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# 1. Programme strategy: main challenges and policy responses

Reference: Article 22(3)(a)(iii), (iv), (v) and (ix) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (CPR)

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| The Programme covers a broad spectrum of actions proposed to be implemented. They will include both the continuation of actions conducted under the Internal Security Fund 2014-2020 (ISF-Police) and some new initiatives. Among the continued actions will be *inter alia* projects aimed at enhancing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions in preventing and combating serious and organised cross-border crime.Actions planned for implementation have been selected on the basis of an analysis of the national needs to ensure a high level of security in the Union, specifically through combating terrorism and radicalisation, serious and organised crime and cybercrime, and to ensure support for and protection of victims of crime, as well as on the basis of multi-level national strategies, including:* *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* – in the area of implementing the model of protection of the critical infrastructure (CI), preventing and responding to crisis situations and terrorist threats, and combating organised crime, including crime in cyberspace.
* *Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for 2019-2024* – in the area of stepping up identification and combating of cybercrime by specialised Police units and other services.
* Plan for adapting Polish government administration bodies to cooperate with modified EU large-scale systems – MasterPlan – in the area of adapting information systems of the Polish Police and other services to cooperate with EU systems.
* *National Programme for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure* – in the area of training and retrofitting Police units and other bodies responsible for identifying and combating threats to the CI.
* *Concept of Border Guard Functioning for 2020-2022, with the perspective up to 2027* – in the area of operations of the Border Guard (BG) as regards the Fund's objectives.
* *National Action Plan Against Trafficking in Human Beings for 2020-2021* (and national action plans for subsequent years, as adopted by the Council of Ministers) – in the area of training and retrofitting of Police units and other services responsible for combating crime relating to human trafficking.

During the process of drafting the Programme, account was also taken of EU-level efforts to introduce changes in the SIS, VIS, Eurodac and implement new systems: EES, ETIAS and, as well as their interoperability with the ISF objectives.The Programme's objectives include ensuring cohesion with the application of the Union acquis and, where applicable, specific actions plans throughout the Programme's life.The social studies conducted demonstrate an increasing sense of security among Poles and a positive assessment of the performance of services involved in preventing and combating crime. Statistics show that, on the one hand, Poland has recorded a slightly increased number of offences (the total number of offences identified in 2019 was 796,557 compared to 768,049 in 2018, an increase by 3.5%) but, on the other, the detection rate in 2019 reached 73.1% and was nearly identical to that in 2018 (73.4%). In addition to defined public expectations regarding security, there are other threats that generate tangible economic and social losses, including organised cross-border crime. In this context, threats in cyberspace (which can target CI and key public services), hybrid attacks, terrorism and organised crime can be considered as the most significant ones. Furthermore, new challenges have been observed as a result of the Russian invasion on Ukraine and mass influx of refugees. Potential threats involve *inter alia* infiltration of crime groups into the country, migrant, weapon and drug smuggling, as well as human trafficking. Therefore, the ISF will provide financing for actions concerning identification of new threats, training and anti-terrorist operations. Among the main challenges faced by Poland, the following priorities can be distinguished:* **Information systems**

Ensuring full and homogeneous application of the Union acquis on security to support exchange of information (including PNR and SIS (Police) data, Europol data, implementation of the Schengen assessment recommendations issued to Poland). Acquiring and adapting relevant tools to eliminate identified loopholes in the Union/national information structure in order to broaden the access to Europol's secure operational network for competent authorities at the level of confidence required for the specific character of cooperation and to improve the state of the connection infrastructure (SIENA).* **Organised crime (in the dimensions of economy, drugs, human trafficking, illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives)**

It is important to enhance the capacities to conduct investigations regarding organised crime. The free movement of persons and goods across internal borders is used by organised crime groups to conduct illicit activities. Within the framework of the ISF 2014-2020 the BG implemented a project which was aimed at modernisation of the ICT resources which support criminal operational analysis and involved purchases of hardware and software. A total of 2,136 analytical products were made at the BG in 2018-2020. All operational and exploratory actions taken by the BG, including criminal operational analysis, are aimed at combating and preventing cross-border crime. Criminal operational analysis, as an essential element of the exploratory, operational and investigative activities, directly contributes to combating organised crime and is also used for the purposes of other law enforcement agencies, e.g. prosecutors. Retrofitting with specialised software used in criminal operational analyses as well as operational and investigative activities in cyberspace increases the quality of the detective processes.The efficiency of individual administrative services and bodies that conduct security-related tasks depends *inter alia* on a high level of competence of officers and staff, professional management, adequate equipment and accurate identification of threats. In this context, it is essential to build new and modernise the existing ICT systems and tools to enable law enforcement agencies and other competent bodies to effectively detect and prosecute perpetrators. Moreover, strategic documents indicate that it is necessary to create optimal conditions in the area of research and training. Poland identifies the needs for preventing and combating organised crime including, in particular in the dimensions of economy, drugs, human trafficking, illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.* **Cybercrime**

Recognising the growth rate and scale of threats associated with the development of crime in cyberspace, actions are taken to increase the efficiency of prosecution of crimes committed in the electronic environment. Terrorist and organised crime groups use cyberspace to conduct terrorist, criminal and disinformation activities. In this context, it is essential to develop the capacities of competent Member State authorities to more effectively prevent and combat cybercrime (training, appropriate tools).* **Combating of corruption**

Poland considers the crime of corruption as a major challenge. Preventing and combating corruption in Poland is the responsibility of a number of bodies, with the dominant role played by State institutions, including law enforcement agencies and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, the latter of which is a service established to combat corruption in economic and public life. There is also cooperation with NGOs, whose domain encompasses counteracting corruptive practices. It is important to facilitate cooperation and operational coordination, exchange of information and training, and strengthen the capacities of national authorities.* **Combating financing of terrorism**

Combating money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT) represents another important area. The AML/CFT system in Poland consists of the General Inspector of Financial Information (GIFI), obligated institutions and cooperating units. Proper cooperation and exchange of information between all three components ensure the optimal use of available resources and provide for achieving synergies in the system. In 2019, the GIFI information system recorded 4,100 descriptive reports on suspicious activities and transactions, in addition to information about 35.26 million so-called above-threshold transactions. In 2019, the GIFI initiated 2,501 analytical proceedings, leading to 320 main notifications on suspicion of money laundering offences. The total value of assets suspected to be the subject of an offence exceeded PLN 11.3 billion. Furthermore, the GIFI blocked 640 accounts with ca. PLN 208 million and suspended 37 transactions worth a total of ca. PLN 31 million.Due to the international dimension of money laundering and terrorist financing offences, the GIFI shares exchanges information with foreign financial intelligence units which transmit information about Polish entities or financial assets (potentially from crime). The joint actions "cut off" criminals from their financial assets, thus preventing them from legalising funds which originate from criminal offences.According to information held by the Ministry of Justice, in 2019 Polish regional courts instituted 182 judicial criminal proceedings for money laundering against 538 individuals, and 157 criminal proceedings for the said offence were completed. In the proceedings conducted, decisions were made to seize financial assets worth a total of PLN 738,579 and property worth a total of PLN 593,271,387 was declared as forfeited.* **Cooperation between law enforcement agencies/training**

Facilitation of the use of operational cooperation mechanisms in the EMPACT context, with special emphasis on cross-border operations. In all areas of crime, Poland aims at strengthening co-operation with the neighbouring countries and EU agencies, in particular with Europol, through increasing training and exercises and exchanging best practices. Throughout implementation of the Programme, Police activities in the area of training will be aligned with actions taken by Europol, CEPOL and ECTEG. With respect to forensic techniques, Poland acknowledges the need for continuous development of technologies, methods and procedures, including improvements in the research infrastructure and personnel competences.The future calls for projects covering training activities will take into account the findings of the strategic assessment of EU training needs, including identified capacity gaps, i.e.:• Digital skills and use of new technologies• High-risk criminal networks• Financial investigations• Cooperation, exchange of information and interoperability• Crime prevention• Falsification of documents• Forensics• Fundamental rights and data protection.* **Protection of infrastructure and citizens**

Protecting public spaces (strengthened cooperation, enhanced protection against threats, purchase and use of CBRNE threat detection devices), responding to internal threats, protecting CI. * **Prevention of radicalisation and hate crime, support for victims of crime**

Inter-agency cooperation (exchange of information) between relevant organisations to manage the risk posed by radicalised individuals (specialist training for officers, officials and other entities involved).Development of mechanisms and best practices in the area of early identification, protection and support of witnesses and victims of crimes. In particular, the intention is to support initiatives addressed to vulnerable target groups.Actions to be conducted under the Programme will contribute in particular to the following strategic objectives for the years 2021-2027:* Increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions in preventing terrorism and radicalisation, combating serious and organised crime, corruption, cybercrime other threats to security, including the impact of disinformation on the public.
* Increasing competencies of officers and employees of law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions who are tasked with preventing and combating various forms of crime, as well as purchasing the necessary equipment.
* Improving inter-institutional cooperation between law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions, including with Europol, strengthening cooperation in the area of exchange of information (e.g. forensic data) with the use of the SIENA app, developing new procedures and best practices at national level as well as cooperation with foreign partners to prevent and combat terrorism and radicalisation, serious and organised crime and cybercrime.
* Modernising the existing national ICT systems, hardware and equipment used for preventing and combating crime and for exchanging information in accordance with EU requirements.
* Developing the necessary IT solutions and measures to improve exchange of information between law enforcement agencies, other competent authorities and EU bodies, interoperability with the existing or planned IT systems and databases developed by the EU or other Member States.
* Ensuring effective utilisation of national and EU information systems: PNR, SIS II and others – to the extent that these systems are used by the Police for the purposes covered by ISF financing.
* Developing procedures and measures to support and protect victims of crimes and individuals who report crimes.
* Increasing equipment capacities of services and institutions involved in crisis management, civil protection and the protection of public spaces and CI.
* Improving cooperation and exchange of information, increasing knowledge and coordination, developing new procedures and best practices between all stakeholders involved in crisis management, civil protection as well as the protection of public spaces and CI.
* It will be the priority to implement the recommendations issued as a result of the Schengen assessment in the area of Police cooperation, shall any such recommendations be issued in the MFF period. Poland was evaluated in 2019 within the framework of the Sch-Eval mechanism in terms of the implementation of the Schengen acquis in all fields, including Police cooperation. The evaluation resulted in 20 recommendations regarding the need to take actions in the aforementioned area. In response, an Action Plan was prepared in early 2021 to rectify the identified inefficiencies, which was assessed by EC as adequate. As of 26 October 2022, seven recommendations were implemented, with the others yet to be implemented.

