

## **POLAND-UK 2030 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP JOINT DECLARATION ON FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY AND DEFENCE**

### **Introduction**

The Republic of Poland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland share an historic partnership rooted in the defence of Euro-Atlantic security, stretching back to before the Second World War.

Our countries are strategic partners with a shared vision for foreign policy, security and defence. We co-operate closely as members of NATO, the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, OECD and WTO. Our partnership is deeply rooted in our commitment to promote and defend freedom and democracy.

The accelerating global transition towards a multi-polar, fragmented and contested international order places us in a period of heightened risk and volatility. Systemic competition has given us renewed purpose, reinvigorating our core alliances and partnerships. NATO, the bedrock of our security and collective defence, has increased in political and military strength. The realisation of NATO's Strategic Concept and full implementation of deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area is the cornerstone of our work. Strong transatlantic relations are indispensable to peace and stability in Europe.

Nine years after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and instigation of the conflict in Donbas, and 15 months since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, over 17.5 million people in Ukraine require humanitarian assistance; more than five million Ukrainians are internally displaced; and another six million have sought refuge across Europe. Poland and the United Kingdom, in concert with our allies and partners, offer our continued, unequivocal humanitarian support for Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons in Ukraine, which is bravely facing the bloodiest war in Europe since the Second World War. We stand strong in our joint endeavours to provide humanitarian support for Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes. We are resolute in our shared determination to see Ukrainians prevail with a just peace on Ukrainian terms.

Our unwavering support to Ukraine demonstrates we will act decisively in defence of our security; an open international order; international law; and the principles of the UN Charter. We are committed to supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity for as long as it takes in the face of Russia's illegal, full-scale invasion. Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Alliance security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia must be denied any benefit from its war of aggression and must incur significant costs that deter future belligerency, whether by Russia or others. We also recognise the further threat posed to our security and prosperity by Belarus' growing military and economic dependence on Russia.

Our countries will stand together in upholding a stable, resilient international system that protects States' freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity, defending their rights to trade fairly and determine their own futures. Both Poland and the UK, fully recognise the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements.

To achieve this, we are building the next generation of capabilities for our armed forces; conducting joint training exercises in support of air, land, sea, space and cyber operations; strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence posture; and standing united in our approaches

to the Indo-Pacific; state threats; hybrid activities; including the instrumentalisation of migrants; and to combatting illegal migration.

Today, our two countries reaffirm our unwavering commitment to supporting Ukraine and maintaining the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

We hereby establish a new strategic partnership, building upon the existing framework of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Defence and Security Co-operation, signed in Warsaw on 21 December 2017 ('the 2017 Treaty').

Together, we will ensure our co-operation is fit to meet the global and regional challenges we face in a rapidly changing world and undertake to deepen our co-operation on foreign policy, security and defence.

### **Euro-Atlantic security**

*Poland and the UK are committed to NATO, as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security and the bedrock of our collective defence. We will work together to ensure the implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept and the Concept of Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area to drive a stronger, more capable Alliance. While much of our effort is focused on the security of the Eastern flank, we must maintain NATO's 360-degree approach to protect every inch of NATO territory. We must be ready to tackle global threats and challenges, including hybrid threats to our own collective security. We will work closely together to sustain the OSCE, and to enhance NATO-EU co-operation on Euro-Atlantic security. Poland and the UK will continue, alongside Allies, to support Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina to increase their resilience and defence against the threats posed by Russia.*

#### **1. NATO: We commit to a joint programme of work to realise NATO's Strategic Concept and Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area.**

##### **We will:**

- 1.1. Strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence posture in line with the baseline agreed at the Madrid Summit in 2022. We will achieve this by working together to ensure that the Alliance has a robust enhanced Forward Presence on the Eastern flank - supported by the necessary plans, forces, enhanced command and control arrangements and prepositioning of stocks - to remain credible and capable of denying any potential adversary opportunity for aggression;
- 1.2. Work together to encourage all Allies to spend 2% GDP on defence as of 2024 as an enduring minimum and fully commit to the new Defence Investment Pledge;
- 1.3. Continue to work together within NATO to assess the implications of Russia's actions for our security.

