Poland in Iraq

1. The Power of Treaties

We trusted our allies. Poland entered the war full of faith in the power of Treaties it had concluded with its European partners since the early 1920s. The earliest of these agreements was the Polish-French Agreement of February 19, 1921. Signed in Paris by the foreign ministers Aristides Briand and Eustachy Sapieha, it was a way to stablisize position of a young Polish state in the face of a possible threat from Germany. The accompanying secret military convention provided that in the event of German aggression both countries would provide "effective and quick assistance". The Polish-Romanian convention on the defense covenant signed in Bucharest two weeks later and extended in 1926 bound Poland and Romania with the obligation of mutual defense against any external assault.

The USSR, although difficult to recognize as Poland's ally, was, however, a party to the non-aggression pact concluded on July 25, 1932, in which both states "renounced war as a tool of national policy in their mutual relations and undertook to refrain from any aggressive actions or from assault on one another. " In May 1934, the non-aggression pact was extended to December 31, 1945. So it was mandatory on September 17, 1939, when the USSR troops entered eastern Poland! Just before the outbreak of war, a key role in ensuring Poland's security was to be played by the Polish-British mutual assistance agreement, hurriedly negotiated during the period of intensifying Polish-German relations, and signed on August 25, 1939. The agreement provided for immediate military assistance in the event of German aggression against one of the signatories.

Illustration caption:

The text of the secret protocol to the Polish-British mutual assistance agreement of August 25, 1939, with the seals and signatures of Ambassador Edward Raczyński and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Lord Halifax.

 

2. Minister Beck's cipher cable

So, war! On September 1, 1939, immediately after the German attack, the activities of Polish diplomacy focused on the implementation of the provisions contained in alliance agreements with Britain and France. The most important tasks faced the ambassadors in London - Edward Raczyński, and in Paris - Juliusz Łukasiewicz, to which Minister Józef Beck sent a cable on 1 September before 7 am: "1. I would like to ask the Ambassador to inform the Government in which you are accredited that despite Polish cooperation in the initiative of Britain, known to the Allied governments, the German army attacked Polish territory at dawn, and at the same time aviation is bombing many places. 2. The Polish government resolved to defend Poland's independence and honor to the end, is convinced that, in accordance with the existing treaties, it will receive immediate assistance from the Allies in this fight. "

Britain and France, fulfilling their obligations, declared war on the Third Reich on 3 September. Unfortunately, Poland did not receive the military support it hoped for. The French and British armies did not start military action against Germany.

Illustration caption:

Cipher cable register of the Legacy of the Republic of Poland in The Hague with Minister Beck’s cable of September 1 with instructions to notify the local government of German aggression. The cable of the same content was also sent to other Polish embassies and legations.

 

3. The desperate mission of ambassador Lipski

What happened after the outbreak of the war with the Polish embassy in Berlin, ambassador Józef Lipski and diplomats working in the Third Reich? After the German attack on Poland, Lipski was evacuated to Copenhagen on September 3 along with the staff of the embassy and consulate general in Berlin. There he decided to take a desperate step. He decided to return to Poland and, despite the chaos of war, seek Minister Beck to personally provide him with information about the last hours preceding the outbreak of the war in Berlin. Utilizing all transport possibilities, heading through Stockholm, Helsinki, Tallinn and Riga, he reached Vilnius on 9 September. From there, he passed through Baranovichi, Rivne and Dubno to Krzemieniec and Kut, where he managed to personally report to the Head of the Ministry before the government crossed the Polish-Romanian border. Then he wanted to return to Warsaw, but this proved impossible.

Further wartime fate of ambassador Lipski turned out to be equally amazing and dramatic. On September 18 he found himself in Romania, from where he traveled to France and volunteered for the formation of the Polish Army. In the training camp in Coëtquidan he graduated from cadets and after a German attack on France he fought in the ranks of the 1st Grenadier Division. Taken captive by the Germans, he escaped from the Alsace camp and through France and Spain managed to get to London. He was promoted to second lieutenant, from November 1940 to September 1946, he was a political advisor and liaison officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of three successive chief leaders - Władysław Sikorski, Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Władysław Anders.

Illustration caption:

Józef Lipski (on the right) as an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, in Cairo, on November 13, 1943, in conversation with Colonel Antoni Szymański, who in 1939 was a military attaché at the Polish Embassy in Berlin, later found himself in Soviet captivity and left the USSR with the Polish Army; the conversation in Cairo was the first meeting of both diplomats since September 1939.

 

 

4. A note that Ambassador Grzybowski did not accept

On September 17, Rzeczpospolita fighting the German invasion received a stab in the back. At dawn, about one and a half million soldiers troops of the Red Army entered the eastern territories of Poland. Thus, the Soviet Union realized its political intention to extend its zone of interest, included in a secret protocol to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which was signed on August 23, 1939 by the Foreign Ministers of the Third Reich and the USSR - Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov.

Shortly before the beginning of the aggression, at 3 in the morning, the USSR Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Potemkin, summoned the Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski, and tried to give him a note justifying the entry of the Red Army into Poland. The Ambassador rejected its argument about the disappearance of the Polish state and refused to accept the document. The text of the note - obtained from Russian diplomats in Romania thanks to contacts of the Polish embassy in Bucharest - reached the hands of Minister Beck while being in Kuty on the Polish-Romanian border on 17 September around noon. The Minister accepted the Ambassador's conduct and instructed the staff of four Polish branches - the embassy in Moscow, consulates general in Kiev and Minsk, and the consulate in Leningrad - to leave the USSR. The decision of the Soviet authorities stood in the way of evacuation, which granted diplomatic privileges to Ambassador Grzybowski, but refused them to other diplomats. The Russians changed their position and issued exit visas to Poles after the intervention of Western powers' ambassadors. Polish diplomatic staff could not leave the USSR until October 10. Despite efforts and interventions, Polish Consul General in Kiev Jerzy Matusiński had not been found. Presumably he was arrested and murdered by the NKVD. "We are at war with Russia by the very fact of aggression. (...) For a state of war to occur, a formal declaration is not a prerequisite. The Russian-Japanese War of 1904 or the Polish-German War of 1939 are classic examples of this, "commented a few months later the state of Polish-Soviet relations, former Foreign Minister Jan Szembek.

Illustration caption:

Cable from the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bucharest with the text of the Soviet note of September 17, 1939.

 

Edition: Ambassador Marek Pernal