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Ministry of Digital Affairs

The Polish perspective  
on Cloud Computing  
**Cybersecurity  
Requirements**



Ministry  
of Digital Affairs


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# Act on National Cybersecurity System – NIS in Poland

On 5 July 2018, the Polish Parliament passed the Act on the National Cybersecurity System (“ANCS” J. of Laws 2018.1560), which enter into force on 28 August 2018.

The ANCS implements the provisions of the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (“NIS Directive”).



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Done?

# National Standards for Cybersecurity (NSC)

## Cybersecurity Requirements / Baselines / Recommendations



# Cybersecurity requirements for WIIP – Government Cloud and Public Cloud use

## Cybersecurity in WIIP PROGRAM

Government Cloud  
Datacenters security  
requirements  
(WIIP – Appendix 1)

Cloud model  
classification criteria  
(WIIP – Appendix 2)

RKB – Government  
Cybersecurity Cluster

- SOC
- NOC
- Interconnections  
security

SCCO – Cybersecurity  
Requirements for Cloud  
Computing

Other initiatives  
e.g. PWCyber –  
Cybersecurity  
Cooperation  
Program with  
vendors and service  
providers

## Standardy Cyberbezpieczeństwa Chmur Obliczeniowych (SCCO)

# SCCO – Cybersecurity Standards for Cloud Computing

## • SCCO Background and Goals

- Integral part of National Standards for Cybersecurity (NSC) !
- Standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring of cloud based services
- Introduction for Cloud Computing deployment and service models
- Definition of Cloud Computing Cybersecurity Impact Levels (C3IL)
- Practical mapping between C3IL and Security Controls/Measures
- Future references to EU wide Cloud Computing Certification Program

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# SCCO – Cloud Computing deployment and delivery models

**NIST**  
National Institute of  
Standards and Technology  
U.S. Department of Commerce

Special Publication 800-145

## The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing

Recommendations of the National Institute  
of Standards and Technology

Peter Mell  
Timothy Grance



7 January 2016

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DOCUMENT  
AC/322-D(2016)0001

### CONSULTATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL BOARD (C3B) NATO Cloud Computing Policy

References: (a) AC/322-N(2015)0050-REV4-AS1, 7 Jan 2016  
(b) AC/322-N(2015)0050-REV4, 16 Dec 2015

1. On 7 January 2016, Ref. (a), the C3 Board agreed the NATO Cloud Computing Policy.
2. At Annex 1 is a clean version of the policy incorporating Ref. (b) with strikethrough and bold changes removed.

(Signed)  
M. Rotermund

Annex 1: NATO Cloud Computing Policy  
1 Annex  
1 Appendix

Action Officer: LTC Klaus-H. Echterbeck  
Original: English

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# SCCO – Security Objectives and Potential Impact – Security Category

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
Based on FIPS PUB 199

Security Category (SC) of an information system is:

SC information system = { (confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact) },

where the acceptable values for potential impact are LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH

$$SC = (x, x, x)$$



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Security Objectives	POTENTIAL IMPACT		
	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
<p><b>Confidentiality</b></p> <p>Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.</p>	<p>The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>
<p><b>Integrity</b></p> <p>Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.</p>	<p>The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>
<p><b>Availability</b></p> <p>Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.</p>	<p>The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>	<p>The disruption of access to or use of information or an information system could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.</p>



# SCCO – Security Requirements Areas

Based on FIPS PUB 200

- Access Control (AC)
- Awareness and Training (AT)
- Audit and Accountability (AU)
- Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (CA)
- Configuration Management (CM)
- Contingency Planning (CP)
- Identification and Authentication (IA)
- Incident Response (IR)
- Maintenance (MA)
- Media Protection (MP)
- Physical and Environmental Protection (PE)
- Planning (PL)
- Personnel Security (PS)
- Risk Assessment (RA)
- System and Services Acquisition (SA)
- System and Communications Protection (SC)
- System and Information Integrity (SI)

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Areas


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# SCCO – Cloud Stack Model

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VIEW  
ON CLOUD




# SCCO – Cloud Computing Roles and Responsibilities


Cloud Roles

- **Cloud Consumer** – a person or organization that maintains a business relationship with, and uses service from, Cloud Providers
- **Cloud Provider** – a person, organization, or entity responsible for making a service available to interested parties
- **Cloud Auditor** – a party that can conduct independent assessment of cloud services, information system operations, performance and security of the cloud implementation
- **Cloud Broker** – an entity that manages the use, performance and delivery of cloud services, and negotiates relationships between Cloud Providers and Cloud Consumers
- **Cloud Carrier** – an intermediary that provides connectivity and transport of cloud services from Cloud Providers to Cloud Consumers

# SCCO – Cloud Computing security reference architecture



# SCCO – Risk Management Framework application for secure Cloud Computing



Based on NIST SP 500-299 - NIST Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture

# SCCO – Cloud Computing Cybersecurity (c3)

## Impact Levels – C3IL

• C3 Impact Level 4 – Classified Information (not included in WIIP)

• C3 Impact Level 3 – Controlled Sensitive Official Information

• C3 Impact Level 2 – Controlled Official Information

• C3 Impact Level 1 – Non-Controlled Unclassified Information

WIIP

# SCCO – Cloud Computing Cybersecurity (c3)

## Impact Levels – C3IL

### • C3 Impact Level 1 – Non-Controlled Unclassified Information

- Public Cloud processing allowed ✓
- Includes all data approved for public access with a low level of confidentiality
- Internet access to services allowed ✓
- Includes public information that:
  - does not contain personal data subject to protection
  - is not a legally protected information
  - may have copyright-related restrictions
- Consequences of disclosure:
  - no negative consequences of access by unauthorized persons or consequences in the form of legal effects related to copyright
- Level 1 supports **LOW** level of confidentiality and a maximum of **MODERATE** integrity level  $SC = (L, M, x)$ .