#### **2. NATO Partnerships: we will continue our cooperation through NATO with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and BiH. To do this we will:**

- 2.1. Support Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations and support Ukraine on its path to NATO membership and enhance Ukraine's capacity to defend itself; and

- 2.2. Work together to strengthen NATO's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova to build their integrity, resilience and defence capacity;
3. **European Security: we will intensify our co-operation on European security outside NATO, including through the OSCE and with the EU. We will:**
  - 3.1. Work together to preserve the OSCE principles and values and enhance the effectiveness of its confidence and security building mechanisms once the conditions allow, and support all participating States to meet their OSCE commitments;
  - 3.2. Strengthen NATO-EU cooperation on defence and security, recognising the importance of EU initiatives permitting fair access to non-EU NATO Allies, in line with the objectives of the respective initiatives and the common goal of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security;
  - 3.3. Take steps to protect the integrity and competitiveness of Europe's defence industrial and technological base, recognising the importance of avoiding barriers to co-operation and providing the highest possible level of inclusiveness between EU and non-EU NATO Allies.

### **Russia and Eastern Europe**

*Recognising the horrors and devastation wreaked upon Ukraine and the atrocities committed there by Russia, and the threat to Allies posed by Belarus' growing military and economic dependence on Russia, we will intensify cooperation to protect ourselves and our allies from all forms of Russian coercion and aggression. Moreover, we will seek to constrain Russia's ability to undermine human rights, freedoms and democracy around the world, particularly of our partners in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans who are most vulnerable to Russian destabilisation. We also recognise strong potential to work together on countering Russia's malign influence in the South Caucasus. We remain steadfast behind Ukraine in its brave fight for freedom and self-determination and committed to our political, economic and security support for the long term. We recognise the imperative of delivering ongoing support to the Ukrainian people, including helping refugees to access food, medicine, and other essentials, and of keeping the Ukrainian economy afloat; while over the longer term co-operating closely in support of Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery.*

4. **Ukraine: Working with our international partners and in coordination with the Government of Ukraine, we will ensure Ukraine has the support it needs to defend itself, win the war and secure a fair and lasting peace. Over the longer term, we will assist Ukraine to deter and defend itself against any further aggression, to rebuild, to enable its economy to recover, and to set a more prosperous economic model than pre-invasion, while protecting and sustaining those who have fled Ukraine due to the war and holding Russia accountable for its actions.**

**The Government of Ukraine is rightfully clear that it needs its citizens to return to Ukraine, when it is safe to do so, to help rebuild and recover. We recognise the need to support Ukraine's pivot to NATO standard equipment, enabling interoperability and resupply, and its alignment with NATO's values. At the same time both parties recognise that it is necessary to give new impetus to NATO-Ukraine relations, moving them to a new, higher level. This applies to addressing Ukraine's Euro-**

**Atlantic aspirations and going beyond declarations referring to the decisions of NATO's Bucharest Summit. This will take sustained effort. Our bilateral and, where relevant, enhanced trilateral co-operation with Ukraine will support and strengthen this work. We will:**

- 4.1. Drive work with partners to support Ukraine to defend itself, including through closely coordinating ahead of key donor and assistance gatherings and mechanisms, e.g. the UDCG, IDCC, Security Assistance Group - Ukraine and International Fund for Ukraine. To this end we will consider supplementary formats of multinational financial and joint procurement mechanisms to expand military support to Ukraine;
  - 4.2. Facilitate joint industrial cooperation to repair and refurbish Ukraine Armed forces (UAF) equipment, while supporting the restructuring of the Ukrainian Defence Industrial base;
  - 4.3. Shape long term security assistance to Ukraine, including through enhanced interoperability; as well as working on supporting and further enabling Ukraine's significant progress towards future membership of NATO;
  - 4.4. Deepen our partnership in support of Ukraine's economic recovery and overall reconstruction, harnessing the power of IFIs and unlocking private sector collaboration;
  - 4.5. Deliver on the potential of the trilateral partnership, including through close collaboration on shared priorities;
  - 4.6. Enable Ukraine to export its produce in a timely manner, including grain, notably to the vulnerable Global South, helping Ukraine's economy, and reducing impacts on the wider world; and
  - 4.7. Strengthen the capacity of NGOs in Ukraine to support internally displaced people and voluntarily returning refugees and identify specific areas of assistance, support the rapid and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid workers to reach those in need, and for vulnerable communities to safely access vital humanitarian assistance wherever it is required.
5. **Russia: Intensify our cooperation on Russia and the wider Eastern Neighbourhood, in particular Ukraine and Belarus. Through the updated Poland-UK Russia Joint Action Plan and annual Russia-focused director level consultations, we will:**
- 5.1. Ensure the new Russia Human Rights Working Group operates as a long-term coordination mechanism for Russia human rights policy officials, developing joint tranches of human rights sanctions and a campaign by likeminded countries to use multilateral organisations (especially the UN Human Rights Committee and the OSCE) to hold Russia to account;
  - 5.2. Enhance the existing cooperation to expose and better counter immediate and long-terms threats from Russia's use of information operations and disinformation, primarily through the Poland-UK Counter Disinformation and Media Development Joint Action Programme. This effort will include sustained director level engagement, joint programme delivery aimed at societal resilience, joint campaign delivery and enhanced information sharing, cross-government expert level dialogue and bilateral engagement. We will work together through multilateral and