Due to the geopolitical and economic situation, inflation and price rises, one must take into account the risk of exceeding the 35% allocation ceiling for the purchase of equipment, means of transport or construction of security-relevant facilities.The actions will be complementary to actions taken under the Integrated Border Management Fund (BMVI and the Customs Instrument), e.g. in the area of large-scale EU IT systems, cooperation with law enforcement agencies in matters relating to migrant smuggling and information gathering. Synergy will be established with other financial mechanisms, including the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Cohesion Policy Funds. Complementarity and synergy between funds covered by the partnership agreement, AMIF, ISF, BMVI and other Union instruments was described in detailed in the *Partnership Agreement on Implementation of the Cohesion Policy in Poland in 2021-2027*.Due to the increased allocation and new obligations imposed under Regulation no. (EU) 2021/1060 on common provisions, it is required to increases the employment at the MA and IB. Institutions involved in actions programming, implementing, monitoring and controlling will ensure the administrative capacities and institutional experience necessary to implement ISF actions. Simplified cost options were available in the 2014-2020 perspective to the minimum extent. Introduction of that system requires prudence due to the risk of decreased the value and scope of services actually provided to the end users. Poland does not intend to use financial instruments as an additional form of support. |

# 2. Specific objectives and technical assistance

Reference: Article 22(2) and (4) of the Common Provisions Regulation

|  Selected | Specific objective or technical assistance | Type of action |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [x]   | 1. Exchange of information | Regular actions |
| [ ]   | 1. Exchange of information | Specific actions |
| [x]   | 1. Exchange of information | Actions set out in Annex IV |
| [x]   | 1. Exchange of information | Operating support |
| [ ]   | 1. Exchange of information | Emergency assistance |
| [x]   | 2. Cross-border co-operation | Regular actions |
| [x]   | 2. Cross-border co-operation | Specific actions |
| [x]   | 2. Cross-border co-operation | Actions set out in Annex IV |
| [x]   | 2. Cross-border co-operation | Operating support |
| [ ]   | 2. Cross-border co-operation | Emergency assistance |
| [x]   | 3. Preventing and combating crime | Regular actions |
| [ ]   | 3. Preventing and combating crime | Specific actions |
| [x]   | 3. Preventing and combating crime | Actions set out in Annex IV |
| [ ]   | 3. Preventing and combating crime | Operating support |
| [ ]   | 3. Preventing and combating crime | Emergency assistance |
| [x]   | TA.36(5). Technical assistance – flat rate (Article 36(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation) |  |
| [ ]   | TA.37. Technical assistance – Financing not linked to costs (Article 37 of the Common Provisions Regulation) |  |

## 2.1. Specific objective: 1. Exchange of information

### 2.1.1. Description of the specific objective

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| **Initial situation**The challenges include modernisation of large-scale EU IT systems (e.g. SIS, Eurodac – in the area of preventing and combating crime as well as Police cooperation), implementation of new large-scale EU IT systems (e.g. EES, ETIAS, ECRIS-TCN) together with Interoperability, including potential modernisation of the PNR. It requires *inter alia* adapting the national systems to the SIS and SIRENE operating processes planned on the EU forum. Actions taken under the Programme will be complementary to actions under the BMVI. Furthermore, the Police operates the SIS. Europol has become a new user of the SIS. As a result, a higher efficiency and reliability of systems which ensure inter-institutional cooperation.Developing high-quality processes of cooperation and exchange of information requires implementing advanced technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence tools), acquiring advanced knowledge and adopting modern data management strategy.The Central Investigation Bureau of Police (*Centralne Biuro Śledcze Policji*, CBŚP) utilises the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) which meets the communications needs of law enforcement agencies in EU Member States and selected third countries up to the restricted level of classification. At present, the Police (including the CBŚP) does not have any infrastructure that would enable it to use SIENA CONFIDENTIAL, which limits the information exchange capabilities of Poland's law enforcement agencies in the area of combating terrorism.Implementation of Directive (EU) no. 2016/681 on the PNR in Poland is the responsibility of the Polish Border Guard (BG), within which a National Passenger Information Unit has been formed. Processing of PNR data is supported by the PNR National Information System (PNR NIS) with the participation of forensic analysts and specialised analytical tools. Over the years of operation, the PNR have shown that the growing experience in the use of PNR data entails a growing demand for better functionality, changes and increased efficiency. The volume of PNR data is growing (Dec 2018 – 2,648,037, Dec 2019 – 7,267,404, an increase by more than 2.5 times; Jan 2019 – 2,073,850 to Jan 2020 – 7,130,027, an increase by nearly 3.5 times), just like the number of requests submitted to the National Passenger Information Unit (the quantity of approved requests was in 3,147 in 2019, 3,788 in 2020, 2,406 in 2021 (Jan-Jun). Moreover, participants in the EC meetings on the functioning of the PNR Directive raised the subject of expanding PNR data processing to include data for other means of transport (railway, buses and ferries). The Directive provides also for transmitting PNR data by non-carrier economic operators (travel agencies and tour operators), which indicates the need to build new functional modules within the current PNR NIS. The work aimed at closing gaps in the EU information structure will be continued.The BG operates classified systems and networks for secure processing and transmission of information. As information becomes increasingly important, providing secure communication channels – ones that are resistant to attacks by organised crime groups – is ever more essential and requires continuous modernisation of classified networks. It is necessary to increase the qualifications of the staff involved in modernising the existing large-scale EU information systems and implementing new European systems.Exchange of information, in particular criminal information, is important for ensuring the State's internal security. In Poland, the processing and transfer of criminal information falls within the remit of the Commander-in-Chief of Police, who performs the related tasks through the National Criminal Information Centre (*Krajowego Centrum Informacji Kryminalnych*, KCIK). Entities entitled to receive information from the KCIK include e.g. the prosecution service, Police, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (*Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne*, CBA), Internal Security Agency (*Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, ABW), BG and National Revenue Administration (*Krajowa Administracja Skarbowa*, KAS).The system for anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism requires optimisation. The General Inspector of Financial Information (GIFI), Poland's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), has access to two information exchange networks enabling it to cooperate with FIUs from more than 100 States. At present, benefits from the exchange of information are limited by the lack of an automatic data download/upload interface between the said systems and the FIU's internal ICT system, and by incomplete utilisation of swap file formulas. It is necessary to include more of the information acquired in the automated data download and verification process, and to automate the data preparation process, which will provide for efficient acquisition of additional information relevant to the analytical processes, and enhance the efficiency of acquisition and publication of information. The GIFI has no direct access to SIENA at present and it relies on Poland's Europol National Unit in this respect, which limits the GIFI's capacity to take part in AML/CFT-oriented EMPACT priorities and to directly cooperate with other State's authorities countering money laundering and terrorism financing activities, including cross-border ones. It is necessary to establish a direct access to SIENA, which will provide for *inter alia* enhancing cooperation with other Member States as part of EMPACT, extending the scope of cooperation with competent authorities in other States, and intensifying cooperation with Europol. Furthermore, the proposed changes to the legal basis for the functioning of Europol may allow it in the future to process all categories of data held by FIUs, which will enable the GIFI to submit queries via SIENA.The Police now faces the necessity of digitalising actions relating to the service of its officers, which involves personnel training and equipment acquisition (e.g. replacing service notepads with mobile terminals will provide for immediate access to national and international information resources and databases). The National Security Threat Map provides law enforcement agencies with new information and its development and potential for integration with other systems will contribute to increasing its utility for the purposes of criminal analysis and provision of data for relevant analytical processes. Fight against cybercrime is another challenge. The number of cybersecurity incidents and cyberattacks targeted at offices, hospitals and schools has increased significantly, with a growing number of attacks observed in the private sectors and with respect to citizens. In the first half of 2020 alone, NASK's Computer Security Incident Response Services (CSIRT) received 16,689 reports, of which 5,205 were considered cybersecurity incidents (compared to 6,484 incidents in 2019). Computer fraud, including phishing, was the most frequent type of incidents, accounting for over 79% (4,127).Cybercrime is a new and one of the fastest growing forms of cross-border crime. The Internet has become an essential element of life, used for transmitting information and communicating globally. Criminals get access to personal data of other people while remaining anonymous. Online security threats have risen significantly in recent years.Exchange of experience with foreign partners is essential in the context of constant technological progress, and it translates into more efficient fight against cybercrime. To ensure effective use of tools and services at the disposal of both Europol and Interpol, it is important to maintain a specialised level of linguistic proficiency among officers. Fight against organised crime is also a challenge. The use of new technologies by crime groups to communicate, transfer data and information, and to conceal/legalise proceeds from organised crime is the primary concern in the area of detection and counteraction of such crime. The volume, scope and format of information acquired, specifically concerning organised economic crime, is a problem. It is therefore required to increase analytical capabilities of law enforcement officers and to equip them with analytical tools.Major problems include opening bank accounts with the use of personal data of identity theft victims and supplying the numbers of opened accounts to fraudsters, the lack of the central register of buyers of securities, the lack of a unified standard for exchange of information subject to banking secrecy, which hinders its analysis, and there is no software supporting such analysis. It is necessary to modernise, streamline and combine operations of crime information exchange systems. Combating traditional crime and fast identification and prevention of its new types, requires constant provision of state-of-the-art equipment and technical solutions to the services concerned. At present, the level of knowledge of liveforensic and triage held by law enforcement officers is inadequate, and qualified and well-trained staff is required. In this context, provision of additional training and modernisation can also produce an added value in the area of exchange of information on drug cases based on improved forensic analyses.Furthermore, the need has been identified to involve the Weapons and Ballistics Department of the Forensic Laboratory (FL) in the operations of the planned national firearms focal point in order to ensure transfer of information, particularly on weapon conversions or home-made weapons.In addition, as the available financial resources permit, it is planned to take actions involving implementation and modernisation of fast, reliable and secure communications for *inter alia* the services concerned.**Union acquis / planned actions**A number of EU and domestic documents were taken into consideration when setting out the priorities, including, but not limited to:* Plan for adapting Polish administration bodies to cooperate with modified EU large-scale systems – MasterPlan; Action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing; EU action plan on firearms trafficking for the years 2020-2025;
* Programme of Integrated Computerisation of the State;
* PNR Directive laying down the rules which facilitate the use of financial and other information
* Regulation on the SIS and interoperability framework
* Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for the years 2019-2024.

**Investments made under the ISF-Police 2014-2020**Projects implemented by the beneficiaries involved e.g. construction, modernisation and maintenance of systems, databases, as well as purchases of equipment and accessories, modernisation of IT systems, i.e.* modernisation of the MAN MEWA network – the network is used for e.g. operational purposes of the Police (classified IT systems)
* modernisation of mobile access to Police information systems – enabling fast checks in Police and non-Police information systems (e.g. SIS)
* implementation of the System for Exchange of Information with Europol (SWIzE) at Field Branches of the CBŚP – deployment of a SWIzE access station with direct access Europol apps and databases
* modernisation of the hardware platform for the central information systems (e.g. SIS) – it contributed to improving the quality, availability and reliability of the systems operation
* modernisation of the ICT resources that support criminal operational analysis at the BG
* construction of the National PNR Component
* specialist training and post-graduate studies (forensic IT, cybersecurity)
* innovative tools for acquiring and securing digital data – the software will enable securing digital data based on the triage methodology, whereas the innovative Fast Binary Copy module will provide for acquiring data with rapid sampling and sifting collector methods
* construction of an integrated central system of information on files (hash) connected with criminal activity
* increasing the Police capacities to conduct geospatial criminal analyses
* increasing the capacities of institutions in the area of exchanging and processing intelligence through SIENA.

