capacity of the MFA and the MIAA, which delegate implementing projects to subordinate units. Stable principles and procedures on which the Programme is based, friendly documentation, lack of excessive bureaucracy and the support of project supervisor facilitate their implementation. The MIAA makes a preliminary selection of projects, supports project promoters in preparing applications for funding and also corrects them, which translates into high quality project documentation.	It is worth encouraging project implementers to maintain working relationships and long-term cooperation with Ukrainian partners. It is recommended not to change the present formats of project applications and project implementation reports because the current solutions using in applying for funds as well as reporting prevent excessive bureaucracy. The project supervisor's support for project promoters should be continued and preliminary project selection by the MIAA should be maintained. It is also advisable to see to it that all Voivodeship commands have equal access to the competition. (Chapter II.5., p. 42)	MFA, MIAA, Polish Police Headquarters, Polish Headquarters of State Fire Service, other project implementers
11.	While implementing the projects, various hindrances came up, which in general have been overcome. The objective problems, which did not depend on the implementers were: the difficult political situation and corruption in Ukraine on the one hand , and delayed information on obtaining funds for project implementation, delayed transfers of funds as well as long-lasting public procurement procedures on the other hand . A cause of delays in launching project initiatives was also formal errors made by grant recipients, which hindered the process of signing agreements. Other difficulties involved staff fluctuation at the managerial level and lack of transparency in the recruitment of project participants and in ensuring a constant personal composition in trained groups, however, the two latter problems have already been overcome. Project implementation could also be hindered by lack of trust from recipients, poor cooperation between particular regions as well as a lack of project teams in	It is suggested that project initiatives should be addressed to people from both managerial and operational levels in parallel as well as that module initiatives should be taken in order to level the problem of managerial staff rotation in Ukraine and to guarantee the complexity of the impact obtained. Also, cascade trainings could counteract the staff fluctuations. It is recommended to continue defining criteria for recruiting participants in each project and to provide the Ukrainian partner with templates of personal questionnaires, to introduce the requirement of appointing a recruitment committee and to write a report on its meeting. The recruitment form should include a description of professional experience, motivation for project participation as well as information on how the knowledge and skills gained during the project implementation will be used. In order to decrease a number of formal errors in grant projects, it is worth working out FAQ – a list of the most frequent errors made by project promoters. (Chapter II.5., p. 41)	MFA,MIAA other project implementers

V. LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND CHARTS

VI. APPENDICES

Appendix 1. List of projects undergoing an in-depth analysis

Appendix 2. Case studies

Appendix 3. Report on benchmarking.

Appendix 1. List of projects undergoing an in-depth analysis

1.	66/2014/ADM2014/M	CBRN – cross-border security and cooperation	2015	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration	The Main Department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Lviv Region
2.	346/2016/ADM2016	Combating human trafficking – support for police services in Volyn region**	2016	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration	Main Board of National Police in Volyn region
3.	617/2016/MG2016	Modernisation of Chornohora mountain rescue station *	2016	Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kiev	Initially in the application- State Emergency Service of Ukraine, later at the stage of signing the agreement, the partner was the Foundation for Development of Social Initiatives
4.	215/PPR2012/JST/IN	Today and tomorrow of practical trainings in fire-fighting	2012	Main School of Fire Service	Lviv State University of Life Security
5.	367/2016/ADM2016/M	Increased effectiveness of emergency response of Ukrainian rescue services*	2016	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration	State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Kherson region