trilateral mechanisms to ensure a strong and coordinated international response on Russian information operations, in defence of our national security interest and liberal democratic values;

- 5.3. Deepen cooperation on sanctions through regular dialogues, dedicated staff exchanges and bilateral sanctions workshops. We commit to intensifying sanctions efforts for as long as Putin's forces remain in Ukraine, ensuring we maintain Western unity while eliminating circumvention routes, and to develop with the G7 a common economic security tool kit;
  - 5.4. Facilitate annual cyber consultations at director-level, exploring opportunities for joint cyber project work in support of Ukraine;
  - 5.5. Intensify co-ordinated support for Russian civil society, independent journalists, and human rights defenders in exile;
  - 5.6. Co-lead an officials-level, like-minded Small Group to consider the future of Belarus and how to support a pluralistic, democratic future for the country;
  - 5.7. Enhance and strengthen cooperation to share best practice and expertise in reducing our and partner reliance on Russian energy, weapons and food, particularly amongst V4, the Three Seas Initiative and NATO allies;
  - 5.8. Work more closely on assessment sharing and intelligence diplomacy including through increased sharing of eastern intelligence reporting and analysis, in pursuit of shared policy objectives;
  - 5.9. Commit to biannual analytical exchanges on Russia and the former Soviet region, in addition to informal exchanges/workshops on specific issues such as illegal migration;
  - 5.10. Reinvigorate our National Security Advisors' Annual Roundtable as an overarching mechanism to share analysis and understanding of live threats, supported by regular consultations on contingency planning for relevant security scenarios;.
  - 5.11. Continue building on Polish-UK convening power to generate consensus among allies and partners along the Eastern flank and broader Europe; and
  - 5.12. Decrease Russian malign influence by continuing to develop and align counter-Russia approaches and priorities; and continuing to build on our existing intelligence relationships.
6. **Western Balkans: Working with the Quint and G7, we will strengthen stability, democracy and the rule of law, and help develop resilience to Russian malign influence and coercion, which seeks to destabilise the region and undermine its Euro-Atlantic trajectory. The stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans is vital for Euro-Atlantic security. We recognise the need to enhance its security, defence capabilities, and increase its energy security to counter Russian influence. We support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and promote the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in support of the EU-facilitated Dialogue. We will:**
- 6.1. Coordinate on energy security across the Western Balkans to reduce dependence on Russia;

- 6.2. Support the region's counter-disinformation and cyber security capabilities;
- 6.3. Continue to support the safe and secure environment in Kosovo through our continued commitments to NATO's KFOR;
- 6.4. Work together politically to support the OSCE's field missions across the region; and
- 6.5. Coordinate relevant lobbying activity.

### **Global Challenges/Foreign Policy**

**7. The Multilateral System: With our allies and likeminded partners, we will protect and empower the multilateral system to champion our values for a free and open rules-based international order. We will defend international law and convention, pushing back against those who seek authoritarian alternatives. This will include but is not limited to:**