**The actions planned will contribute to achieving SO1 while taking into account the following implementation measures a), b) and d).** **As part of implementation measure a):*** Adaptation and maintenance of ICT systems, training, tests, improvement of components that ensure data quality in the systems, e.g. through the development of the SIS, the Europol's operating system. Modernisation of the PNR NIS as well as ICT assets which support criminal analysis, cyber intelligence and protection against attacks from cyberspace; cooperation with national and foreign bodies aimed at effective utilisation of PNR, improvement of its functionality, introduction of changes and increased efficiency.
* Implementation of the Schengen evaluation recommendations e.g. in the area of the SIS and data protection.
* Purchase of equipment, communications systems (the same types of equipment can be repeated in different implementation measures and will be selected as needed).

**As part of implementation measure b):*** Creation, adaptation and maintenance of ICT systems, training, tests and improvement of components that ensure interoperability. Adaptation of the national systems – including ones operated by the services and the system for exchange of national and international information – to the requirements of the changing EU information systems and their interoperability tools (including the processes relevant to the functioning of the SIS and SIRENE Office planned on the EU forum).
* Modernisation of the premises used for the purposes of operating the Europol system, adaptation and adjustment of the building and furnishing of the premises to ensure 24-hour execution of tasks regarding points of access to PNR, VIS data and the newly created EES and ETIAS (**for ISF objectives only**).
* Purchase of equipment, communications systems (as above in point a).

**As part of implementation measure d):*** Improvement of the flow of information on criminal cases, maximisation of the speed of exchange of information between the State/local government administration and bodies that detect and prosecute perpetrators of crime and prevent and combat crime.
* Implementation of new functionalities in the national systems following the establishment of the EU information system interoperability framework. Establishment of the so-called Central Access Points for data processed at newly created EES and ETIAS systems to prevent terrorist and other serious crime.
* Extension and modernisation of systems which process classified information related to crime prevention and combating and to the exchange of information with other services.
* Improvement of the process of registering and verifying data of persons suspected of involvement in a terrorist incident.
* Improvement of the AML/CFT system through modernisation of ICT systems and direct access to SIENA for competent bodies, e.g. the GIFI, in accordance with the needs.
* Streamlining the exchange of Police information, including internationally, to ensure fast detection of threats, crime responsiveness and effective prosecution of perpetrators.
* Development of comprehensive IT methodology and infrastructure solutions to support detection in cyberspace.
* Enhancement of the FL's forensic capacity by using state-of-the-art devices for electronic registration of traces, markings and characteristics of firearms. Providing for fast transmission of data obtained during examinations to the national firearms focal point.
* Purchase of equipment, communications systems (as above in point a).

The aforementioned actions under implementation measures a, b and d will be implemented through purchasing, replacing and modernising ICT hardware and software, as well as training and developing relevant procedures and system documents.The purchases will involve equipment understood as tangible fixed assets, such as e.g. disk arrays, servers, terminals, storage virtualisation devices and accompanying equipment. It is also planned to implement projects connected with adapting and equipping the premises used for the purposes of the ICT systems in service. It is planned that the aforementioned actions will take ca. 15% of the allocation.The actions taken will include actions referred to in Annex IV to the ISF Regulation, e.g. projects which aim to improve the interoperability of EU information systems and national ICT systems. **Operating support**Expected beneficiaries: the Police and Border Guard.The responsibilities of the Police Commander-in-Chief include *inter alia* ensuring the maintenance of the reliability of the National Information System (NIS) in accordance with the EU requirements and standards regarding international systems of the Schengen area, as well as making it available to other authorised bodies of public administration that have a key role in ensuring security in the country and across the Schengen area and the EU territory. It is planned to take actions regarding management and administration of EU systems EU (on-going maintenance and operation) and staff costs. The support will take into account modernisation and maintenance of systems connected with the EUROPOL network*.*In 2017-2018, the BG implemented a project of vital importance to Poland and the EU titled *Construction of the National PNR Component*. In order to ensure adequately efficient, redundant and secure infrastructure, it is planned to modernise the computing power and data storage infrastructure supporting the system, and to conduct comprehensive modernisation of PNR devices.The Central Database EWIDA, implemented under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/103, is another system that supports the BG.Maintenance of the aforementioned systems, which take active part in the processes of preventing and combating crime and exchanging information the BG and other public order services, will require increased utilisation of the computing power resources. The disk space of those systems will also be expanded and their server component will be modernised, network devices and necessary equipment will be purchased, and a backup data processing centre will be established. Staff costs are also planned. |

2.1. Specific objective 1. Exchange of information

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: Article 22(4)(e) of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 1: Output indicators

| ID | Indicator | Measurement unit | Milestone (2024) | Target (2029) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| O.1.1 | Number of participants in training activities  | number | 200 | 1,000 |
| O.1.2 | Number of expert meetings/workshops/study visits  | number | 5 | 13 |
| O.1.3 | Number of ICT systems set up/adapted/maintained | number | 0 | 5 |
| O.1.4 | Number of equipment items purchased | number | 50 | 150 |

2.1. Specific objective 1. Exchange of information

2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: Article 22(4)(e) of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 2: Result indicators

| ID | Indicator | Measurement unit | Baseline value | Baseline value measurement unit | Reference year/years | Target (2029) | Target measurement unit | Source of data | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| R.1.5 | Number of ICT systems made interoperable in the Member States/with security-relevant EU and decentralised information systems/with international databases  | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 4 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.1.6 | Number of administrative units that have set up new, or adapted existing, information exchange mechanisms/procedures/tools/guidance for exchange of information with other Member States/Union bodies, offices or agencies/international organisations/third countries | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 3 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.1.7 | Number of participants who consider the training useful for their work | number | 0 | participation | 2021 | 850 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.1.8 | Number of participants who report three months after the training activity that they are using the skills and competences acquired during the training | number | 0 | participation | 2021 | 800 | number | Member State - projects |  |

2.1. Specific objective 1. Exchange of information

### 2.1.3. Indicative breakdown of programme resources (EU) by type of intervention

Reference: Article 22(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation and Article 16(12) of the AMIF Regulation, Article 13(12) of the ISF Regulation or Article 13(18) of the BMVI Regulation

#### Table 3: Indicative breakdown

| Type of intervention | Code | Indicative amount (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type of action | 001.ICT systems, interoperability, data quality (excluding equipment) | 19,400,000.00 |
| Type of action | 002.Networks, centres of excellence, cooperation structures, joint actions and operations | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 003.Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) or other joint operations | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 004.Secondment or deployment of experts | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 005.Training | 2,633,310.55 |
| Type of action | 006.Exchange of best practices, workshops, conferences, events, awareness-raising campaigns, communication activities | 1,000,000.00 |
| Type of action | 007.Studies, pilot projects, risk assessments | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 008.Equipment | 9,755,450.00 |
| Type of action | 009.Means of transport | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 010.Buildings, facilities | 670,000.00 |
| Type of action | 011.Deployment or other follow-up of research projects | 0.00 |

## 2.1. Specific objective: 2. Cross-border co-operation

### 2.1.1. Description of the specific objective

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| **Initial situation**Improvement in cooperation between law enforcement agencies is a challenge. Crime has mainly an international character at present. Detecting and combating it require joint actions by different countries and institutions. It is essential to intensify joint cross-border operations of EU law enforcement agencies and other competent authorities regarding serious and organised cross-border crime by virtue of joint training, exchange of experience and maintenance of uniform technological level.It is a priority to execute tasks with the use of operational support resources regarding organised crime, including combating illegal migration and human trafficking organisations, kidnapping, production, smuggling and trade in narcotic substances and illicit tobacco products, theft of property of substantial value, introduction of means of payment generated by criminal activities. Identification of threats posed by cybercrime and its impact on the development of international organised crime is another important issue.The exchange of information at central level is complemented by cross-border cooperation conducted by Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs), which operate at the borders with the Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia and Lithuania. Volumes of information exchanged by the aforementioned Centres as well as expert meetings and case-handling consultations held by the relevant services on both sides of the border as part of that international cooperation at regional level are growing. Europol has provided police forces of EU Member States with a tool for secure exchange of information - SIENA BPL (Basic Protection Level). Poland can undertake a gradual introduction of this tool to the Polish PCCCs, which will require SIENA/Europol training for PCCC officers in the Police, BG and the Customs and Tax Service.Given the global nature of modern crime, it is necessary to conduct specialist language training courses for officers and employees who handle cases which require assistance of law enforcement agencies of other States and who are involved in international exchange of criminal information. Persons who will acquire the language skills will contribute to effective execution of international tasks and projects by being able to enter into direct interactions with foreign entities, including specifically within the framework of the EMPACT 2022+ policy and joint investigation teams. It is also necessary to exchange experience in this respect with foreign partners.It is essential to implement specialised exchange programmes regarding international bilateral cooperation between law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions, including exchange of best practices in acquisition of information. Training in joint operations, including cross-border ones, is essential for officers of the services.11 Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Poland conduct forensic genetics examinations. The require both personnel competencies and highly-specialised hardware and equipment to automate the investigation processes. The capacity to conduct fast genetic tests and register persons and unidentified traces facilitates effective fights against organise crime.Poland is involved in the exchange of DNA and fingerprint profiles with EU Member States. Equipping officers with mobile devices for quick ID checks with a fingerprint reader will provide for improving the detection process regarding various crimes (drug crime, vehicle theft etc.).The changing nature of criminal activities in border areas calls for developing new solutions and employing modern technologies to counter them, including the geographical information system (GIS) for intensification of contacts between police partners in combating cross-border crime.Poland is struggling with the growing problem of drug crime. It can be noticed that the percentage share of recovered narcotic drugs and precursors is growing every year, which shows increasing demand for those substances, also among minors. This leads to increasing creativity of criminal groups in methods of masking the practice. The related trafficking is most often conducted through websites and various technological novelties, to which the Police has limited access. There is a need to intensify monitoring of new markets, such as the Internet, and to improve monitoring of production of synthetic drugs in Poland and the EU. Cannabis plantations are set up in remote locations known only to narrow groups of individuals involved in the criminal activity. The production of psychotropic substances often takes place abroad, where they are imported as unfinished products. All this makes it easier for criminal groups to smuggle them into the country. At present, Poland is leading the EMPACT efforts relating to the priority *New psychoactive substances – synthetic drugs* (NPS/SYD) and will continue to lead that priority in the next EMPACT 2022-2025 cycle. The actions will be coordinated with the National EMPACT Coordinator (NEC), Europol and relevant analytical files (AP Synergy, AP Cola, AP Cannabis, AP Heroin), we well as with EU agencies and institutions/bodies either involved in or supporting EMPACT groups – including *inter alia* the EC, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, CEPOL, EMCDDA, ENAA, EUCPN, EUROJUST and FRONTEX.The involvement of Polish law enforcement agencies in EMPACT contributes to the country's growing activity in the area of creating and implementing priorities and to strengthening of its role in Europe. At present, Poland is involved in all EMPACT priority areas for the years 2022-2025. The document *Model of National Implementation of the Policy Cycle* has been adopted.The actions implemented will be complementary to projects to be implemented under other specific objectives: constructing the information exchange and analysis module SOCTA (EMPACT) as part of the BIGDATA system (SO1), and an EMPACT OPC project (SO3).The most effective methods of human capacity building include opportunities to acquire and broaden knowledge and to share experiences and skills through direct interaction and participation in dedicated forums, such as conferences, workshops, seminars. The multidisciplinary and international character of such ventures make it possible to increase one's qualifications and skills, and to establish direct contacts which are relevant to operational activities undertaken.Special BG units conduct operations across the country and at aerodromes to *inter alia* prevent terrorist threats and attacks on BG and critical infrastructure facilities while using diverse transport and specialist means as well as mobile devices for detecting living beings in enclosed spaces. There is a need to strengthen the BG's competencies in this respect.The migration pressure which has been high in the recent years, and which is growing now, as well as accompanying threats which have a significant impact on the safety of EU citizens, entail the necessity to search for alternative, often external, solutions regarding operational, detective and investigative actions in cases of illegal migration organisation or illegal activities involving third-country nationals. Ensuring current and professional interpreting/translating during investigative activities is an effective tool. At present, execution of those activities represents a major challenge, both in logistic and financial terms.The BG plays the role of the National EMPACT Coordinator for *Illegal Migration* and the action leader with respect to combating organisation of illegal migration from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia to Western European countries. The BG implements projects also under other EMPACT priorities. As part of the broadly understood international cooperation, it undertakes a number initiatives aimed at detecting, combating and prosecuting members of organised international crime groups.Freedom of movement across the EU results in *inter alia* migrations of people for economic/tourist purposes. Polish citizens are often not aware of threats relating to e.g. human trafficking, in particular forced labour, sexual exploitation, small-scale crime or radicalisation leading to extremist behaviour, and it happens that when falling victim to, or being perpetrators of, such offences they do not reach out for assistance of competent State authorities. This may lead to the so-called unrecorded crime and erosion of trust with law enforcement agencies, and therefore it is necessary to develop and improve the capacity of conducting joint Police cross-border patrols, which will facilitate communication between Polish nationals and law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions in States where they stay. Future action in this respect should be carried out in the context of EMPACT.Public expectations regarding combating and preventing corruption are growing, which is primarily shown by opinion polls which for many years now put corruption at the front of the most dangerous social pathologies in the country. Poland considers the crime of corruption as a major challenge. Generally, preventing and combating corruption in Poland falls within the remit of State institutions, including law enforcement agencies and the CBA. There is also cooperation with NGOs, whose domain encompasses counteracting corruptive practices. In 2019, the Police recorded 22,499 corruption offences.**Union acquis / planned actions**A number of EU and domestic documents were taken into consideration when setting out the priorities, including, but not limited to * Regulation on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).
* Regulation on the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints (planned amendments in the area of the Eurodac Regulation).
* Council Decision on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime.
* Council Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector.