# SCCO – Cloud Computing Cybersecurity (c3)

## Impact Levels – C3IL

- C3 Impact Level 2 – Controlled Official Information

- Public Cloud within Polish jurisdiction
- Data relevant to the statutory operation of a public administration, available without restriction to the staff of the institution or on the basis of confidentiality agreements
- Level 2 includes public information that:
  - Contains personal data subject to statutory protection (GDPR)
  - Information containing the trader's secret, including trade secrets protected
- Consequences of disclosing information:
  - The negative consequences of unauthorized access – breach of Data Protection Act; reach of the laws on the protection of trade secrets, the breach of the trade secret and, consequently, may trigger certain Statutory sanctions (e.g. article 23 of the Public Information Provision Act).
- Level 2 supports information with **MODERATE** level of confidentiality and **MODERATE** integrity level SC = (M, M, H).

# SCCO – Cloud Computing Cybersecurity (c3)

## Impact Levels – C3IL

- C3 Impact Level 3 – Controlled Sensitive Official Information

- Government Cloud Only
- Level 3 includes sensitive, legally protected information and referential national registries data – defined in dedicated legislation (incl. data critical to Public Safety)
- Level 3 supports HIGH level of confidentiality and HIGH level of integrity information: SC = (H, H, H).



# SCCO - Cloud model classification criteria (WIIP - Appendix 2)

## General Explanation:

The categories of electronic systems presented in the table are in principle disaggregated. The category distinction criterion takes into account the main types of electronic systems operating in public authorities and their main aspects, from the point of view of security of cloud computing, characteristics and intended use. In Practice, it may be possible for a system to qualify for two or more categories. If the explanations for each category do not show precedence for a given category about the processing capability of a particular type of cloud, the analysis of the individual system is determined.

The absence of a designation in the form X in the column "Bcancer of the cloud services specified in the resolution" means that the system should be maintained using cloud services (Cloud Priority principle), and The type of allowable cloud services depends on the sign in the table.

Designation X in the column "Bthe possibility of using the cloud services specified in the resolution" and the column "Governmental cloud computing" means the ability to maintain the system within a dedicated Infrastructure (DIT) or Government cloud computing, depending on the outcome of the analysis.

Similarly, the rules apply to other classifications.

Lp.	System category	The inability to use the cloud services specified in the resolution <sup>1</sup> (Need to use dedicated ICT infrastructure-DIT)	Government cloud Computing	Public cloud computing in national jurisdiction	Public cloud computing IN EU country jurisdiction	Explanations for each category
1.	Electronic systems in which classified information is processed.	X	Gov Cloud			This applies to systems which, directly from the provisions of the laws, are defined as classified systems or for which the competent authorities have

# SCCO Impact Levels and Security Requirements

SCCO IMPACT LEVEL	INFORMATION SENSITIVITY	SECURITY CONTROLS	LOCATION	OFF-PREMISES CONNECTIVITY	SEPARATION	PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
1	Non-Controlled Unclassified Information	SCCO LOW & MODERATE	Outside or Inside Polish Jurisdiction	Internet	Virtual / Logical PUBLIC COMMUNITY	Personnel vetted by CSP
2	Controlled Official Information	Level 1 + CUI-Specific Tailored Set	Inside Polish Jurisdiction	Internet + NSC	Virtual / Logical Limited "Public" Community Strong Virtual Separation Between Tenant Systems & Information	Personnel vetted by GOV, Personnel hired by CSP
3	Controlled Sensitive Official Information	Level 2 + RKB	Polish GOV premises	RKB	Virtual / Logical GOV COMMUNITY Dedicated Multi-Tenant Infrastructure Physically Separate from Non-GOV Systems Strong Virtual Separation Between Tenant Systems & Information	Personnel vetted and hired by GOV
4	National Security Classified Information	Level 3 + Classified Security Controls	Polish GOV Security Accredited premises	Classified Security Accredited Networks	Security Accredited Virtual / Logical GOV COMMUNITY Dedicated Multi-Tenant Infrastructure Physically Separate from Non-GOV Systems	Personnel vetted and hired by GOV - National Security Clearance



# SCCO – Security Requirements for C3ILs

- Security Controls based on the **Low, Moderate, and High** baselines recommended in NIST SP 800-53(R5 Draft) catalog of security controls

POL / SCCO vs. US / Fed RAMP

- SCCO leverage the work done as part of the US FedRAMP assessment methodology, and adding specific security controls and requirements necessary to meet Public Sector and Critical Information Infrastructure requirements defined in the Polish legislation

Based on NIST SP 800-53

Thank you...

The Polish perspective on  
Cloud Computing  
Cybersecurity  
Requirements

and now Discussion in Panel...

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# EXPERT PANEL DISCUSSION

Cyber security and certification – the CEE administration and business perspective

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