- 7.1. Working together within the UN Security Council, the General Assembly and the whole UN system to hold Russia accountable for its aggression on Ukraine and to support Ukraine;
- 7.2. Cooperating closely to support Ukraine and hold Russia to account across UNESCO's mandate (education, cultural heritage & property, science collaboration and media freedom);
- 7.3. Working together through UNODC to counter transnational organised crime, prevent trafficking and support criminal justice reform;
- 7.4. Work together to help sustain effective leader level dialogue of the European Political Community on priority pan-European issues including on energy, security and migration;
- 7.5. Support closer cooperation to improve migration management at a UK-EU level, including upstream along migration routes to Europe. This will include cooperation with Frontex, underpinned by a Working Arrangement, and other instruments and agencies, and a willingness to work towards an EU-UK cooperation agreement on migration;
- 7.6. Working together towards strengthening the OSCE and the effectiveness of its conflict-preventing mechanisms, building on Poland's 2022 term as Chair-in-Office;
- 7.7. Committing to Ministerial/Senior Official participation at Poland/United Kingdom led events, such as the Warsaw Security Forum and CYBERUK;
- 7.8. Working closely as members of the OECD to implement the Ukraine Country Programme and support the activities of the newly established OECD Ukraine Liaison Office in Kyiv;
- 7.9. Working together to give Geodiversity the place it deserves in sustainable development and our response to climate change.

8. **Indo-Pacific:** We will work together with our partners to support a free and open Indo-Pacific, promoting freedom, democracy and sovereignty, challenging malign actors seeking to destabilise the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. We recognise that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are inextricably linked.

We recognise the systemic challenge of China and its increasing international assertiveness.

We call on China to comply with its international obligations, including on human rights, in particular in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. We continue to call upon China to not provide material assistance to Russia or Russian proxies in Russia's illegal war in Ukraine. We emphasise that our basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We will continue to seek development of constructive bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China as well as preserve space for cooperation with China on common global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss and pandemic prevention. We will:

- 8.1. Co-operate with the US, European partners, NATO Allies and regional actors to support free and sustainable economic growth in the region, uphold global norms and principles, and defend our interests and shared values;
- 8.2. Commit to enhance information sharing and collaboration with international partners to increase our resilience in the face of arbitrary and coercive economic policies and practices, countering disinformation, and academic interference;
- 8.3. Scope dialogues to develop understanding of military-civil fusion, dual-use strategies, military modernisation and the risks posed by China's increasing overseas influence, particularly through military basing.

### **Military Capability and Operations**

*The Poland-UK defence relationship is the closest it has been in recent history. Building on the formalisation of the relationship through the 2017 Poland-UK Defence Treaty, both countries have sought to cohere military, political, and industrial activity to develop an effective defence partnership with an increasingly compelling voice for security and stability at the heart of transatlantic security. Both countries have high ambition to modernise our armed forces and build shared capability across all five operational domains - air, sea, land, space and cyber. Combined with enhanced joint training, exercising and military education, this will allow us to jointly develop and deploy next generation capability, delivering NATO's Concept of Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and significantly increasing transatlantic deterrence and defence by 2030.*

9. **Contribution to the security of NATO Eastern flank:** We will continue to develop closer working relationships between UK and Polish forces, including UK contribution to NATO Allies armed forces presence in Poland.

- 9.1. At the NATO Madrid Summit, Allies agreed on further strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence posture. An increase of forces and capabilities to conduct multi-domain operations at NATO's Eastern Flank is an essential part of this

process. Allies made a decision to move towards deterrence by denial and forward defences concepts. One of the concepts being developed is the mechanism by which framework nations reinforce enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups to brigade-level. Poland and UK will strive to make visible progress in this regard.

9.2. Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has led to an unprecedented increase in the threat of a Russian attack on NATO. Facing this new strategic reality, Allies are developing a new NATO Force Model that would strengthen the NATO Force Structure. This includes, increasing the pool of high readiness forces, aligned to the operational plans and with the necessary authorities SACEUR requires to execute them. We will strive to ensure substantial and high readiness combat forces required to implement the new Family of Plans.

9.3. Command and Control is fundamental for any Allied operation. Poland and the UK are committed to a more responsive and effective command structure that facilitates multi-domain operations and delivers digital transformation. The guiding principles should be the ability to perform collective defence tasks across domains and ensuring executability of the new family of plans

10. **Capability Co-operation: We will substantially increase joint defence and industrial capability. We will build on a shared understanding of the threats faced by Poland, the UK, and our Allies and of the next generation capabilities needed to deter and defend against them. Where possible we will use the introduction into service of common equipment and capabilities to bring our militaries together to drive interoperability and understanding over the next ten years. In the near-term we will agree a wide range of capability projects where Poland and the UK are best suited to work together. In the medium to long-term we will facilitate the deepening and diversification of the capability relationship by creating a Joint Policy Hub/Programme Office. We will:**

10.1. Continue cooperating in support of our respective industries in the development, production, and delivery of the AH140 frigate to the Polish Armed Forces and on the development of the Miecznik programme;