**Investments under the ISF-Police 2014-2020*** The Police capacities to conduct geospatial criminal analyses have been increased – the workstations and software purchased were used in aces of *inter alia* fraudulent acquisition of EU grants, financial fraud and misappropriations of significant sums of money, drug crime, including international and cross-border crime e.g. smuggling of drugs from the Netherlands to Poland, dissemination of child pornography.
* Training courses in ArcGIS software were organised for forensic analysis – the use of modern techniques and methods of information analysis in the process of countering, preventing and combating crime through increasing the capacities to acquire, process and analyse data.
* Innovative cross-border surveillance tools have been put in place – the project brought with it such innovative tools as audio-video equipment, anti-drone system and unmanned aerial vehicles. Cross-border exercises have also been carried out with the participation of officers from EU Member States as well as training in pursuit operations for Police officers.

**The actions planned will contribute to achieving SO2 with the use of implementation measures a) and b).** **As part of implementation measure a):** * Maintenance of the involvement in EMPACT in accordance with the Union policy cycle. Support of national EMPACT coordination within the services involved (Police, BG, CBA, KAS).
* Improved cooperation between law enforcement agencies in conducting joint operations, e.g. joint actions in border areas.
* More efficient use of joint patrols, cross-border hot pursuits and similar activities.
* Enhanced methods and tools for preventing and prosecuting drug offences, including fight against drug and precursor trafficking, by: improving operational cooperation between officers in EU Member States and Europol, expanding the capacity to monitor such online platforms as social media, websites etc.

**As part of implementation measure b):*** Improved crisis communications: the Police and other law enforcement agencies must be provided with adequate means of communication during e.g. protection of public assemblies as well as policing and cross-border operations. Exchange of information should be secure and provide for immediate access to databases via mobile terminals.
* Combating cross-border crime, taking into account *inter alia* ferry routes to Sweden. Despite its growing significance, this area remains unexplored. The said routes are used by international criminals for such activities as human smuggling, crimes against life, health and property, drug crimes and economic crimes.
* Language training courses for officers who handle cases which require assistance of law enforcement agencies of other States and who are involved in international exchange of criminal information.
* Specialised exchange programmes concerning possible international bilateral cooperation between law enforcement agencies, including exchange of best practices in acquisition of information or conduct of joint operations, in particular cross-border ones.
* Ensured 24h access to DNA data for other States' contact points – DNA profile checks in the Polish DNA Database.
* Training for officers of services in border areas in the use of tools and instruments offered by the EU, as well as sharing these tools and instruments as part of cross-border cooperation, e.g. by PCCCs.
* Improvement in the effectiveness of combating corruption by direct electronic access to data sources, in particular financial and economic data, as well as exchange of information between States, law enforcement agencies and local government units.
* Facilitation of operational cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies and other relevant authorities in EU Member States in order to ensure more effective proceedings in cross-border corruption cases. Effective and efficient exchange of knowledge in the area of corruption, economic and financial offences, in particular in the context of application of new technologies.

The purchases under SO2 will involve equipment understood as tangible fixed assets, i.e. for *inter alia* surveillance of the border area (e.g. drones, the anti-drone system, data recording equipment etc.). It is also planned to purchase mobile electronic devices as well as technical means for special other units. These actions will take ca. 4.2% of the allocation.The actions taken under SO2 will include actions referred to in Annex IV to the ISF Regulation, e.g. projects which aim to fight the most important threats posed by serious and organised crime, in the framework of EU policy cycle/EMPACT operational actions. **Operating support**The expected beneficiary is the Police, which is responsible for *inter alia* organisation and conduct of joint cross-border-patrols. Joint patrols are carried out by the Police under the Council Decision and bilateral agreements and arrangements. Pursuant to *inter alia* the *Council conclusions on certain aspects of European preventive policing*, the EU Council supports preventive policing implemented through joint cross-border patrols, which represent a type of Police operations. Up till now there have been no effective methods of financing these types of activities from the EU budget, which is why it is reasonable to finance them on the expense reimbursement basis. The funds will be allocated to additional remuneration of seconded Polish officers (staff costs) as well as, possibly, to maintenance of the necessary technical equipment used in this area.**Specific actions**As part of specific actions, Poland will implement the following two EMPACT projects (details are provided in Annex 3):* ISF/2022/SA/2.2.1/008 *CRYSTAL PALACE – General support for the EMPACT NPS and Synthetic Drugs platform under EMPACT 2022+ instrument*; Union contribution for Poland: EUR 1,010,663.50. The project will be implemented in partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Italian Republic.
* ISF/2022/SA/2.2.1/012 *CCH - EUROPEAN OPERATIONAL TEAM Costa del Sol*; Union contribution for Poland: EUR 108,000. The project of the Kingdom of Spain in which Poland is one of the partners.
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2.1. Specific objective 2. Cross-border co-operation

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: Article 22(4)(e) of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 1: Output indicators

| ID | Indicator | Measurement unit | Milestone (2024) | Target (2029) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| O.2.1 | Number of cross-border operations | number | 13 | 53 |
| O.2.1.1 | Including the number of joint investigation teams | number | 3 | 14 |
| O.2.1.2 | of which, the number of EU policy cycle/EMPACT operational actions | number | 10 | 39 |
| O.2.2 | Number of expert meetings/workshops/study visits/common exercises | number | 0 | 57 |
| O.2.3 | Number of equipment items purchased | number | 0 | 30 |
| O.2.4 | Number of transport means purchased for cross-border operations | number | 0 | 0 |

2.1. Specific objective 2. Cross-border co-operation

2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: Article 22(4)(e) of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 2: Result indicators

| ID | Indicator | Measurement unit | Baseline value | Baseline value measurement unit | Reference year/years | Target (2029) | Target measurement unit | Source of data | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| R.2.5 | The estimated value of assets frozen in the context of cross-border operations  | amount | 0 | EUR | 2021 | 0 | amount | - | - |
| R.2.6.1 | Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations – cannabis | kg | 0 | kg | 2021 | 25,850 | kg | Member State - statistics |  |
| R.2.6.2 | Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations – opioids, including heroin | kg | 0 | kg | 2021 | 50 | kg | Member State - statistics |  |
| R.2.6.3 | Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations – cocaine | kg | 0 | kg | 2021 | 4,000 | kg | Member State - statistics |  |
| R.2.6.4 | Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations – synthetic drugs, including amphetamine-type stimulants (including amphetamine and methamphetamine) and MDMA | kg | 0 | kg | 2021 | 4,200 | kg | Member State - statistics |  |
| R.2.6.5 | Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations – new psychoactive substances | kg | 0 | kg | 2021 | 600 | kg | Member State - statistics |  |
| R.2.6.6 | Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations – other illicit drugs | kg | 0 | kg | 2021 | 300 | kg | Member State - statistics |  |
| R.2.7.1 | Quantity of weapons seized in the context of cross-border operations – weapons of war: automatic firearms and heavy firearms (anti-tank, rocket launcher, mortar, etc.) | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 0 | number | - | - |
| R.2.7.2 | Quantity of weapons seized in the context of cross-border operations – other short firearms: revolvers and pistols (including salute and acoustic weapons) | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 0 | number | n/a |  |
| R.2.7.3 | Quantity of weapons seized in the context of cross-border operations – other long firearms: rifles and shotguns (including salute and acoustic weapons) | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 0 | number | n/a |  |
| R.2.8 | Number of administrative units that have developed/adapted existing mechanisms/procedures/tools/guidance for cooperation with other Member States/Union agencies/international organisations/third countries  | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 3 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.2.9 | Number of staff involved in cross-border operations  | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 94 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.2.10 | Number of Schengen evaluation recommendations addressed  | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 100 | percentage | Member State - projects |  |

2.1. Specific objective 2. Cross-border co-operation

### 2.1.3. Indicative breakdown of programme resources (EU) by type of intervention

Reference: Article 22(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation and Article 16(12) of the AMIF Regulation, Article 13(12) of the ISF Regulation or Article 13(18) of the BMVI Regulation

#### Table 3: Indicative breakdown

| Type of intervention | Code | Indicative amount (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type of action | 001.ICT systems, interoperability, data quality (excluding equipment) | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 002.Networks, centres of excellence, cooperation structures, joint actions and operations | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 003.Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) or other joint operations | 2,578,916.00 |
| Type of action | 004.Secondment or deployment of experts | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 005.Training | 1,071,028.00 |
| Type of action | 006.Exchange of best practices, workshops, conferences, events, awareness-raising campaigns, communication activities | 1,495,719.50 |
| Type of action | 007.Studies, pilot projects, risk assessments | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 008.Equipment | 2,930,000.00 |
| Type of action | 009.Means of transport | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 010.Buildings, facilities | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 011.Deployment or other follow-up of research projects | 0.00 |

## 2.1. Specific objective: 3. Preventing and combating crime

### 2.1.1. Description of the specific objective

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| **Initial situation**It was identified through analysis that effective preventing and combating crime requires increasing the level of competencies of law enforcement officers and staff by means of training, exchange of good practices and strengthened cooperation. Increased public awareness is also needed.Protection of citizens and infrastructure is another challenge**.** The Personal and Property Protection Act defines the areas, objects and devices which are subject to obligatory protection, including against terrorist threats. They include buildings, devices, installations and services enumerated in the critical infrastructure list.In the context of the terrorist threat in Europe and worldwide, it is also relevant to ensure security of the so-called soft targets, i.e. sites or events with large concentrations of people which can become potential targets of terrorist attacks.Threats to Poland arise from:* the country's location at the Baltic Sea in the vicinity of critical infrastructure facilities, which poses a threat of terrorist attacks
* higher terrorist threat across Europe
* the country's participation in missions around the world, which poses threats of terrorist bomb attacks.

Challenges identified in Poland include also the fight against financing of terrorism**.** Due to the international situation and terrorist threat, it is necessary to improve the AML/CFT system.Poland is also struggling with the growing problem of drug crime. The most serious problems include smuggling of narcotic and psychotropic substances and their precursors. With the percentage share of such substances recovered increasing every year, it is necessary to improve methods and tools used by the officers involved. In 2019, the Police recorded 66,831 offences against the Act of Preventing Drug Addiction, compared to 60,073 recorded in 2018. Training provided will take into account the provisions of the *European Drug Report* and *Health and social responses to drug problems: a European guide*.Furthermore, the technological progress offers criminals increasingly more advanced tools to pursue their activity. It is therefore necessary to develop educational efforts in the area of preventing and combating cybercrime, as indicated in the Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland.Poland is among those EU Members States that are most exposed to international organised crime as regards smuggling of tobacco products and counterfeit goods. The growth of the shadow economy in the area of trafficking in counterfeit goods contributes to the development of other sectors of crime, including ones which provide for transferring proceeds to non-EU residents, mainly in Asia, and introducing them into the legal circulation through complex criminal structures.The problem of document fraud, particularly against travel documents, is becoming an important issue in the context of terrorist attacks and certain aspects of migration movements across the EU. Such offences have enabled terrorists and organised crime groups to operate. They are also linked with human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Issuing (and reprinting) electronic documents may facilitate counterfeiting.It is necessary to take actions aimed to preventing and combating the smuggling of migrants both within and outside the EU (e.g. cooperation with the civil society, training, strengthening of the capacity in the area of cross-border cooperation). The Police will take into account the participation in the EMPACT priority on combating migrant smuggling and fund operational actions, e.g. in the area of the fight against falsification of documents, anti-money laundering and use of the Internet for smuggling purposes.Combating corruption is another challenge faced by Poland. According to social studies conducted in 2017, three quarters of respondents considers corruption as a major social problem, while 50% admitted to having given a single bribe and 6% to giving bribes. It is therefore relevant to prevent corruption by creating strategic and practical solutions regarding transparency and honesty of public life. Poland implemented the *Government Anti-Corruption Programme for 2018-2020*.Poland is among Top Five EU Member States whose nationals are most often identified as victims of human trafficking, and shows a high percentage rate of suspects of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of exploitation for forced labour (8%). Therefore, actions are planned in this respect. Trafficking in human beings is a form contemporary slavery and a serious crime which is a major breach of human rights. The variety of its forms as well as cross-border nature, diverse means of coercion used by perpetrators, difficult situation of the victims and differences in the public perception of this crime around the world make human trafficking a challenge for the international community, authorities and law enforcement agencies. The crime in question is closely related to certain aspects of migration movements, and as such is a dynamic problem that affects the whole world and is rooted primarily in the existing social, economic or cultural problems and differences. Effective prevention of and fight against this crime requires involvement and cooperation of numerous governmental bodies and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-government organisations (NGOs) and non-EU Member States, as well as support of such EU agencies as Europol and Eurojust.Prevention of radicalisation is another challenge identified through analyses. State institutions monitor phenomena related to radicalisation or popularisation of violence, e.g. in prisons, where individuals convicted of such crimes are incarcerated. It is therefore important to train the personnel involved, ensure appropriate selection of rehabilitation programmes, and undertake cooperation aimed at exchange of information and experience.Countering hate crime has been among EU priorities for many years. It is necessary to support hate crime victims and to provide the services concerned with additional modern tools for the collection and analysis of data about such offences, and to raise the awareness of the victims and the society as a whole. It is essential to establish cooperation with the ICT sector and civil society organisations to enable countering as well as creating an alternative narrative online.At present, there are several areas in Poland that require strengthening in terms of prevention of terrorist threats and protection of public spaces, e.g. the matter of the low level of identification of threats arising from the presence of extremists and terrorists in prisons, both during incarceration and after release. The foregoing is also in line with trends and needs at EU level, and is currently the subject of intensive debates and discussions. Another, equally important sphere involves strengthening the awareness of the education, which has not been targeted by awareness-raising activities on a wider scale. At the same time, European and global lessons, as well as isolated cases in Poland, confirm that it is necessary for specialised services to step up activities in this area. The foregoing is also accompanied by the need to improve cooperation between security structures via communications systems and institutions in order to establish a clear and uniform standard of providing information about threats, so that reporting person, the recipient of the report and the target recipient of the information could have a similar set of competencies to enable efficient circulation of information and therefore faster neutralisation of any potential threats. Furthermore, the problem of converting firearm replicas into actual firearms has become noticeable in recent years. This applies to organised crime groups, so-called military fanatics and individuals who want to have such weapons for their own protection. Weapons which are licensed under Polish law are normally ordered in countries where no such licence is required (e.g. the Czech Republic and Slovakia). Such weapons are easy to convert into actual firearms.**Union acquis / planned actions**In the context of the aforementioned priorities, the following national and EU documents were taken into consideration:* EU Security Union Strategy
* Council Decision on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime
* Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022
* Directive laying down the rules which facilitate the use of financial and other information to prevent certain offences
* Action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing
* EU Drugs Strategy 2021–2025
* Cybersecurity Strategy of the Republic of Poland for the years 2019-2024
* National Action Plan Against Trafficking in Human Beings 2020-2021 (and onwards)
* Government Anti-Corruption Programme 2018-2020
* A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond
* EU Action plan on firearms trafficking for the years 2020-2025.

**Investments made under the ISF-Police 2014-2020**Co-financing covered training aimed at more effective prevention and combating of crime by means of increasing the level of competencies and skills of officers and staff at law enforcement agencies and other competent institutions, mainly in the area of developing their skills, expertise, compliance with procedures as well as use and operation of systems, databases and tools used in preventing and combating crime. Actions were also taken to strengthen the competencies and skills of competent services that provide support to victims of crimes, with preference especially for actions aimed to support victims of human trafficking, organised crime and victims of hate crime.Support was also provided to projects regarding crisis management aimed to further cooperation, conduct joint projects and exercises in protecting critical infrastructure, train representatives of services and critical infrastructure operators in common operating methods and procedures. Furthermore, equipment and accessories for conducting and coordinating operations were purchased, and early warning and alerting systems and communications networks were expanded and modernised (as permitted by the resources available).**Based on the above achievements, Poland intends to contribute to achieving SO3 of the ISF by contributing to the execution of implementation measures a), c), d), e).****As part of implementation measure a):*** Enhancing the effectiveness and developing the competencies of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities through training, as well as improving the effectiveness of procedural and operational actions through streamlining cooperation between law enforcement agencies and external bodies. Educating and training of the staff and experts at relevant law enforcement agencies, judicial authorities and administrative bodies, in cooperation with CEPOL and, where appropriate, the European Judicial Training Network.
* Enhancing the national agencies' capacity through training, specialised exchange programmes and sharing good practices to prevent, detect and combat crime, including corruption. Training in computer crime, drug crime, document fraud; and in protection of public space (against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats – CBRNE; also taking into account the Council conclusions on the protection of public spaces (9545/21)). Enhancing the knowledge of utilisation of forensic traces and examination methods to increase crime detection.
* Preventing and countering of radicalisation, in particular among convicts. Cooperation between relevant partner organisations (law enforcement agencies and social assistance organisations) aimed at manage the risk with respect to individuals identified in the radicalisation process. Development of a strategy for getting out of extremism; preparation of the related training.
* Providing support to the existing and establishing new networks that deal with the problem of radicalisation, as well as furthering cooperation with social bodies in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda.
* Countering extremism and terrorist propaganda online. Enhancing the capacity to detect and respond to terrorist and extremist content in collaboration with special services, including Europol.
* Countering hate crime.
* Increasing the officers' specialist knowledge of ballistics, gunsmithing and methods of converting replicas into firearms. Increasing the level of international cooperation regarding firearms smuggling.

**As part of implementation measure c):*** Rehabilitation of human trafficking victims in social life and on the labour market, reintegration and effective legal assistance. Increasing the public knowledge of that subject, in particular among specifically threatened persons, including vulnerable women and children. Increasing the level of knowledge in the area of early identification of victims of human trafficking at public administration entities and among business operators; promoting training based on the rights of the child. Exchanging experiences and best practices regarding effective identification and counter-action of human trafficking among officers from EU Member States, IGOs and NGOs.
* Providing support for more effective fight against child sexual abuse, including as part of prevention, investigation and assistance to victims.
* Counter-acting crime through increasing social prophylactic measures.

**As part of implementation measure d):*** Taking actions to increase the resilience with respect to emerging threats, including illicit trade in the Internet, hybrid threats, harmful use of unmanned aerial vehicle platforms as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
* Streamlining methods and tools used by law enforcement agencies in combating crime harming the EU financial interests. Equipping the institutions concerned with additional software for more efficient analysis of cryptocurrency transactions in order to improve financial investigation techniques. Actions aimed at identified needs will involve innovative solutions and methods.
* Financing of the equipment, specialist vehicles, communications systems and security-relevant facilities.

**As part of implementation measure e):*** Stepping up the activities which support effective and coordinated responding to crisis situations, and combining the capacities existing in respective sectors, including civil protection, terrorism and cybercrime.
* Improving cooperation between public bodies and other sectors in order to increase the level of security in public spaces and critical infrastructure.
* Protection of public spaces: furthering cooperation between the public and private sectors, strengthening protection against threats, purchasing CBRNE detection devices.
* Crisis management and protection of critical infrastructure against security-related incidents by means of detection, assessment and elimination of vulnerabilities.