10.2. Continue Cooperating in support of modernising the Polish Armed Forces Very-Short-Range Air Defence programme, Pilica+;

10.3. Commit to deliver the NAREW programme with the CAMM family of missiles and to form a longer-term relationship and strategic partnership in the field of complex weapons;

10.4. Support the delivery of an urgent operational requirement, the Malan component of Poland's air defence capability;

10.5. Progress cooperation in support of our respective industries in the common development of a future common missile based on the Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM) family;

10.6. Build on recent successes to explore opportunities to deliver a pan-European air defence offer for other NATO Allies; and



- 10.7. Deepen cooperation between our respective defence, cyber and security industries including on third-country exports, and on opening trade access for defence SMEs.
11. **Professional Military & Diplomatic Education:** We will develop and cohere the professional capability of both Armed Forces by agreeing to deepen our educational ties. Building a shared operating culture and bettering each other's understanding of our respective doctrines and procedures will facilitate combined operations of the future. We commit to furthering our educational co-operation across all phases of military and diplomatic education. We will do so by:
- 11.1. Exploring deeper Polish access to UK Tier 1 Courses at initial officer, mid-career and senior officer training:
    - 11.1.1. Initial officer Training (Dartmouth/Sandhurst/Cranwell);
    - 11.1.2. Mid-career Training (Advanced Command & Staff Course); and
    - 11.1.3. Senior officer training (Royal College of Defence Studies).
  - 11.2. Exploring increased attendance of UK personnel on Polish training/staff courses;
  - 11.3. Investigating further service personnel exchanges to operational HQ's/UK Armoured division/UK Standing joint Force HQ and Polish Equivalents;
  - 11.4. Enlarging the annual Joint Diplomats training with a focus on security policy development and implementation in multilateral fora; and
  - 11.5. A programme of secondments within MFAs, Defence Departments and Prime Ministerial Chancelleries focusing on defence and security.
12. **Joint Training and Exercising:** We will increase the intensity and frequency of joint training and exercising. We will build on our greater commonality of capability and educational understanding by increasing the frequency and intensity at which our armed forces train and exercise together. This will ensure we develop a joint and combined capacity to identify threats and operate together to counter them. We will:
- 12.1. Immediately task our single Services to commit to scoping at least one joint training opportunity for 2024;
  - 12.2. Task our single Services to conduct annual Staff Talks, the first to be held in the fourth quarter of 2023; and
  - 12.3. Further task our Single Service Staff Talks to develop a Year 1 (2024-25) and Years 2-3 (2025-27) forward look that identifies new opportunities for training plans and exercise programmes.
13. **Cyber:** We will enhance and develop cyber cooperation across Governments, bringing in defence and intelligence components as well as trusted industry partners into a single, coherent approach. This renewed and refocused effort will support our operational cooperation and reinforce mutual commitments to a safer cyber environment. We will:
- 13.1. Agree a joint programme of activity, sharing experience and expertise;


- 13.2. Share analysis, intelligence and data, to counter cyberattacks and strengthen Cyber resilience;
  - 13.3. Expand operational cooperation on cybercrime, continuing to deepen partnerships across law enforcement platforms; and
  - 13.4. Revitalise existing Bilateral Cyber Consultations and agree to regular senior-level Cyber-focused engagement to deliver against this strand, as well as working together in support of the V4 regional cyber defence forum; and
14. **State Threats: We will bolster cooperation and collaboration on countering state threats and hybrid activity. We will:**
- 14.1. Share latest analysis to increase awareness and understanding of threats; and
  - 14.2. Hold an annual Poland-UK dialogue to increase expertise, build capability and consider joint action to practically counter state threats.

## Delivery


15. **Oversight:** This Partnership will be overseen by our Foreign and Defence Ministers, meeting bilaterally and through the annual Quadriga meeting, to ensure the full delivery of this document and support its updating. They will be supported as necessary by meetings between other Ministers, Security Policy Directors, Defence Policy Directors Political Directors, and other Officials.

**Communication:** We will work together on strategic communications to support delivery of our Strategic Partnership and keep our publics updated on progress against our commitments. Our communications teams will work together to ensure messaging is timely and appropriately disseminated. This will include Ministerial and Senior Official public engagement on the Partnership.

London, 5 July 2023




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Minister of Foreign Affairs  
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**The Rt Hon James Cleverly MP**  
Secretary of State for Foreign,  
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