The purchases under SO3 will involve equipment understood as tangible fixed assets, including *inter alia* specialist devices/tools, drones, the anti-drone system, mobile threat detection devices, specialist vehicles; modernisation of the system of warning and alerting the public, construction/adaptation/equipping of the facilities. Projects covering the development of public warning systems, which represent an element of critical infrastructure, will be continued. The example infrastructure included public warning and alerting systems, radio communications systems for crisis management, measurement data exchange systems, mobile CBRNE laboratories, integrated crisis situation management and information stations. These actions will take ca. 15.8% of the allocation.The actions taken under SO3 will include actions referred to in Annex IV to the ISF, including projects which aim to prevent and counter radicalisation, prevent cybercrime, and to improve the security and resilience of critical infrastructure.**Operating support**Not planned for SO3. |

2.1. Specific objective 3. Preventing and combating crime

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: Article 22(4)(e) of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 1: Output indicators

| ID | Indicator | Measurement unit | Milestone (2024) | Target (2029) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| O.3.1 | Number of participants in training activities  | number | 200 | 2,000 |
| O.3.2 | Number of exchange programmes/workshops/study visits  | number | 3 | 15 |
| O.3.3 | Number of equipment items purchased  | number | 5 | 40 |
| O.3.4 | Number of transport means purchased  | number | 0 | 0 |
| O.3.5 | Number of items of infrastructure/security-relevant facilities/tools/mechanisms constructed/purchased/upgraded  | number | 0 | 10 |
| O.3.6 | Number of projects to prevent crime  | number | 10 | 50 |
| O.3.7 | Number of projects to assist victims of crime  | number | 0 | 5 |
| O.3.8 | umber of victims of crimes assisted  | number | 0 | 200 |

2.1. Specific objective 3. Preventing and combating crime

2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: Article 22(4)(e) of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 2: Result indicators

| ID | Indicator | Measurement unit | Baseline value | Baseline value measurement unit | Reference year/years | Target (2029) | Target measurement unit | Source of data | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| R.3.9 | Number of initiatives developed/expanded to prevent radicalisation | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 2 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.3.10 | Number of initiatives developed/expanded to protect/support witnesses and whistleblowers | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 0 | number | - | - |
| R.3.11 | Number of critical infrastructure/public spaces with new/adapted facilities protecting against security-related risks  | number | 0 | number | 2021 | 6 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.3.12 | Number of participants who consider the training useful for their work  | number | 0 | participation | 2021 | 1,600 | number | Member State - projects |  |
| R.3.13 | Number of participants who report three months after the training activity that they are using the skills and competences acquired during the training | number | 0 | participation | 2021 | 1,400 | number | Member State - projects |  |

2.1. Specific objective 3. Preventing and combating crime

### 2.1.3. Indicative breakdown of programme resources (EU) by type of intervention

Reference: Article 22(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation and Article 16(12) of the AMIF Regulation, Article 13(12) of the ISF Regulation or Article 13(18) of the BMVI Regulation

#### Table 3: Indicative breakdown

| Type of intervention | Code | Indicative amount (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type of action | 001.ICT systems, interoperability, data quality (excluding equipment) | 1,291,091.00 |
| Type of action | 002.Networks, centres of excellence, cooperation structures, joint actions and operations | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 003.Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) or other joint operations | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 004.Secondment or deployment of experts | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 005.Training | 10,068,300.00 |
| Type of action | 006.Exchange of best practices, workshops, conferences, events, awareness-raising campaigns, communication activities | 2,862,800.00 |
| Type of action | 007.Studies, pilot projects, risk assessments | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 008.Equipment | 7,529,006.00 |
| Type of action | 009.Means of transport | 0.00 |
| Type of action | 010.Buildings, facilities | 3,465,000.00 |
| Type of action | 011.Deployment or other follow-up of research projects | 0.00 |

## 2.2. Technical support: TA.36(5). Technical assistance – flat rate (Article 36(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation)

Reference: Article 22(3)(f), Article 36(5), Article 37 and Article 95 of the Common Provisions Regulation

### 2.2.1. Description

|  |
| --- |
| It is expected to use the entire allocation available under ISF for the work relating to the preparation, management, monitoring, assessment and control of the ISF. The Technical Assistance funds will be spent in the following types of intervention:* Preparation, implementation, management, monitoring and control of the fund as well as financial flows and payments, including financing of personnel salaries, administrative costs of units, costs of project monitoring and control, participation in foreign trips and meetings, organisation of training for the programme beneficiaries and partners; legal analyses;
* Information and communication, including financing of the production of information brochures and posters, promotion materials and maintenance of the website;
* Evaluation and studies, data collection, including evaluation of the programme, updates and development of the database;
* Capacity building through inter alia increasing professional qualifications of the personnel, participation in training and courses;
* Organisation of training/meetings for Applicants/Beneficiaries;
* Material support, including office appliances, office supplies and didactic aids.
 |

2.2. Technical assistance: TA.36(5). Technical assistance – flat rate (Article 36(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation)

### 2.2.2. Indicative breakdown of technical assistance under Article 37 of the Common Provisions Regulation

#### Table 4: Indicative breakdown

| Type of intervention | Code | Indicative amount (in EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Intervention field | 034.Information and communication | 100,000.00 |
| Intervention field | 035.Preparation, implementation, monitoring and control | 3,808,094.00 |
| Intervention field | 036.Evaluation and studies, data collection | 19,265.00 |
| Intervention field | 037.Capacity building | 77,678.26 |

# 3. Financing plan

Reference: Article 22(3)(g) of the Common Provisions Regulation

## 3.1. Financial allocations by year

#### Table 5: Financial allocations by year

| Type of allocation | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Initial allocation |  | 9,585,318.00 | 14,346,565.00 | 13,999,410.00 | 12,067,178.00 | 10,264,567.00 | 9,306,837.00 | 69,569,875.00 |
| Mid-term review |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Work programme under Thematic Facility I |  | 1,185,783.31 |  |  |  |  |  | 1,185,783.31 |
| Work programme under Thematic Facility II |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Work programme under Thematic Facility III |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transfer (to a State) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transfer (from a State) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total |  | 10,771,101.31 | 14,346,565.00 | 13,999,410.00 | 12,067,178.00 | 10,264,567.00 | 9,306,837.00 | 70,755,658.31 |

## 3.2. Total financial allocations

#### Table 6: Total financial allocations by fund and national co-financing

| Specific objective (SO) | Type of action | Basis for calculation Union support (total or public) | Union contribution (a) | National contribution (b)=(c)+(d) | Indicative breakdown of national contribution | Total (e)=(a)+(b) | Co-financing rate (f)=(a)/(e) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Public (c) | Private (d) |
| Exchange of information | Regular actions | Total | 17,955,762.00 | 5,985,254.00 | 5,985,254.00 | 0.00 | 23,941,016.00 | 75.0000000000% |
| Exchange of information | Actions set out in Annex IV | Total | 6,003,000.00 | 667,000.00 | 667,000.00 | 0.00 | 6,670,000.00 | 90.0000000000% |
| Exchange of information | Operating support | Total | 9,499,998.55 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 9,499,998.55 | 100.0000000000% |
| Total Exchange of information |  |  | 33,458,760.55 | 6,652,254.00 | 6,652,254.00 | 0.00 | 40,111,014.55 | 83.4153933162% |
| Cross-border co-operation | Regular actions | Total | 3,750,000.00 | 1,250,000.00 | 1,250,000.00 | 0.00 | 5,000,000.00 | 75.0000000000% |
| Cross-border co-operation | Specific actions | Total | 1,118,663.50 | 124,295.95 | 124,295.95 | 0.00 | 1,242,959.45 | 89.9999995977% |
| Cross-border co-operation | Actions set out in Annex IV | Total | 2,707,000.00 | 300,777.78 | 300,777.78 | 0.00 | 3,007,777.78 | 89.9999999335% |
| Cross-border co-operation | Operating support | Total | 500,000.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 500,000.00 | 100.0000000000% |
| Total Cross-border cooperation |  |  | 8,075,663.50 | 1,675,073.73 | 1,675,073.73 | 0.00 | 9,750,737.23 | 82.8210555726% |
| Preventing and combating crime | Regular actions | Total | 23,191,197.00 | 7,730,399.00 | 7,730,399.00 | 0.00 | 30,921,596.00 | 75.0000000000% |
| Preventing and combating crime | Actions set out in Annex IV | Total | 2,025,000.00 | 225,000.00 | 225,000.00 | 0.00 | 2,250,000.00 | 90.0000000000% |
| Total Preventing and combating crime |  |  | 25,216,197.00 | 7,955,399.00 | 7,955,399.00 | 0.00 | 33,171,596.00 | 76.0174367251% |
| Technical assistance – flat rate (Article 36(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation) |  |  | 4,005,037.26 |  |  |  | 4,005,037.26 | 100.0000000000% |
| Grand total |  |  | 70,755,658.31 | 16,282,726.73 | 16,282,726.73 | 0.00 | 87,038,385.04 | 81.2924760466% |

## 3.3. Transfers

### Table 7: Transfers between shared management funds1

| Transferring fund | Receiving fund |
| --- | --- |
| AMIF | BMVI | ERDF | ESF+ | Cohesion Fund | EMFAF | Total |
| ISF |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1Cumulative amounts for all transfers during programming period.

### Table 8: Transfers to instruments under direct or indirect management1

| Instrument | Transfer amount |
| --- | --- |

1Cumulative amounts for all transfers during programming period.

# 4. Enabling conditions

Reference: Article 22(3)(i) of the Common Provisions Regulation

## Table 9: Horizontal enabling conditions

| Enabling condition | Fulfilment of enabling condition | Criteria | Fulfilment of criteria | Reference to relevant documents | Justification |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Effective monitoring mechanisms of the public procurement market | Yes | Monitoring mechanisms are in place that cover all public contracts and their procurement under the Funds in line with Union procurement legislation. That requirement includes:1. Arrangements to ensure compilation of effective and reliable data on public procurement procedures above the Union thresholds in accordance with reporting obligations under Articles 83 and 84 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 99 and 100 of Directive 2014/25/EU; | Yes | Link to the Act:http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190002019/U/D20192019Lj.pdf Link to annual reports on the functioning of the public procurement system:https://www.uzp.gov.pl/baza-wiedzy/analizy-systemowe/sprawozdania-o-funkcjonowaniu-systemu-zamowien-publicznych | In accordance with the obligations under applicable directives, the PPO prepares, every three years, reports on monitoring of the public procurement system based on data provided by contracting entities in their annual reports on public contracts awarded, data from the e-Zamówienia Platform, data from the TED and information on findings of inspections conducted by the PPO President. |
| 2. Arrangements to ensure the data cover at least the following elements: a) quality and intensity of competition: names of winning bidder, number of initial bidders and contractual value; b) information on final price after completion and on participation of SMEs as direct bidders, where national systems provide such information; | Yes | Link to the Act: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190002019/U/D20192019Lj.pdf Link to annual reports on the functioning of the public procurement system:https://www.uzp.gov.pl/baza-wiedzy/analizy-systemowe/sprawozdania-o-funkcjonowaniu-systemu-zamowien-publicznych | The PPO has access to all data required within the framework of the basic conditionality (the data comes from the EC's TED database, from annual reports submitted to the PPO President by contracting entities, and from the Public Procurement Bulletin database). |
| 3. Arrangements to ensure monitoring and analysis of the data by the competent national authorities in accordance with Article 83(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 99(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU; | Yes | Link to the Act: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190002019/U/D20192019Lj.pdf Link to annual reports on the functioning of the public procurement system:https://www.uzp.gov.pl/baza-wiedzy/analizy-systemowe/sprawozdania-o-funkcjonowaniu-systemu-zamowien-publicznych | In accordance with the obligations under applicable directives, the PPO prepares, every three years, reports on monitoring of the public procurement system based on data provided by contracting entities in their annual reports on public contracts awarded, data from the TED and information on findings of inspections conducted by the PPO President. |
| 4. Arrangements to make the results of the analysis available to the public in accordance with Article 83(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 99(3) Directive 2014/25/EU; | Yes | Link to the Act: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190002019/U/D20192019Lj.pdf Link to annual reports on the functioning of the public procurement system:https://www.uzp.gov.pl/baza-wiedzy/analizy-systemowe/sprawozdania-o-funkcjonowaniu-systemu-zamowien-publicznych | On its website, the PPO publishes annual reports on the functioning of the public procurement system and periodic Information Bulletins. |
| 5. Arrangements to ensure that all information pointing to suspected bid-rigging situations is communicated to the competent national bodies in accordance with Article 83(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 99(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU. | Yes | Link to the Act: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190002019/U/D20192019Lj.pdf Link to annual reports on the functioning of the public procurement system:https://www.uzp.gov.pl/baza-wiedzy/analizy-systemowe/sprawozdania-o-funkcjonowaniu-systemu-zamowien-publicznych | If an inspection by the PPO raises any suspicions that there the procurement procedure could involve bid rigging, the PPO sends relevant information to the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK). The PPO and UOKIK have also signed an agreement on cooperation between the two institutions and exchange of information and experiences. Notwithstanding the foregoing, institutions and contracting authorities may contact the UOKIK directly if they suspect big rigging. |
| 3. Effective application and implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights | No | Effective mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("the Charter") which include: 1. Arrangements to ensure compliance of the programmes supported by the Funds and their implementation with the relevant provisions of the Charter; | No | None | The common procedure applies to verification of compliance with the CFR both at the stage of submitting an application for co-financing and during project implementation. Suspicions regarding non-compliance and/or actions of the Beneficiary or IB/IA/MA with the CFR are reported to respectively IB/IA/MA/EU Funds Officer (in the case of programmes financed under EMFF, AMIF, BMVI and ISF there is a relevant equivalent). The competent institution analyses the matter, takes verifying actions and decides whether the report is substantiated. If it is confirmed that the CFR has been breached, depending on the character of the matter, the competent institution transmits the breach notification to relevant services, i.e. Commissioner for Human Right, National Labour Inspectorate, Patient's Rights Ombudsman and/or relevant law enforcement agencies. The programme's MA is responsible also for conducting information policy in the aforementioned area. The Polish side believes that the requirement is met in accordance with the position dated 7 July 2022, but in the absence of the EC response to that position, the status of the requirement has been marked as not met. |
| 2. Reporting arrangements to the monitoring committee regarding cases of non-compliance of operations supported by the Funds with the Charter and complaints regarding the Charter submitted in accordance with the arrangements made pursuant to Article 69(7). | No | None | The procedure involves the Programme MA's obligation to prepare annual summary information on all reports of project non-compliance with the CFR and complaints for consideration by the Programme MC. The MC decides whether any further relevant preventive actions need to be taken with respect to teh cases reported. The Polish side believes that the requirement is met in accordance with the position dated 7 July 2022, but in the absence of the EC response to that position, the status of the requirement has been marked as not met. |
| 4. Implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (UNCRPD) in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC | Yes | A national framework to ensure implementation of the UNCRPD is in place that includes: 1. Objectives with measurable goals, data collection and monitoring mechanisms; | Yes | Link to the document:https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/MP/rok/2021/pozycja/218 https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20220000767/O/M20220767.pdf | The framework of the national policy for ensuring implementation of the UNCRPD is formed by the Strategy on the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 adopted by the Council of Ministers on 16 February 2021, which lays down the objectives and actions to be achieved within a specific period with indicators and entities responsible, as well as mechanisms for monitoring of the objectives and actions and data collection in this respect. Furthermore, as regards implementation of the process of de-institutionalisation of social services, including for persons with disabilities (PwDs), the relevant strategic document is also the Strategy for the development of social services, public policy by 2030 (with the perspective by 2035) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 7 June 2022 (SRUS).Therefore, adoption and implementation of the SRUS allows implementation of the objectives in the area of de-institutionalisation specified in the Strategy on the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 and ensures monitoring of the implementation of the indicators regarding this area for PwDs. |
| 2. Arrangements to ensure that the accessibility policy, legislation and standards are properly reflected in the preparation and implementation of the programmes; | Yes | Link to the document:https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/MP/rok/2021/pozycja/218 https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20220000767/O/M20220767.pdf | The criterion will be met by way of requiring the MA to take the following actions: (1) indicate specific UNCRPD articles relating to the scope of support planned for teh programme,(2) ensure UNCRPD compliance of all processes and procedures at every stage of the programme implementation, i.e. programming, selection and implementation of projects, as well as project control, monitoring and evaluation, which will be reflected in *inter alia* the content of the procedures/guidelines/rules defining the manner of execution of individual processes relating to implementation of the programme,(3) evaluate projects in terms of the UNCRPD compliance criterion,(4) ensure application of accessibility standards by way of Guidelines setting forth accessibility standards for investments financed under the cohesion policy,(5) carry out information/awareness building actions relating to UNCRPD compliance,(6) introduce into the programme implementation system a procedure for reporting suspicions and complaints regarding non-compliance of interventions/actions with the UNCRPD. |
| 3. Reporting arrangements to the monitoring committee regarding cases of non-compliance of operations supported by the Funds with the UNCRPD and complaints regarding the UNCRPD submitted in accordance with the arrangements made pursuant to Article 69(7). | Yes | Link to the document:https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/MP/rok/2021/pozycja/218 https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20220000767/O/M20220767.pdf | The criterion will be met by way of obligatory annual reporting of cases of non-compliance of interventions/actions with the UNCRPD and complaints regarding non-compliance with the UNCRPD to the Monitoring Committee.The MC will be informed about the character and number of complaints and cases of non-compliance of interventions supported by the programme with the provisions of the UNCRPD and about related actions taken by the competent institutions. In the event of systemic or recurring breaches, following the submission of a report by the MA, the MC may take a number of actions to prevent those breaches in the future.The scope of the MC's prerogatives in this respect will be defined in the MC rules based on the minimum powers defined for the MC of all programmes, including (1) the possibility of appointing a working group to investigate a given matter/problem identified, (2) continuation of analyses in order to prepare detailed recommendations regarding the most recurring breaches, and (3) intensification of awareness and information actions. |

# 5. Programme authorities

Reference: Article 22(3)(k) and Articles 71 and 84 of the Common Provisions Regulation

## Table 10: Programme authorities

| Programme authority | Name of the institution | Contact name | Position | E-mail |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Managing authority | European Funds Department, Ministry of the Interior and Administration | Maciej Kaczorowski | Director of the European Funds Department, Ministry of the Interior and Administration (MIA) | fundusze.kontakt@mswia.gov.pl |
| Audit authority | Head of the National Revenue Administration | Dominik Zalewski | Director of the Department for Audit of Public Funds, Ministry of Finance | sekretariat.DAS@mf.gov.pl |
| Body which receives payments from the Commission | Minister competent for public finance | Dorota Jaworska | Director of the Paying Authority Department, Ministry of Finance | sekretariatIP@mf.gov.pl |

# 6. Partnership

Reference: Article 22(3)(h) of the Common Provisions Regulation

|  |
| --- |
| As regards preparatory work, the Programme partners included a wide spectrum of entities, in particular the competent services and public institutions at national and provincial level. During the preparations, requests to submit proposed actions and comments were also sent to NGOs.The draft Programme was prepared by the Department of European Funds of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration on the basis of information received from key institutions - also ones which were involved in actions under the ISF 2014-2020, including the Police, the Border Guard, the State Fire Service, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, Voivodes, the Central anti-Corruption Bureau, the Internal Security Agency, and others. Due to its specificity, the Programme was subjected to public consultations by virtue of publication on the ministerial website dedicated to European funds together with a request for comments, which allowed non-governmental, intergovernmental and international organisations as well as other bodies to submit their comments and action proposals. This was meant to enable organisations which were potentially interested in conducting ISF activities to provide additional/missing information/actions and comments. Subsequently, the document was transmitted for intraministerial and interministerial consultations. Following the stage of interministerial consultations, the document was submitted for approval to the Interministerial Team for the European Home Affairs Funds (hereinafter "the Monitoring Committee"). Having received a positive opinion of the Monitoring Committee, the document was transmitted to the European Commission.The good practice of consultations and cooperation with the bodies indicated in Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 will be continued during the implementation of the Programme.The 2014-2020 Monitoring Committee, responsible for two funds: the AMIF and ISF 2014-2020, included representatives of institutions of key importance for its operations, including the Ministries of: Finance, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Family and Social Policy (with the responsibility for integration and legal migration in Poland), Development Funds and Regional Policy, Polish Border Guard Headquarters and National Police Headquarters, National Headquarters of the State Fire Service of Poland, Internal Security Agency and Office for Foreigners. The participation of different institutions in the Monitoring Committee 2021-2027, responsible for three funds: ISF, BMVI and AMIF 2021-2027, will ensure complementarity with other financial mechanisms in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1060. Furthermore, representatives of the third sector organisations concerned will be invited to take part in the Monitoring Committee as part of partnership in the implementation and subsequent evaluation of the ISF Programme.Moreover, in order to ensure that the partnership principle is implemented more effectively, the Managing Authority plans to engage partners which are most representative for a given environment - adequately to the subject scope of a given programme. In accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (CPR), invitations were sent to the following bodies/organisations: * Joint Government and Local Government Commission
* Social Dialogue Council
* Public Benefit Works Council
* International organisations – IOM Poland, UNHCR – Representation in Poland
* Government Plenipotentiary for Disabled Persons
* Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment
* Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland
* Main Board of Research Institutes.

The aforementioned bodies were asked to name at least one representative to be officially nominated as members of the Monitoring Committee. The Joint Government and Local Government Commission names a representative of regional/local public authorities. The Social Dialogue Council names a representative of the social/economic partners. The Public Benefit Works Council names a representative of the civil society to ensure representation in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060. The Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland names a representative of academic schools. The Main Board of Research Institutes names a representative of research institutes. Depending on the subject range of the work of the Monitoring Committee, the representatives named can consult competent members of their organisations to provide relevant answers to issues raised. The rules and scope of cooperation with the partners will be laid down in the Rules of the Monitoring Committee. The Rules will be consulted with the Committee members and will also provide for the manner of involvement of the partners in the decision-making process.Participation of the partners under the partnership principle will be taken into account at all stages of implementation of the programmes. The participation involves also support for the Managing Authority at the stage of programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programmes for the years 2021 - 2027, in particular through:* participating in the work of the Monitoring Committee
* providing opinions on ISF, BMVI and AMIF programmes and on amendments to the programmes
* analysing the progress in implementing the programmes and achieving their objectives
* providing opinions and approvals regarding project selection criteria
* participating in the process of evaluation of the programme implementation
* analysing actions in the area of communication and visibility.
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# 7. Communication and visibility

Reference: Article 22(3)(j) of the Common Provisions Regulation

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| The ISF 2021-2027 Communication Strategy comes as a part of the Communication Strategy For European Migration, Borders and Security Funds (hereinafter "the Strategy") and concerns the manner of communication with target groups for the purpose of supporting the Programme's visibility.The Strategy is in line with the national Strategy for Communication of European Funds 2021-2027 managed by the Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy (MDFRP), and it will be implemented in cooperation with the MDFRP.ISF Programme communication involves informing about the Programme's offering, results and impact on the country and EU development as regards:* improving the exchange of information between competent EU authorities and organisational units, within those authorities, as well as with third countries and international organisation;
* developing cross-border cooperation, including joint operations, between competent authorities, as regards terrorism and serious and organised cross-border crime;
* supporting the capacities of Member States in the area of preventing and combating crime, terrorism and radicalisation, as well as security incident, risk and crisis management.

The Strategy is provided in Annex to the MA Procedures Manual. Communication actions are carried out by the MA, IB and beneficiaries. As far as possible, information about national EMPACT awareness raising initiatives will also be included.**Communication Officer**The MA has appointed the officer for Communication of European Migration, Borders and Security Funds who, in cooperation with the National Coordinator in the MDFRP, conducts actions to support the visibility and promotion of the funds. Within the INFORM EU network, the Officer is responsible for cooperation with the EC, attends meetings and training, and is responsible for the website content.**Objectives of communication actions*** informing about and encouraging to use ISF funds
* informing about the Programme actions and effects, showing the positive impact of the EU support in the ISF area
* supporting the beneficiaries in implementing their projects

**Target groups*** beneficiaries: institutions with the monopoly on internal security (e.g. Police, Border Guard, Internal Security Agency)
* potential beneficiaries: bodies that use ISF support and implement projects: public finance sector units, Voivodeship Offices, international organisations, non-governmental organisations
* general public: persons and entities that benefit from the effects of the ISF, whether consciously or not

**Communication channels**Communication channels will be selected on the basis of their effectiveness and specific objectives. Examples of channels:* bilingual (Polish and English) websites dedicated to home affairs funds: www.fundusze.mswia.gov.pl and www.gov.pl/web/DFE-MSWiA;
* information and promotion events;
* European Funds portal (MDFRP);
* network of European Funds Information Points (MDFRP);
* social media: MIA and MDFRP.

The MA will ensure publication of information in accordance the requirements laid down in Regulations No. (EU) 2021/1060, excluding where either the EU of domestic legislation forbid such publication for reasons of security, public order, criminal investigations or personal data protection in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.It will be important for communication to use the beneficiaries' communication capacities. Among materials prepared to support the beneficiaries in promoting the projects are a downloadable guide and graphic templates.Tools used in communication and individual target groups:* Beneficiaries: the MA's website, project supervisor, social media, the European funds portal, information and promotion events
* Potential beneficiaries: the MA's website, social media, the European Funds portal, EFIPs
* General public: social media, the MA's website, the European Funds portal

**Monitoring and assessment**The communication actions are subject to evaluation and monitoring in terms of their quality, relevance and effectiveness. Provisions governing the obligation to ensure visibility of EU financing will be included in agreements signed with beneficiaries and will be monitored.Monitoring and assessment indicators:Number of meetings for beneficiaries and applicants (unit: number)* Baseline value - 0
* Milestone value (2024) - 7 (including one joint meeting for the ISF, the AMIF and the BMVI)
* Target value (2029) - 23 (including three joint meetings for the ISF, the AMIF and the BMVI)

Number of visits to the MA's website covering the ISF, the AMIF and the BMVI (unit: number)* Baseline value - 0
* Milestone value (2024) - 115,200
* Target value (2029) - 241,200

Number of responses to inquiries about financing possibilities (unit: number)* Baseline value - 0
* Milestone value (2024) - 20
* Target value (2029) - 50

**Budget**Communication actions of the MA and the IB will be financed from Technical Assistance. The estimated ISF communication and visibility budget is EUR 100,000, including for the following purposes:1.   Information and training meetings – 78%2.    Meetings and conferences regarding the ISF, the AMIF and the BMVI – 12%3.    Production of information materials - 10%The budget will be updated depending on the results achieved. |

# 8. Use of unit costs, lump sums, flat rates and financing not linked to costs

Reference: Articles 94 and 95 of the Common Provisions Regulation

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| --- | --- | --- |
| Intended use of Articles 94 and 95 of the Common Provisions Regulation | Yes | No |
| From the moment of adoption onwards, the programme will use reimbursements of Union contribution based on unit costs, lump sums and flat rates in accordance with Article 94 of the Common Provisions Regulation | [ ]   | [x]   |
| From the moment of adoption onwards, the programme will use reimbursement of Union contribution based on financing not linked to costs in accordance with Article 95 of the Common Provisions Regulation | [ ]   | [x]   |

# Appendix 1: Union contribution based on unit costs, lump sums and flat rates

## A. Summary of the main elements

| Specific objective | Estimated proportion of the total financial allocation within the priority to which the SCO will be applied in % | Type(s) of operation covered | Indicator triggering reimbursement (2) | Unit of measurement for the indicator triggering reimbursement | Type of SCO (standard scale of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates) | Amount (in EUR) or percentage (in case of flat rates) of the SCO |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Code(1) | Description | Code(2) | Description |

(1) This refers to the code in Annex VI of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF Regulations.

(2) This refers to the code of a common indicator, if applicable.

Appendix 1: Union contribution based on unit costs, lump sums and flat rates

## B. Detailed information by type of operation

## C. Calculation of the standard scale of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates

#### 1. Source of data used to calculate the standard scale of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates (who produced, collected and recorded the data; where the data are stored; cut-off dates; validation, etc.):

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#### 2. Please specify why the proposed method and calculation based on Article 94(2) CPR is relevant to the type of operation.

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#### 3. Please specify how the calculations were made, in particular including any assumptions made in terms of quality or quantities. Where relevant, statistical evidence and benchmarks should be used and, if requested, provided in a format that is usable by the Commission.

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#### 4. Please explain how you have ensured that only eligible expenditure was included in the calculation of the standard scale of unit cost, lump sum or flat rate:

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#### 5. Assessment of the audit authority(ies) of the calculation methodology and amounts and the arrangements to ensure the verification, quality, collection and storage of data.

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# Appendix 2: Union contribution based on financing not linked to costs

## A. Summary of the main elements

| Specific objective | The amount covered by the financing not linked to costs | Type(s) of operation covered | Conditions to be fulfilled/results to be achieved triggering reimbursement by the Commission | Indicators | Unit of measurement for the conditions to be fulfilled/results to be achieved triggering reimbursement by the Commission | Envisaged type of reimbursement method used to reimburse the beneficiary or beneficiaries |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Code(1) | Description | Code(2) | Description |

(1) This refers to the code in Annex VI of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF Regulations.

(2) This refers to the code of a common indicator, if applicable.

## B. Detailed information by type of operation

# Annex 3

## Thematic instrument

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Procedure reference number | Programme version | Status | Date accepted/rejected | Comments |
| C(2021)8460 - 26 Nov 2021 - 1 | 1.1 | Accepted | 24 Oct 2022 |  |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Specific objective | Method | Type of intervention | Union contribution | Advance payment rate | Description of action |
| 2. Cross-border co-operation | Specific actions |   | 1,118,663.50 |  | The objective of this specific action is to develop complex and long-term EMPACT activities and actions, laid down in the operational action plans (OAPs) and implementing one or more common horizontal strategic goals (CHSGs) contained in the EMPACT multi-annual strategic plan (MASP) designed for the EMPACT cycle 2022-2025 (reference: Council document 10109/21 of 23 June 2021 (EU LIMITE). ISF/2022/SA/2.2.1/012 EMPACT EUR 108,000 - Spain is carrying out the project CCH - EUROPEAN OPERATIONAL TEAM Costa del Sol, mainly related to EMPACT CCH (Cannabis/Cocaine/Heroin), but also to EMPACT HRCN (High-Risk Criminal Networks), covering strategic goals n°1, 2, 3, 4 and 8. The project partnership is composed of Spain, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Serbia, UK, USA, Frontex and Europol. The Pilot Project is meant to establish a European Operational Team (EOT) in the Spanish region ‘Costa del Sol’, to develop and implement a joint investigative and operational strategy against the main criminal organisations and related High Value Targets (HVTs) affecting the EU Member States from the region. The activity of the EOT will be primarily aimed at identifying, investigating and dismantling HVTs and related organised criminal networks. The selection of HVTs and the establishment of related Operational Task Force (OTF) will be carried out in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure developed jointly by the EU Member States and Europol. ISF/2022/SA/2.2.1/008 EMPACT EUR 1.010.663,50 - Poland is carrying out the project CRYSTAL PALACE - General support for the EMPACT NPS and Synthetic Drugs platform under EMPACT 2022+ instrument for 36 months related to EMPACT “Production, trafficking and distribution of synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances”, covering strategic goals n°1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. The project partnership is composed of Poland, the Netherlands and Italy. The purpose of the project is the EU/international coordinated fight against the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs by identifying and dismantling organised crime groups and facilitators involved in the phenomenon. The trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique compared to other substances as the production of these drugs in most cases takes place in the EU and they are subsequently distributed on a global level and on European markets. The project will focus on strengthening the EU Law Enforcement capabilities in the several areas – including operational activities, exchange of experience and knowledge, capacity building and strategic cooperation. |
| TA.36(5). Technical assistance – flat rate (Article 36(5) of the Common Provisions Regulation) |   |   | 67,119.81 |  | TA |

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# DOCUMENTS

| Title of document | Type of document | Date of document | Local reference number | Commission reference number | Files | Date sent | Sender |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ISF METHODOLOGY – output and result indicators | Supplementary information | 7 Nov 2022 |  | Ares(2022)7667862 | ISF methodology – output and result indicators | 7 Nov 2022 | Skalska, Joanna |
| Programme snapshot 2021PL65ISPR001 1.1 | Data preview before sending | 7 Nov 2022 |  | Ares(2022)7667862 | Programme snapshot 2021PL65ISPR001 1.1 - Machine TranslatedMetodyka - FBW 2 - 07.11.2022 final\_wysłana w SFC.docxProgramme\_snapshot\_2021PL65ISPR001\_1.1\_pl.pdfProgramme\_snapshot\_2021PL65ISPR001\_1.1\_en.pdf | 7 Nov 2022 | Skalska, Joanna |